[2024] UKUT 217 (LC)
Upper Tribunal Lands Chamber

[2024] UKUT 217 (LC)

Fecha: 29-Jul-2024

Inference of a lost modern grant

Inference of a lost modern grant

22.

In response to the difficulty of proving sufficient use to satisfy the common law requirement, judges developed more practical rules to avoid the disturbance of long established uses. Proof of long use, of the required quality and duration, was taken to give rise to a legal presumption that a previous owner of the land must have done something to confer a lawful title on the person or group who had been making use of the land, including title to use it for recreation as a village green or title to a right of way over it. That presumption is referred to as a “lost modern grant”, and its evolution was explained by Lord Hoffmann in R v Oxfordshire County Council ex p Sunningwell Parish Council [2000] 1 AC 335, at 349-351. The grant which is presumed is fictional but it nevertheless gives rise to a right which binds the owner of the land just as much as if the owner had themselves granted the right of way or dedicated the land for public use; the use is said to be “as of right”. A grant will be presumed where it is proved that the use has been enjoyed for a period of 20 years, provided the use for that period has been of the required quality or character to justify the law treating it as if it had a lawful origin.

23.

To justify treating sufficiently long use as if it was use “as of right”, the law requires that the use must have three characteristics: it must not have been enjoyed by force; it must not have been enjoyed secretly; and it must not have been enjoyed with the permission of the owner of the land. In Sunningdale Lord Hoffmann used the traditional Latin phrase, nec vi, nec clam, nec precario to refer to these three qualities before explaining why the absence of force, stealth or permission had been insisted on:

“The unifying element in these three vitiating circumstances was that each constituted a reason why it would not have been reasonable to expect the owner to resist the exercise of the right--in the first case, because rights should not be acquired by the use of force, in the second, because the owner would not have known of the user and in the third, because he had consented to the user, but for a limited period. So in Dalton v. Angus (1881) 6 App.Cas. 740, 773, Fry J. (advising the House of Lords) was able to rationalise the law of prescription as follows:

‘the whole law of prescription and the whole law which governs the presumption or inference of a grant or covenant rest upon acquiescence. The Courts and the Judges have had recourse to various expedients for quieting the possession of persons in the exercise of rights which have not been resisted by the persons against whom they are exercised, but in all cases it appears to me that acquiescence and nothing else is the principle upon which these expedients rest.’”

24.

In this appeal the only one of these three qualities which is contentious is the first, that the use of the right of way must not have been “by force”.

25.

It is not suggested that Mr Sagier’s use of the route over Mrs Kaur’s driveway involved physical force or violence. “Force”, in this context, means contentiously or subject to protest or objection. To defeat the accrual of a right based on long use it is therefore enough for an owner to make it clear that they do not acquiesce in the use of their land. In Dalton v. Angus & Co. (1881) 6 App.Cas. 740, at 786, Bowen J suggested that “continuous and unmistakable protests” should be enough:

“The neighbour without actual interruption of the user, ought perhaps, on principle, to be enabled by continuous and unmistakable protests to destroy its peaceable character, and so to annul one of the conditions on which the presumption of right is raised […].”

This tentative suggestion has become fully incorporated into the modern approach to the requirement that the use relied on must not be forcible.

26.

In Newnham v Willison (1987) 56 P&CR 8, 18, at page 19, Kerr LJ concluded from a review of the authorities that a use of land may become forceful “once there is knowledge on the part of the person seeking to establish prescription that his user is being objected to and that the use which he claims has become contentious.”

27.

In R. (Lewis v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council (No. 2) [2010] 2 AC 70, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry JSC cited Bowen J’s suggestion in Dalton v Angus and explained the requirement that the use should be without force, or “peaceable”, in the same way:

“If the use continues despite the neighbour’s protests and attempts to interrupt it, it is treated as being vi and so does not give rise to any right against him.”

28.

In Winterburn v Bennett [2016] EWCA Civ 482 the issue was whether a fish and chip shop had acquired a right by prescription for its owners and their customers to park on the car park of an adjoining social club. The club had erected two signs stating that the car park was private and for the use of its patrons only, but the owners of the shop argued that these were not enough to prevent the right they claimed from having accrued through long use. The Court of Appeal held that the signs were sufficient and that it had not been necessary for the club to do more. Having reviewed the authorities since Dalton v. Angus, David Richards LJ concluded:

“[40] In circumstances where the owner has made his position entirely clear through the erection of clearly visible signs, the unauthorised use of the land cannot be said to be “as of right”. Protest against unauthorised use may, of course, take many forms and it may, as it has in a number of cases, take the form of writing letters of protest. But I reject the notion that it is necessary for the owner, having made his protest clear, to take further steps of confronting the wrongdoers known to him orally or in writing, still less to go to the expense and trouble of legal proceedings.

[41] The situation which has arisen in the present case is commonplace. Many millions of people in this country own property. Most people do not seek confrontation, whether orally or in writing, and in many cases they may be concerned or even frightened of doing so. Most people do not have the means to bring legal proceedings. There is a social cost to confrontation and, unless absolutely necessary, the law of property should not require confrontation in order for people to retain and defend what is theirs. The erection and maintenance of an appropriate sign is a peaceful and inexpensive means of making clear that property is private and not to be used by others. I do not see why those who choose to ignore such signs should thereby be entitled to obtain legal rights over the land.”