Case No. UKUT-00118-(IAC)

12. The correct analysis of the Secretary of State’s decisions, considered in their statutory context, is in our judgment the following: (a) By the impugned decisions the Secretary of State conveyed to the Appellants that an order depriving them of their British citizenship under section 40(2) of the 1981 Act was forthcoming: a classic “minded to decide” notification or notice of intention. The language of section 40(5) is “notice”. (b) Simultaneously, the Secretary of State notified an intention to defer making such an order in the event of an appeal being pursued: this was a voluntary act, not mandated by the statute. (c) The pursuit of an unsuccessful appeal would give rise to the making of a deprivation of citizenship order (and a further notification to this effect): this is portrayed as a virtual inevitability. (d) In the event of an order being made, the Secretary of State would give consideration to removing or deporting the Appellants from the United Kingdom. 13. The course adopted by the Secretary of State’s decision-making process in these cases therefore contemplates two further stages. First, the making of a formal deprivation of British Citizenship order in each case, in the event of an unsuccessful appeal. Second, further to the latter order, a removal decision or deportation order. We observe that if the second further stage is reached in any of the Appellants’ cases, it will involve all of the formalities, procedures, rights and protections which decisions of this kind entail. We shall revisit the significance of this infra . 14. Given the factual and legal context outlined above, it is unnecessary to consider the hypothetical question of whether a deprivation of citizenship order may lawfully be made in circumstances where an appeal to the tribunal against a “notice of intention” decision is pending.