Case No. UKUT-0237-(LC)-UTLC-No:-LC-2021-261

37.Mr Westmoreland Smith submitted that with regard to curtilage within which the stables could be appurtenant property, the only realistic candidate for living accommodation was the Oast House. The appellant had suggested that the house at Old Place, which is in common ownership with the stables, could also be considered as relevant living accommodation, but it is a mile away up a track and in another county. The stables cannot be within its curtilage, as concluded by the Tribunal in Martin v Hewitt [2003] RA 275 where three boathouses on the shores of Lake Windermere were found not to be domestic property because they were a substantial distance from the living accommodation of their owners and therefore not appurtenances within the curtilage of those houses.38.Regarding the requirement that the appurtenance should belong to or be enjoyed with living accommodation, the respondent suggested that because, as owner of the Oast House, Jessica has no personal right to use the stables which belong to the company they cannot be enjoyed with it. They are enjoyed with the arena, where the horses are ridden.39.Looking at their function, the stables support the Sternberg family in their sport of reining and the arena is integral to that. The current arena replaced an earlier indoor arena on that site. The accounts of the appellant give a feel of the activities on the site. The sale of horses belonging to family members involves using the arena to ride and show them for sale. The arena and stables are for specialist horses and there is no material boundary between them. They have a shared access road. Both the stables and the arena are owned by the appellant, who covers all the costs of keeping the horses, including the wages of staff. There is one meter and one bill for each of the services on site. Those using the stables do not spring from one single identifiable accommodation and the Oast House is not owned in common with the stables. The stables are not enjoyed with the Oast House, but with the arena, which ties everything together by providing the facility to train the horses kept in the stables. The stables are in close proximity to the arena and have access to it (from Doorways B and C).40.Mr Westmoreland Smith submitted that the need for an appurtenance to be within the curtilage of the house was folded into the Bigwood decision by reference to case law. The concept of curtilage had not been jettisoned. In Methuen-Campbell v Walters [1979] QB 525 (at 543H) LJ Buckley said “In my judgment, for one corporeal hereditament to fall within the curtilage of another, the former must be so intimately associated with the latter as to lead to the conclusion that the former in truth forms part of the latter.” In Bigwood at [61] the Tribunal referenced that observation, stating that the size of the equestrian buildings and the professional use of the facilities did not prevent them from being “intimately associated” with the house so as to form “part and parcel” with it. That is not the case at this hereditament.41.Mr Westmoreland Smith accepted that an appurtenance could be enjoyed with living accommodation as an alternative to belonging to it. In the Lands Tribunal decision of Head (VO) v Tower Hamlets LBC [2005] RA 177 it was held that district heating systems integral to the council’s residential buildings were appurtenant to living accommodation, even though not to any individual hereditament, and therefore fell to be treated as domestic property. However, in Allen the Tribunal found at [26] that a district heating system was not appurtenant to living accommodation unless it was situated within an identifiable curtilage used wholly for the purposes of living accommodation to which it belonged or with which it was enjoyed. In this case the stables are not integral to the curtilage of the Oast House.42.In Bigwood the key difference from this hereditament was the unified ownership between the house and the equestrian facilities. No reference was made to ownership in the decision as it was not relevant to that case. However, in Cornwall v Alexander, the President of the VTE, Professor Graham Zellick QC, had concluded from his summary of case law relevant to the meaning of “curtilage” that there were three tests: physical layout, ownership (past and present) and use or function (past and present). In this case ownership of the Oast House at the material day is a problem for the appellant because Jessica, as owner of the Oast House, did not become a director until 25 March 2013. There was therefore no connection between the ownerships at the material day. Moreover, although Rosanne has an option to purchase the Oast House, the appellant does not. It only has an option to purchase the courtyard area (outlined green on the plan above).43.Mr Westmoreland Smith concluded that the stables are not in the curtilage of the Oast House. They are entered from the appellant’s land, not from the Oast House and are more closely associated with the arena than the house. The stables are close to the Oast House, but closer to the arena. Although the access road passes between the stables and the arena there is only a physical barrier between them when a chain is hung across the opening beside Stables 2. The users of the stables come from Old Place as well as the Oast House and the unifying factor is the arena where horses from the stables are ridden.44.He submitted that there is no prospect of the stables passing in any conveyance of the Oast House as they are in different ownership and not part and parcel of it. They therefore fall outside of ss.66(1)(b).