[2025] UKUT 168 (AAC)

In giving directions on the appeal, I commented that insofar as the FTT purported to set out an alternative basis for its decision in paragraph 14 of its statement of reasons (even assuming that as a matter of law such an alternative basis for the decision was open to the FTT given the sole basis for the decision it had seemingly given in the Decision Notice), it was arguable given the decision in R(TC)1/05 that it was not for the FTT to extend time for an ‘any grounds’ revision under regulation 4 of the Social Security and Child Support (Decision and Appeals) Regulations 1999.

The oral hearing of the appeal took place before me on 25 February 2025. Through Mr Howell, the issues on the Secretary of State’s appeal were said to amount to two:

“(1)

whether the FTT erred in law, in holding that where a customer who has attained pensionable age makes a claim for state pension from a particular date within the limits contained in regs 15B(2) and 19(1) of the Claims and Payments Regulations, that date can be changed after an award has been made on the claim; and

(2)

to the extent the FTT so held, whether it erred in law in holding that the Secretary of State should have investigated the claim further, as a matter of “good practice” or otherwise”.

The essence of the Secretary of State’s argument on the first issue was that where a person claims state pension after attaining pensionable age, the effect of the statutory provisions on their proper construction is that the claimant must choose the date on which their entitlement is to begin, subject only to the time limits contained in regulations. Provided those express time limits are complied with, that date (and so the extent, if any, of deferment of a customer’s entitlement) is a matter for the claimant alone to determine, rather than a matter for the Secretary of State. Further, the statutory scheme further does not permit the claimant to alter their choice after an award on the claim has been made. The critical issue was whether the Secretary of State’s decision was correct at the time it was made. In this case the decision was plainly correct at the time it was made on the information given in the claim. Moreover, Miah does not provide any authority to the contrary.

The claimant, as a litigant-in-person and not being a lawyer, was quite understandably not able to make legal arguments on these issues. He and his wife told me about numerous phone calls they had made to the Pensions Service within the Department for Work and Pensions to, as they put it, “put matters right”, and were concerned that these calls had not been acknowledged. These phone calls, however, were all made after the 17 August 2002 decision had been made on the claim by the Secretary of State. The claimant further told me that he did not think he could put down a date in the past in answer to the question on the claim form “What date do you want to get your State Pension from?”. I have to say that it is not readily apparent why a past date could not be provided by way of an answer, particularly where (as here) the claimant knew he had reached his (state) pensionable age a year earlier and taking account of information that may have been available to help with claiming the state pension, including from when to claim it if the claim is made after pensionable age. However, the claimant candidly accepted he had made a mistake in answering this question on the claim form. The issue on this appeal is whether the statutory scheme allowed for that mistake to rectified once the claim had been decided.

I will address and set out as is necessary the relevant aspects of the statutory scheme as I consider the grounds of appeal.