Case No. UKUT-00090-(IAC)

32. The fact that, as is evident from the e ntrance clearance o fficer’s decis ion, that officer did not accept the strength of the asserted family life between the appellant and her relatives in the United Kingdom , including her alleged dependants, does not, of cou rse, cast doubt on whether a human rights claim was being made. On the contrary, these passages of the decision make it plain, in our view, that the e ntry c learance o fficer was examining these matters as ECHR Article 8 issues , in order to decide , in all the circumstances, whether the appellant should be re - admitted as a returning resident. 33. As we have seen, paragraph 19 of the immigration rules confers a broad discretion on the entry clearance officer . In the particular circumstances of this case, it accordingly matter s not whether the entry clearance officer was considering the human rights claim of the appellant as an aspect of the decision whether to g rant entry clearance under the r ules or, alternatively, whether to do so outside the r ules, expressly by reference to Article 8. T he statement in the decision that refusing the application “is proportionate under the immigration r ules” probably indicates that the entry clearance officer was taking the former course. In either event, however, the entry clearance officer was refusing the appellant ’s h uman r ights claim. 34. As we have also seen, the entry clearance manager’s review expressly considered the appellant ’s A rticle 8 rights. The entry clearance manager was responding to the grounds of appeal. These contended that “refusing appellant to join her family in the UK would violate her human right under A rticle 8 ECHR” , on the basis that the: “ appellant has strong connections in the UK . All her close relatives liv e in the UK . Her father and sister (British Citizens) live in the UK ” [and] appellant no longer ha s any close relatives in Sierra Leone ”. There were also said to be “exceptional reasons why appellant lived outside the UK for over two years”. 35. As a matter of law, the issue of whether a h uman r ights claim has been refused must be judged by reference to the decision which is said to constitute the refusal of such a claim. The e ntry c learance m anager ’s review cannot , for this purpose, be part of that earlier decision. If a person has not made an application which constitutes , in law , a human rights claim, she cannot c hange that position by raising h uman r ights i ssues in her grounds of appeal t o the T ribunal. By the same token, the entry clearance manager’s review cannot re- characterise a decision of the r espondent which was not, in its own terms, the refusal of a human r ights claim. 36. That said, however , both the grounds of appeal and, more particularly , the terms of the entrance clearance manager’s review, may, depending on the circumstances, shed light on the true nature of the application and its refusal. In the present case, the entry clearance manager’s review may, w e consider, be seen as casting light on what the entry clearance officer had been doing when she refused the appellant ’s application. 37. For these reasons, based on the application and its accompanying materials, we find that the appellant made a human rights claim, which was refused by the entry clearance officer on 2 6 June 2015. The statement in the notice of decision, that the appellant had a right of appeal to the Tribunal , was, accordingly, entirely correct. 38. Although it has played no part in our determination of the jurisdictional issue, we should perhaps mention that matters have moved on, in that witness statements have been filed which assert that the appellant was returned to Sierra Leone by her father in 2004, as some sort of punishment for her unruly behaviour. Whether there is any truth in this will need to be determined by the First-tier Tribunal . In doing so, that Tribunal will no doubt wish to asses s the credibility of the appellant and her witnesses. This will entail consideration of the fact that, after her arrival in the United Kingdom , the appellant claime d asylum on the basis that her g randmother was the head of a secret society and that the appellant was in fear of having to take over the running of that society. This asylum claim was specifically withdrawn by the appellant in September 2016 (see paragraph 9 above) .