Ground (3) – arguable perversity based on inconsistent decisions
Ground (3) – arguable perversity based on inconsistent decisions
The Applicant’s case
Although not formally abandoned, Mr Bandegani did not make any additional oral submissions to us beyond the grounds and skeleton argument and he placed no emphasis on this ground. The Applicant relies on R (Hussain) v SSHD [2012] EWHC 1952 (Admin) and says that the Respondent’s decision was irrational, because there was no rational basis for treating him differently from five of his colleagues who were granted ILR under the ACRS. The Respondent’s contention that she had allowed others’ applications in error was not a rational basis for distinguishing the Applicant’s case.
- Heading
- Decision
- The Respondent’s initial rejection of the Applicant for ACRS
- The Respondent’s decision under challenge
- The relevant passages of the ACRS and ARIPS
- The Applicant’s application for judicial review and the grant of permission
- Ground (1) - Interpretation of the ACRS and whether the Respondent misapplied it
- The Respondent’s case
- Legal principles - Interpretation of policy
- Conclusions on Ground (1)
- Ground (2) – the adequacy of the reasons in the Respondent’s decision
- The Respondent’s case
- Legal principles on sufficiency of decision-making reasons
- Conclusions on Ground (2) and the adequacy of the reasons in the decision
- Ground (3) – arguable perversity based on inconsistent decisions
- The Respondent’s case
- Legal principles on irrationality because of inconsistency of treatment and legitimate expectations
- Conclusions
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