UT (Tax & Chancery) UT/2023/000079 UT/2023/000109 - [2025] UKUT 00059 (TCC)
Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber

UT (Tax & Chancery) UT/2023/000079 UT/2023/000109 - [2025] UKUT 00059 (TCC)

Fecha: 20-Nov-2024

Summary of parties’ submissions

Summary of parties’ submissions

29.

Mr Bradley submitted that:

(1)

s103(1) requires that the deceased must himself have incurred a debt – here, the liability under the Note was not a “liability consisting of a debt incurred by [Mrs Elborne]”; the liability had been incurred by the Life Trustees. Section 49(1) merely said that a person holding an interest in possession should be deemed to be beneficially entitled to the property in which that interest subsisted, and the decision in St Barbe Green had made it clear that that property was to be valued net of the settlement liabilities. Section 49(1) did not deem the person with the interest in possession to have incurred the debts of the settlement, and no such deeming should be treated as applying for the purposes of s103. Section 60 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (“TCGA 1992”) illustrates that it is not be difficult for Parliament to say expressly what the FTT thought it had said by implication. The approach of the FTT and the dichotomy (which he described as a false dichotomy) which it had identified at FTT[125] to FTT[129] raised difficult and fundamental questions as to how trust liabilities are taken into account for inheritance tax purposes, given that s49 only applies where there is “an interest in possession in settled property” and cannot therefore apply to bare trusts or discretionary trusts; and

(2)

s103 requires that the deceased must, by some prior disposition(s) have furnished someone else with the property used as consideration for that debt (or incumbrance) - Mr Bradley submitted that this meant that the Property itself could not fulfil this requirement. There needed first to have been a disposition of property by the deceased and then that property (or property representing that property) needed to be used as consideration for the debt. Mr Bradley drew attention to the different conclusion which the FTT had reached on this submission in the context of the Section 103 Incumbrance Issue.

30.

At the beginning of his oral submissions at the hearing, Mr Davey drew our attention to the context in which this appeal arose, emphasising:

(1)

Mrs Elborne had entered into a scheme to reduce the liability of her estate to inheritance tax, the “home loan scheme”;

(2)

the witness evidence of Mr Mark Elborne (one of Mrs Elborne’s children, who was a beneficiary of both settlements, a Family Trustee and an executor under Mrs Elborne’s will) was that the sole purpose of entering into the scheme had been to remove the value of the Property from his mother’s estate (assuming she was able to survive for more than seven years);

(3)

that scheme involved multiple documents being executed (including the creation of the two trusts, an agreement for sale, the Note, letters of wishes and trustee resolutions); and

(4)

there had been no transfer of funds (either physical cash or electronic transfer), the agreement for sale of the Property was not completed, the scheme documentation was essentially ignored, following Mrs Elborne’s death the executors simply sold the Property to a third party directly, and the Note has not been repaid. In the real world, nothing actually changed – Mrs Elborne continued to live at the Property, there were no proceeds of sale in a bank account, and no changes recorded at the Land Registry (although noting that the Property was unregistered property).

31.

Against this background, Mr Davey submitted that the Note does not operate as a “magical device” to swerve the statutory provisions and reduce the value of the estate by £1.8m.

32.

Mr Davey addressed the application of s103, submitting that this is generally regarded as an anti-avoidance provision. We should not narrow the scope of this provision by reference to an example of when the provision can apply (eg to loan-backs). The FTT had concluded that their approach fulfilled the “manifest purpose” of the provision (FTT[230]).

33.

Mr Davey addressed the reasoning of the FTT from FTT[226] to FTT[233] on whether the Note was a “debt incurred by” Mrs Elborne:

(1)

The FTT had recognised that s49 does not say expressly that the liabilities incurred by the trustees should be treated as having been incurred by the holder of the interest in possession in the settlement (FTT[226]).

(2)

The FTT set out its analysis at FTT[228], which HMRC broke down into three parts:

(a)

Mann J saw s49 as bringing within the estate the whole of the settled property but as requiring the settlement liabilities to be deducted in valuing that property. Mann J was not saying that the effect was that the deceased did not have an interest in possession in the portion of the gross settlement assets which did not exceed the liabilities of the settlement.

(b)

Since that is the effect of s49, who else apart from the deemed beneficial owner of the gross settled assets should be treated as having incurred the relevant liabilities which are to be taken into account in reducing the value of the gross settled assets.

(c)

Those assets are deemed to be beneficially owned by the holder of the interest in possession but to have a reduced value to that holder by reference to the liabilities. A necessary implication arising from that process is that the liabilities have been incurred by the holder of the interest in possession.

(3)

The FTT saw its conclusion as in line with St Barbe Green (FTT[233]).

(4)

In St Barbe Green, Mann J held that liabilities in the free estate could not be used to reduce the value of the surplus assets held in trusts. Mann J had addressed s49 at [12], stating that whilst s49(1) does not say “net property” (ie the value of the property net of trust liabilities) that is what it must mean, thus it has the “notion of property from which liabilities have been notionally deducted”.

(5)

Mr Davey submitted that liabilities cannot be disregarded under s49. Section 49 is a deeming provision. At [11] in St Barbe Green, Mann J had described the statute as creating “its own logical world” by deeming trust property to be owned by the deceased. In Fowler, Lord Briggs had set out the guidance as to the way in which statutory deeming provisions ought to be interpreted and applied, the fifth principle of which (at [27(5)]) is that “the court should not shrink from applying the fiction created by the deeming provision to the consequences which would inevitably flow from the fiction being real”. The FTT had considered that the effect of s49 was that Mrs Elborne was to be treated as having incurred the debt owed by the Life Trustees. It is then an incident of the consequences of that deeming to interpret Mrs Elborne as having incurred that debt for the purposes of s103(1).

34.

Addressing the further submissions made by the Appellants, Mr Davey submitted:

(1)

We should beware of Mr Bradley’s submissions as to the dichotomy apparently identified by the FTT in relation to trust liabilities and how such liabilities might be taken into account in different situations. The Appellants are wrong to say that the source of the right to deduct trust liabilities can be explained in all situations by s162(4). That provision addresses certain deductible liabilities (that they should be set “so far as possible” against the properties they incumber) and is not itself dealing with the prior question of whether the liability is deductible. There are a plurality of provisions performing different roles (including s5(3), s49(1) and s162); the inheritance tax code is not straightforward and a number of provisions might have a bearing. In any event, the FTT was very clear that it was dealing with the sections before it and the facts in these appeals.

(2)

As regards the treatment of liabilities for other trusts, when establishing the value of the property to which the person is beneficially entitled (in the case of a bare trust) and property to which the person is deemed to be beneficially entitled (by s49), applying St Barbe Green, liabilities can be deducted and those liabilities are also subject to the other provisions, including s103. Consistently with the language and structure of s64 IHTA 1984, trustee liabilities can be deducted in calculating the “value” of the relevant property for the purposes of calculating the ten-year charge on settlements without an interest in possession. Section 60 TCGA 1992 cannot assist, as it is a differently worded section within a different tax regime. We need to focus on construing the provisions in front of us in this appeal.

(3)

To the extent that the Appellants submit that the deeming in s49(1) should not be applied for the purposes of s103, that begs the question by assuming the validity of the Appellants’ position on the structure and purpose of s103.

(4)

There is nothing self-defeating or anomalous in applying the deeming to s103 in the manner set out by the FTT. The effect is that, had Mrs Elborne not transferred the Note to the Family Settlement, her estate would have had equal and offsetting assets and liabilities represented by the Note (subject to any provisions requiring that the liability not be taken into account).

35.

Addressing the Appellants’ alternative submission that the consideration for the Note was not “property derived from” Mrs Elborne for the purposes of s103, Mr Davey submitted that s103 does not require two separate transactions. The FTT had rightly rejected this argument, having stated at FTT[212] (in the context of the Section 103 Incumbrance Issue) that “the use of the past tense is adequately explained by the fact that Section 103 is necessarily looking back in time from the point immediately before the deceased’s death”. He submitted that the Appellants’ argument seeks to cut down the meaning of “property derived from the deceased” in a manner which is inconsistent with the meaning of that phrase (including as defined in s103(3)) and with the purposive construction intended for an anti-avoidance provision.

36.

Mr Davey submitted that the Appellants’ approach gives rise to the peculiar consequence identified by the FTT at FTT[235], namely “it would be very peculiar if the application of the Section were to turn on the fact that the consideration given for the issue of the Note was provided simultaneously with, and not a scintilla of time before, the issue of the Note”.

37.

In addition, Mr Davey submitted that the Appellants’ contention is inconsistent with McDougal’s Trustees v The Lord Advocate [1952] SC 260 (“McDougal’s Trustees”), where Lord Patrick, addressing the predecessor provision to s103 which applied to estate duty, addressed a gift and loan which were said to be “related in the closest possible way” as they “formed part of one transaction” (at p276) and said these facts did not prevent the application of case (b) of (what was then) s31(1) Finance Act 1939 (“FA 1939”) to the debt in question.

38.

The Appellants had submitted that their approach was consistent with the purpose of limb (a). Mr Davey submitted that this takes the position no further where there is no universally agreed purpose.

39.

Mr Bradley had contrasted the FTT’s approach to debt cases with that which it had taken in respect of incumbrance cases, where the FTT had concluded at FTT[214] that the language of s103 is such that there is a “clear and obvious” separation between the disposition which created the incumbrance and the disposition of the property which was, or was represented by the property which was, the consideration for the creation of the incumbrance. Whilst HMRC are not cross-appealing the FTT’s decision on the Section 103 Incumbrance Issue, Mr Davey confirmed that HMRC's position is that the FTT’s analysis on the incumbrance limb was erroneous. They therefore agree with the Appellants that the language concerning the creation of an incumbrance in s103(1) does not justify the separation which was read in by the FTT in the context of the Section 103 Incumbrance Issue.