Case No. CO-2850-2005

th April 2005 62.The letter falls into parts. A response to the threat of proceedings and the reasons for maintaining the ban after consideration of the further representations. The principal reason for the ban and the defence is that:“…what is at issue is the desire of the TRNC to advertise the tourism opportunities in the northern part of Cyprus and to seek if necessary to invoke the court’s help to that end”.The role of TRNC in promoting tourism by advertising is the source of offence, but only because TRNC is not recognised:“If the political position pertaining to North Cyprus were to change or the territory were to become subsumed within an internationally recognised state, TfL would, of course, reconsider its position”.But the letter also puts forward another reason, a reason for not permitting any advertising for tourism in North Cyprus:“In any event, TfL considers that it would be improper for a public authority such as TfL to permit advertising of this kind designed to attract tourism into an area which carries such a substantial “health warning” from the Foreign Office”.63.The letter from Mr Wood, subsequently received by the defendant which refuted the so-called “health warning”, created difficulty for Mr Allen, but he manfully attempted to argue that the reason was nevertheless sound. It has to be said it was not abandoned by the defendant, even after the letter from Mr Wood, although it was rephrased. In the letter to agents in May 2005, the defendant put it thus:“in its capacity as a public authority, TfL also considered that it would be inappropriate to carry such advertising taking into account the concerns highlighted with the Travel Advice section of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office website”.64.In my judgment, the FCO website information, sensibly, could not be described as amounting to a substantial “health warning”. It is enough that the FCO rejected the defendant’s suggestion that it was intended as such. But more than that, after the defendant received the letter, it had been informed that the UK government supported “moves to start direct flights between the UK and northern Cyprus”. It was an exaggeration to suggest that concerns were highlighted by the FCO. The advice draws attention to the existence of border controls and the implications for buying property. I have little doubt that such advice has to be given regularly in respect of many countries, not to deter travellers from going there, but to inform them of relevant facts. Mr Allen submitted that “someone might take advantage of a holiday there and things could go wrong” and the defendant could be “seen” to have advertised the holiday. This argument bore little or no relationship to the reliance upon a substantial health warning. The ban was not imposed to protect travellers from some of the usual vagaries of foreign travel. In truth, the original “FCO reason” advanced by the defendant was plainly wrong.65.The reasons based on the defendant’s advertising policy was developed in the following passage:“TfL’s decision, based upon the complaint received from the Chairman of the London Assembly … pointed out quite clearly that TRNC was not recognised by the UK (and which TfL understands represents the views of his Greek Cypriot constituents) was fully justified by reference to the provisions of the Advertising Policy”.Later:“It is simply unarguable that this advertisement and its basis in action of the so called “Ministry of Tourism of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) is anything other than deeply politically controversial”.66.I do not doubt that many Greek Cypriots in London object to and are offended by any form of promotion of tourism in North Cyprus. As Mr Wood pointed out, the key issues in connection with tourism were related to “displaced people and appropriated property”. In Hesperides Hotels Limited the action was brought by the displaced owner of the hotel. The complaint advanced by Mr Coleman on behalf of his constituents was not put forward on behalf of dispossessed property owners. No constituents have been identified. The defendant, if it had in mind the case for any particular Greek owners of property who could have been offended by the advertising, gave no thought to inquiring into the matter. On the evidence, whatsoever possibility there may be that one of Mr Coleman’s constituents is a dispossessed property owner, there is no evidence before the court on the issue. 67.In truth, on the evidence, it is clear that the substance of the complaint was that it was seen to be the campaign of the administration of TRNC, an unrecognised state. This perception and thus the decision which was driven by it, disregarded the independent status and existence of the first claimant, which had its own commercial interests in promoting tourism and failed to draw a distinction between the first claimant and TRNC. Drawing upon the principles in connection with state recognition, it was reasoned that the campaign was “offering tourism” over an area contrary “to the rights recognised as lawfully being with the Republic of Cyprus”. I have already stated why, in my judgment, the first claimant’s right to promote tourism in North Cyprus stands apart and is unaffected by the fact that the Republic of Cyprus is the power which HMG recognises as sovereign in the territory. 68.Mr Beloff submitted that the ban was imposed for an improper political motive. The target, he submitted, was the regime or administration in North Cyprus. It is difficult to interpret Mr Coleman’s complaint as not being politically motivated. He was reticent about attributing his intervention to his Greek Cypriot constituents and expressed the matter as being his concern, but the material shows it was driven by representations from the Greek Cypriot community. It is not likely that he had in mind the arguments on standing and justiciability laid out in the second decision letter. 69.It seems to me to be unnecessary to inquire beyond the validity of the legal peg of non-recognition upon which the defendant has hung its decision. In my judgment, it cannot sustain the case and it is unnecessary to consider whether it was a cloak to disguise an ulterior motive (see Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] AC 1054). 70.It follows that judicial review must be granted for error of law, error of fact and irrationality, on the grounds above and for the following reasons which I shall state briefly as possible.