[2025] UKUT 00092 (IAC)

As to issue (1) (stay necessary to defend criminal proceedings on modern slavery grounds), Mr Irwin submitted that ECAT imposed no requirement on States Parties to the Convention to grant a residence permit to a defendant in criminal proceedings. Staying in the United Kingdom in order to defend criminal proceedings was not encompassed by the objectives of protection and assistance of victims of trafficking. The Convention should be construed as a whole; Chapter IV makes provision pertaining to the substantive criminal law. It is not possible to read the result for which Mr Buttler contends into Article 14(1)(a).

As to issue (2) (inadequate referral by the Competent Authority to the Metropolitan Police Service), Mr Irwin submitted that this facet of the applicant’s case had not been pleaded in the manner the applicant sought to rely on it in the Statement of Facts and Grounds. The applicant had not pleaded a duty to refer both phases of the applicant’s modern slavery to the relevant police forces by reference to Article 4 of the ECHR. There was no obligation for the Secretary of State to make multiple referrals to different police forces. Once a referral had been made, it was a matter for the police.

In relation to point (3) (failure to apply anxious scrutiny to the medical evidence and failure to take into account the Thomas report), the Secretary of State approached this issue in a manner that was open to her. Dr Thomas is not an expert in healthcare provision in Nigeria, as she acknowledged in her report. The DL policy requires the Secretary of State to ensure that adequate treatment for some of the harm caused by trafficking is available, but does not mandate the provision of a complete recovery.

Mr Irwin submitted that Article 8 was not engaged by the 12 December decision. At all material times the applicant had an outstanding Article 8 application that was pending before the Secretary of State. It has since been granted. The applicant’s true complaint, properly understood, was that the Secretary of State had not taken a decision on that application. It was open to him to have challenged any perceived unlawful in action or delay on the Secretary of State’s part in relation to his Article 8 human rights claim, which he had not. The mere fact that the Secretary of State had cause to take a decision under the DL policy concerning MS leave while that application was pending was, in Mr Irwin’s submission, nothing to the point.