The claimed public law errors in the respondent’s compliance with her section 55 duty in this case
The claimed public law errors in the respondent’s compliance with her section 55 duty in this case
In the appeals before us, it is not immediately clear when in the decision-making process the respondent took into account the best interests of the appellants’ children. The freestanding paragraph on section 55 comes after both the consideration of discretion and the article 8 assessment and section 55 is not referred to within either section. At the hearing before us, however, both parties agreed that the best interests of the children must be a relevant consideration in the exercise of discretion. This is consistent with the language of the refusal letters, which refer to the duty being taken into account “[i]n deciding whether deprivation action is appropriate” (rather than “proportionate”).
The appellants say that the respondent failed to comply with her section 55 duty in two ways. First, she failed to take into account a highly relevant factor which was known to her, namely that both parents were being considered for deprivation at the same time. Secondly, she had insufficient evidence before her about the children’s circumstances to make a rational decision about how their bests interests would be affected by either or both deprivation decisions. She therefore had a legal duty to make further enquiries before taking a decision.
The duty to make enquiries is known as the Tameside duty, after the speech of Lord Diplock in Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council[1977] AC 1014. A court considering whether a public authority has complied with that duty must consider two questions:
What material was before the decision-maker and what did they know when they made the decision? and
Could a reasonable decision-maker possessed of that knowledge have proceeded to make a decision without making further enquiries?
See: Plantagenet Alliance Ltd v The Secretary of State for Justice & Others [2014] EWHC 1662 (QB) at [141]. The question is not whether a reviewing court considers that further enquiry might have been sensible or desirable, but whether no rational decision-maker could have been satisfied that it possessed the information it needed to make a rational decision. Id at [100]. For the duty to have been breached, there must be a “vital gap in the evidence”. CAO at [48].
- Heading
- The appellants were granted anonymity before the First-tier Tribunal in consideration of the best interests of their children, two of whom were minors. Having heard from the parties, and taking into a
- Introduction
- The process that led to Mr Mujaj being deprived of his citizenship
- The process that led to Mrs Mujaj being deprived of her citizenship
- The respondent’s decisions
- The appeals before the First-tier Tribunal
- The hearing before us
- The legal framework
- The available grounds of appeal
- The respondent’s section 55 duty
- The relevance of the respondent’s compliance with her section 55 duty in a tribunal appeal
- The claimed public law errors in the respondent’s compliance with her section 55 duty in this case
- Did the respondent exercise her discretion lawfully?
- The decision to deprive Mrs Mujaj of her British citizenship
- Article 8
- Conclusions
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