Case No. UKUT-00197-(IAC)

56. We are bound to question what the Secretary of State and the First-tier Tribunal considered to be the proper and suitable outcome. It appears to have been contemplated that the child should remain with his partially paralysed grandmother whose inability to look after him was not challenged. Assuming that it was not considered appropriate that the appellant should become feral, the underlying assumption must be that the child should live with one or other of his adult siblings, none of whom had, on the evidence, taken steps to assume any responsibility towards him, two of whom were his elder brothers aged 2 6 and 24 and two of whom were his elder sisters whose circumstances had neither been examined nor the subject of any evidence. We consider that such a dismal outcome should at least have sounded alarm-bells. 57. Thankfully, Mr Duffy did not take the same view as that adopted in the Rule 24 response. He did not materially challenge the submissions made by Ms Cronin. In these circumstances, we conclude that the First-tier Tribunal made a material error of law and that its determination should be set aside. We re-make the d ecision allowing the appeal of T Y by our finding that the appellant met the requirements of the Immigrati on Rules. We consider that a decision made by the respondent that runs counter to the Immigration Rules in the circumstances of this appeal engages Article 8 and amount s to a breach of it , see for example Singh v Entry Clearance Officer New Delhi [2004] EWCA Civ 1075 and Ahmadi & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1721 in which the Courts have found family life to exist as between prospective adopters and adoptive children and that the obligation to respect family life requires not only that a State refrains from interfering with existing family life but may also entail s a positive obligation to permit family life to develop.