CONVENTION REASON
36 . A person is entitled to refugee status under the Refugee Convention if she has a well - founded fear of persecution on account of her nationality, religion, race, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 37 . Regulation 6(1)(d) of the Qualification Directive states that:
“A group shall be considered to form a particular social group where in particular
a) members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it, and
b) that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country as it is perceived as bein g different by the surrounding society”.
38 . At page 7 of 20 of the refusal letter, the Respondent accepted that women who have been victims of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation do share an immutable characteristic which cannot be changed. 39. I also note that i n TD and AD (Trafficking women) Albania CG [2008] UKAIT 00002 the Upper Tribunal held that “trafficked women from Albania may well be members of a particular social group on that account alone”. 40 . The Respondent accepted that the A ppellant wa s a national of Albania but did not accept that she had been trafficked within Albania and between Albania and Italy between 2012 and 2015. Therefore, for the purposes of re-making her asylum appeal , I must consider whether there is a serious possibility that the Appellant was trafficked as claimed. 41 . Section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 states that: (1) A person commits an offence of [human trafficking] if the person arranges or facilitates the travel of another person with a view to V being exploited. (2) It is irrelevant whether V consents to the travel (whether V is an adult or a child). (3) A person may , in particular , arrange or facilitate V’s travel by recruiting V, transporting or transferring V, harbouring or receiving V, or transferring or exchanging control over V . (4) A person arranges or facilitates V’s travel with a view to V being exploited only if-
(a) the person intends to exploit V or
(b) the person knows or ought to know that another person is likely to exploit V… (5) “Travel” means-
(a) arriving in, or entering, any country;
(b) departing from any country;
(c) travelling within any country”. 42 . It is the Appellant’s case that she was moved between Albania and Italy and within Albania in order to be sexually exploited. It is also her case that Florian recruited her and arranged for her to travel to Sauk for the purpose of being exploited by Artan and that then Artan and his associates exploited her in Albania and Italy. Whilst doing so her account indicates that they transported, transferred, harboured, received and exchanged control over her at different times. 43 . W hen considering the credibility of the Appellant’s account of travel and exploitation , I have taken into account that in Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 11 Lord Justice Brooke held that:
“when considering whether there is a serious possibility of persecution for a Convention reason if an asylum seeker is returned, it would be quite wrong to exclude matters totally from consideration in the balancing process simply because the decision-maker believes, on what may be somewhat fragile evidence, that they probably did not occur. Similarly, even if a decision-maker finds that this is no serious possibility of persecution for a Convention reason in the part of the country to which the Secretary of State proposed to send an asylum seeker, it must not exclude relevant matters, from its consideration altogether when determining whether it would be unduly harsh to return the asylum seeker to that part, unless it considers that there is no serious possibility that those facts are as the asylum seeker contends”. 4 4. Therefore, it is necessary to consider all relevant evidence before reaching a holistic assessment of the credibility of the Appellant’s account. 4 5. The Appellant’s account largely relies on her own recollection of past events and , as human trafficking and any consequent sexual exploitation are clandestine and criminal acts, it is not reasonable to presume that the organised and criminal gangs profiting from these actions would leave a “paper trial” of their activities. At the hearing, the Home Office Presenting Officer accepted that the “ inconsistencies ” listed in the refusal letter were more accurately described as issues of plausibility and that there were no internal inconsistencies in the Appellant’s account . 4 6. I have reminded myself of the inherent dangers of judging an account to be implausible on the basis of experiences gained in a very different culture and country. For example, what was characterised as a normal happy relationship between the Appellant and Florian could as easily have be en part of the lover-boy syndrome described below , when viewed through the prism of life in Albania. 4 7. In addition, the weight given by the Respondent to the length of the relationship between the Appellant and Florian was disproportionate in the context of Florian not living in Albania on a regular basis and the Appellant still being a student , who would not be in a position to agree to travel with him. 4 8. The Respondent also asserted that the Appellant had been able to travel to Greece by car on 16 May 2013 and return to Albania the next day. However, the Respondent did not produce any evidence to substantiate this bare assertion. 4 9. It was also held against the Appellant that there was no record of her being trafficked back to Albania. However, given the clandestine nature of human trafficking, this is not necessarily inconsistent with the Appellant’s account of being exploited. 5 0. The Respondent also asserted that it was implausible that the Appellant would not have been able to escape during her period of exploitation. However, the unchallenged medical evidence of Dr Ceasar records that she was informed by the Appellant that she did not have the option of leaving as she was threatened with harm if she did so. She also told the clinician that she only risked escaping when it became so bad that she decided to risk her life by trying to escape. The fact that she was able to escape on that one occasion is not necessarily implausible as she explained why her traffickers left her with a woman in charge when a nephew of one of them died. 51. However, the credibility of her account can also be assessed holistically by looking at its consistency and plausibility , as above, and also by comparing it to what is known about the modu
s operandi of Albanian gangs who traffic women for the purposes of sexual exploitation. For example, in paragraph 5.2.1. of the Home Office’s own Country Guidance on Albania: Female victims of trafficking, Version 5.10, July 2016, it was noted that in January 2016, the EU Observer stated that:
“Thousands of women and girls have been trafficked from Albania alone to Western E u r o pe as sex slaves in the last two decades. Well-organised criminal gangs control the trafficking…and launder profits by buying property back in Albania, police and experts say”. 52 . At paragraph 5.2.2. it was also said that:
“The US Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report 2016 stated that ‘Albania’ is a source and destination country for men, women and children subject to sex trafficking…GRETA stated that ‘Albania is primarily a country of origin for victims of human trafficking”. 53 . In addition, it was stated in paragraph 5.2.5 that:
“GRETA further stated that “…as regards transnational trafficking, the main countries of destination of Albanian victims were Italy…”. 54 . Furthermore, in relation to the Appellant’s asserted experience of being trafficked within Albania, paragraph 5.2.3. stated that:
“The Albanian Helsinki Committee noted in a report dated December 2015 that ‘trafficking of persons for prostitution, particularly domestic trafficking of women and children, has increased”. 55 . It is also the Appellant’s account that she was trafficked and exploited at two seaside resorts, Durres and Flore , between June and August of 2014. This accords with what is said at paragraph 5.2.4 of the Guidance , where:
“GRETA stated the following in a report published in June 2016; ‘trafficking and exploitation for different purposes of women, men and children within Albania has been on the rise and there have been more identified victims of internal trafficking than of transnational trafficking. The risks of human trafficking increase during the tourist season, including for the purposes of sexual exploitation…’ 56 . Therefore, the Appellant’s account of being trafficked from Albania to Italy and within Albania for sexual exploitation is consistent with the objective evidence. 57 . It is also the Appellant’s case that Florian duped her into believing that he wished to take her to Italy as his girlfriend and that they would live there together as a couple. This is a well-recognised method of entrapment of victims of trafficking, which may be effective ( even when a woman is well-educated ) . This is confirmed in paragraph 5.2.5 of the Guidance where it says that:
“GRETA further stated:
‘…No breakdown into types of exploitation…is available, but GRETA was informed that that identified victims were mainly women and girls subject to sexual exploitation. The authorities have referred to cases linked to the “lover-boy” phenomenon, where men seduce women and girls and then force them into prostitution”. 58 . Therefore, the manner in which the Appellant says that she became a victim of human trafficking in also consistent with the objective evidence. 60. Taking all of the above into account and applying the requisite low standard of proof, I find that the Appellant was a victim of human trafficking and therefore a member of a particular social group, as asserted.