[2025] UKUT 00277 (IAC)

The appellant is a citizen of Sierra Leone born in 1999. When he was around 4 years old, he entered the United Kingdom (‘UK’) and was granted indefinite leave to remain in 2010. On 27 March 2020, the appellant was sentenced to a total of 13 years’ imprisonment. This included a 12 year sentence imposed for wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm. This took place in 2018, when the appellant was 19. On 28 May 2022, the respondent notified the appellant of her intention to deport him, and on 4 July 2024 refused his consequential protection and human rights claims. The appellant’s appeal to the FTT was dismissed on all grounds.

The appellant applied to the FTT for PTA to the Upper Tribunal (‘UT’), in accordance with rule 33 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 (‘FTT Procedure Rules’). These grounds entirely focussed upon Article 8 and the FTT’s findings pursuant to s. 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘the 2002 Act’), in particular the FTT’s approach to the elements of Exception 1 prescribed within s. 117C(4) (b) and (c), which it is claimed, led to a materially flawed assessment under s. 117C(6) and the relevant proportionality assessment.

In accordance with the FTT’s change in practice in January 2025, the PTA application was allocated to the same salaried judge who decided the substantive appeal. The FTT refused PTA, providing the following reasons:

“1.

The application is in time. The grounds assert that I erred in relying on public interest considerations when considering the private life exception to deportation, specifically in considering the level of the Appellant’s integration.

2.

I do not accept that I have done so. In referencing the public interest in deportation before the question of cultural and social integration, I have simply avoided duplicating my findings. As I set out, ‘cultural and social integration’ is the acceptance and assumption of the core values, customs and social behaviours of the UK, including the rule of law. It is trite that offending behaviour is not consistent with social integration. It was therefore necessary to consider the Appellant’s criminality in order to consider whether he met the requirement of being socially and culturally integrated.

3.

My sub-headings make clear that I was considering different matters in each section. Nowhere in the ‘Cultural and social integration’ part of my decision do I reference the public interest. I consider my assessment of this issue was correct and properly directed. I undertook the ‘qualitative’ assessment as dictated in Bossade. I see no arguable error of law in this ground.

4.

Ground 2 amounts to an attempt to give expert evidence in the form of a submission. I consider it was correct to place little weight on such historical evidence of mental illness. As the grounds acknowledge there was no PTSD diagnosis or treatment ever required for the same. The Appellant himself accepted being fit and well which I note in the decision. I see no arguable error of law in this ground.

5.

Ground 3 amounts to a submission that the overall conclusion was wrong because of flaws as identified in the other two grounds. Having concluded that the other 2 grounds do not disclose an arguable error of law, I therefore do not agree with this ground either. The Appellant received a very lengthy sentence for very serious criminality and his overall private life claim was comparatively weak when set against the very significant public interest in his deportation. He needed a very compelling case indeed and this was not demonstrated on the evidence.”

In the renewed application to the UT pursuant to rule 21 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (‘UT Procedure Rules’), the appellant maintained reliance upon his initial grounds and in addition asserted that it was procedurally erroneous for the same FTT Judge to deal with the PTA application against his own decision.