Case No. UKUT-00094-(IAC)

) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 3064 (Admin). It is well established that Tekle turns on its facts. See Negassi at [35]: “ Tekle may have been correctly decided on its facts but they went way beyond those in the present cases. The context was one in which the Secretary of State had deliberately adopted a policy whereby decisions on claims such as the one under review were deferred for five years or more.” And again at [38]: “ Tekle is readily distinguishable.” 92. Mr Hays highlights the Court of Appeal’s lukewarm endorsement of Tekle in the extract quoted above; even when confined to its facts, the high watermark of the Court of Appeal’s views of the case were that it “ may have been correctly decided”. There is force to that submission. Tekle is of no assistance to the applicant on Article 8 grounds. 93. Negassi is binding on this tribunal. As Hickinbottom J said at [111] of Rostami of similar Article 8 submissions made in those proceedings when following and applying Negassi : “[W]e are simply not in Article 8 country here.” 94. I find that Article 8 was not engaged by the February 2020 decision. I dismiss Ground 5 of this application. Ground 6 95. As pleaded in the Statement of Facts and Grounds, Ground 6 is anchored to case-specific considerations which contend that the applicant has suffered unjustified discrimination on account of his disability, thereby contravening Article 14 of the ECHR, on the basis the decision is within the “ambit” of Article 8. 96. At [80], Ms Harrison’s skeleton argument seeks impermissibly to expand the scope of the pleaded ground to attack the Work Policy itself on this basis, as well as paragraph 360A(ii) of the Immigration Rules. I decline to permit the applicant to advance a significantly broader ground for judicial review than the ground upon which he was granted permission, which related to the decision and not the policy. See paragraph (4) of Judge Owens’ grant of permission. Further, this tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to an immigration rule, and it was incumbent upon the applicant to seek to transfer the proceedings to the High Court in order to seek permission to advance submissions on that basis. 97. In the light of my decision concerning Ground 4, it is not necessary to consider whether the impugned decision breached Article 14 of the ECHR on the basis it was within the ambit of Article 8. I accept that in IJ (Kosovo) , the High Court held that the decision in those proceedings was within the “ambit” of Article 8, although Bourne J held that, in the case of the decision refusing to exercise discretion in IJ’s favour, all relevant factors were taken into account: see [109]. However, in light of my decision concerning Ground 4, it will be incumbent upon the Secretary of State to consider all factors advanced by the applicant upon reconsideration of the application, and no further analysis of the Article 14 point is necessary in relation to the February 2020 decision in these proceedings. 98. For these reasons, I dismiss this application on Ground 6.