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Conclusions
Was the tenancy perpetually renewable?
It is well-established that the courts lean against perpetual renewals. It is generally unlikely to have been what the parties intended and only unequivocal words will give rise to a right of perpetual renewal: Woodfall, Landlord and Tenant 18.014 to 18.015.
A clause that confers an option to renew “on the same terms including this option”, or similar, obviously gives rise to a perpetually renewable tenancy: Parkus v Greenwood [1950] Ch 644, Caerphilly Concrete Products v Owen [1971] EWCA Civ 1. Equally, a tenancy which confers a right of renewal “excluding this option” is clearly not perpetually renewable. Mr Constantine’s lease did not say that the option to renew was to be included or excluded in the renewed tenancy and to that extent it was ambiguous – hence the dispute between the parties.
However, because of the ambiguity I find that the tenancy was not perpetually renewable, because only unequivocal wording will have that effect. As Woodfall puts it, “equivocal expressions will not be construed as conferring a perpetual right of renewal where they are fairly capable of being otherwise interpreted”; for example, in Marjorie Burnett v Barclay [1980] EWHC Ch 1 the lease gave the tenant the right to take a new lease on its expiry:
“such lease shall also contain a like covenant for renewal for a further term of seven years on the expiration of the term thereby granted.”
It was held that those words did not create a right of perpetual renewal.
I find that Mr Constantine had the right to renew his tenancy once only, for a single term from March 2018 to 2019. Thereafter a statutory periodic tenancy arose. The FTT was correct so to find; its decision was not properly explained, but I hope that the above amounts to a sufficient explanation and on that basis there is no point in setting aside and remaking the FTT’s decision.
The landlord has indicated in correspondence that he is content for Mr Constantine to stay in the property so long as he agrees to abide by the FTT’s decision as to rent. In the meantime the landlord has accepted Mr Constantine’s annual payment of rent. In my judgment neither the landlord’s willingness to let Mr Constantine stay, nor his acceptance of rent on an annual basis, indicate his acceptance that this is a perpetually renewable tenancy.
Accordingly the appeal fails and the FTT’s determination of the market rent takes effect.
Upper Tribunal Judge Elizabeth Cooke
6 August 2025
Right of appeal
Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision. The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal’s decision on costs is sent to the parties). An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.