Case No. UKUT-00392-(IAC)

at [15] and [20]). That is distinct from the question whether there is any evidence upon which the evaluations could be made. This court cannot know what evidence, if any, was provided on questions (1) and (2) and whether the tribunal accepted or rejected any part of that evidence in coming to a value judgment which is accordingly not supported by evidence. It has not been demonstrated to us that the conclusions of fact are inferences that could properly be drawn from materials that were available. It is accordingly wrong to say that there were clear factual findings to which the test of reasonableness was applied or that the tribunal had sufficient factual material to undertake an holistic assessment for the purpose of the third question.” 24. We conclude the burden of proof remains on appellant, where the respondent has identified the location to which it is asserted they could relocate, to prove why that location would be unduly harsh, in line with AMM , but within that burden, the evaluation exercise should be holistic. An holistic approach to such an assessment is consistent with the balance-sheet approach endorsed later in SC at paragraphs [40] and [41]: “40… is it unduly harsh to make SC mov e to another place in Jamaica where he will be safe, rather than letting him stay in the UK? The phrase ‘unduly harsh’ imports a value judgment of what is ‘ due ’ to the person. It is possible to postulate that what may be an unduly harsh consequence for one person may not be an unduly harsh consequence for another person where the latter is a person who represents a danger to the community because he has committed serious offences. This is not to allow public interest considerations to infringe human rights; there would be no infringement of article 3 in the new location. I am accordingly persuaded that SC’s criminality should have been considered and it was not. 41. Does this analysis vitiate the finding of the FtT ? The tribunal did not expressly weigh SC’s criminal activity in the balance (see, for example the judgment at [38]), although the judgment is informed by the tribunal’s view of SC’s criminal conduct and, ultimately, by the conclusion that the traumatic experiences of SC’s childhood are partially to blame and that he can be rehabilitated. The UT found that some of the factors considered by the FtT in assessing reasonableness (including criminality) were implicit but that is not in itself a satisfactory conclusion. It is accordingly unclear what the tribunal weighed in the balance. The FtT would have been better advised to structure the consideration of internal relocation differently. A useful structure would be to list all the factors pointing towards internal relocation being unduly harsh and then list those factors pointing against internal relocation being unduly harsh. A paragraph should follow which explains the balancing exercise undertaken, the conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion. This kind of balance sheet approach has become a commonplace in questions of this kind and might usefully be adopted by the FtT when this question arises.” 25. Setting aside the issue of criminality, which is not relevant in this appeal, we followed a bal ance-sheet approach in the holistic assessment. An over-emphasis on the overall burden of proof can be a distraction from that holistic assessment. 26. The appellant ’s final assertion fails as a result of the fact that the QD has been accurately transposed by paragraph 339O of the Immigration Rules. 27. The findings preserved relate to the following. The appellant is a bisexual woman who was at risk, as a result of her sexual identity, from her father, in four identified locations already referred to in this decision. Her father had been abusive to both the appellant and members of her family. There had been a finding that domestic violence was widespread in Albania, with societal discrimination to the extent that it was said that the appellant might choose to keep her sexual identity secret, even if she were not at risk from her father or other family members in Shkodër . 28. Although the appellant was not called to give evidence in the context of Dr Chelvan’s submission that the burden of proof was on the respondent, he stated that the appellant would not open about her sexual identity in Albania; and that she would not have any difficulty in obtaining employment or housing. Her concealment meant that, when considering whether she could lead a ‘relatively normal life’, which was a consideration in AS, (paragraph [31]), the answer was that she could not , but would instead be forced to live a ‘ half - life.’ In particular, the appellant would be unable to develop a private life with friends. She would be returning as a lone woman without family connections, seeking to integrate into a society in which there was discrimination against people based their sexual identity. The FTT’s findings about the appellant’s mental health combined to make her internal relocation to Shkodër unduly harsh. 29. For the purposes of paragraph 276ADE (1) (vi) of the Immigration Rules, and whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Albania, once again the starting point was that she was a single woman who would be returning to Albania without family connections, where there was societal discrimination and where she had never lived openly as a bisexual woman. The authority of BF , relating as it did to gay men, was of limited assistance, as was the respondent’s most recent Country Policy and Information Note (‘ CPIN ’) - Albania: Sexual orientation and gender identity (April 2019). While Dr Chelvan objected to its admission as new evidence, he was content to deal with it in submissions, noting that the only additions since the last version of the CPIN (version 4) which had been considered by the FTT, were as a result of BF , which it was open to us to consider. The respondent’ s submissions 30. As a starting point, Mr Clarke submitted that societal discrimination within Albania did not amount to societal persecution. Whilst the appellant said that she would feel compelled not to disclose this aspect of her identity as a result of shame and fear; in relation to obtaining employment and housing, the need to disclose or discuss her sexual identity would never arise; and in relation to friendships and social networks, the appellant was hardly likely to disclose aspects of her identity to those who did not share a common acceptance of those aspects. In essence, she would be choosing not to share those aspects of her life, in circumstances where she would not otherwise naturally have done so, rather than being compelled to conceal aspects of her identity. 31. In terms of the appellant’s personal circumstances, while she had been kicked out by her family, there was no further detail, in terms of evidence about her claim to be compelled not to disclose aspects of her identity; there was no updated medical evidence beyond the evidence provided to the FTT in July 2017; no evidence about what friendships in Albania had been retained and what not; and no evidence, beyond a bare assertion, that she would feel compelled to live almost as a recluse in Albania. 32. Considering the wider objective evidence, the respondent had referred to the 2019 CPIN to assist the appellant - in fact, what it demonstrated, as did BF , was the paucity of any evidence about prevailing country or regional circumstances for women, as opposed to gay or bisexual men in Albania. In essence, there was simply a dearth of evidence; either in relation to whether it would be unduly harsh to relocate; or by reference to the test under paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) or article 8, which Dr Chelvan accepted was a different, more difficult test for the appellant to satisfy, as to any obstacles, let alone very significant ones, to the appellant’ s integration in Albania. Discussion and conclusions on internal relocation and obstacles to integration 33. The appellant has relied only on the evidence before the FTT in July 2017, nearly 2 years ago, despite being aware since November 2018 that this Tribunal would remake the decision and that in doing so, she was able to apply to adduce whatever additional relevant evidence, particularly more up-to-date evidence, she wished. Instead, she has relied upon the narrow legal point about where the burden of proof lies in seeking to argue that as the respondent has the burden which it has not discharged, that internal relocation to Shkodër must be unduly harsh. As we have already indicated, we reject the appellant’s submissions on the burden of proof, so that we are left with limited evidence on which to make the assessment, albeit we have done so as best we can using a holistic approach, within the framework of a ‘balance sheet’ analysis. 34. Focusing on the appellant’s personal circumstances, she will be a lone woman relocating to a city, Shkodër , with which she is not familiar; without family connections, being estranged from her family; fearing her father and with, at best, only telephone contact with her mother (as recorded in her evidence at paragraph [11] of the FTT decision). 35. Beyond that, the evidence about the appellant’s personal circumstances, which are relevant to the issue of whether it would be unduly harsh for her to relocate to Shkodër , is extremely limited. Her written witness statement for the FTT includes four brief paragraphs on the inability to internally relocate (pages [88] to [89] of the appellant’s bundle). She recites her fear that her father will attempt to find and kill her. The FTT has already rejected the ability of the appellant’s father to locate her outside the four specified cities in Albania ([31] of the FTT decision). She further asserts that she could not be open about her sexuality. The FTT also found that the appellant would be able to find employment, specifically as a shop worker. Dr Chelvan does not dispute that she would also be able to obtain accommodation, and we find that with an ability to find work, she would be able to find accommodation in Shkodër . 36. Another facet of the issue of whether relocation to Shkodër would be unduly harsh is the appellant’s ability to establish friendship groups and social networks. We considered whether the appellant’s history of localised persecution from her father (who would not be able to persecute her in Shkodër ); her depression or any associated mental health issues; or societal attitudes more generally would hinder her ability to do so. 37. Dealing with the connected issues of past, localised , persecution, and depression, we have considered the expert report of a consultant psychiatrist, dated 22 June 2017, at pages [71] to [82] of the appellant’s bundle. The expertise of the consultant is unchallenged. While brief, the report describes the appellant as suffering from a depressive episode, with fleeting suicidal thoughts; poor concentration; anxiety; low mood; disturbed sleep; an inability to enjoy life; and a fear for the future ([75] of the appellant’s bundle). The report makes a number of other brief points: first, that with antidepressants with which the appellant was being treated in June 2017, and further psychological treatment, the appellant was likely to recover with a period of a year from the date of the examination i.e. her recovery would be complete by 20 June 2018, a year ago ([76] of the appellant’s bundle). Second, her condition was likely to get worse if she were deported to Albania against her wishes, as she has an understandable fear of returning there; with an increased risk of suicide because she is terrified of her father and other members of her family. 38. The author of the report did not consider the issue of internal relocation to another part of Albania, where, objectively, the appellant would not be at risk of adverse attention from relatives, and in the context of the appellant having found employment and accommodation. There is no update on the appellant’s current medical condition, and we can only assume that she has recovered from her depressive episode, given the prognosis of recovery within a year. Any risk of recurrence of mental illness, associated with her fear of her father and cousins, must be considered in the context of that recovery and internal relocation to somewhere objectively beyond the reach of her father and cousins. There is no evidence that after a period of recovery, the appellant would continue to suffer a subjective fear (as opposed to objectively justified fear) of discovery by her father, which would result in further illness. 39. We have also considered the impact of wider societal discrimination against bisexual women in Albania; to what extent, if any, it would impact on the appellant’s ability to form friendships and social networks, given her history of depression. We remind ourselves of the Country Guidance case of BF . We accept the submission that, relating as it did to the prevailing circumstances for gay men in Albania, it was of limited assistance to the question of whether it was unduly harsh for bisexual woman to return to Albania. Nevertheless, it recited, at paragraph [2], the only (limited) general Country Guidance case of direct relevance,