Responsibilities of the EJA
Responsibilities of the EJA
The EJA has legal responsibilities of its own. Article 26/624 forms part of the extradition arrangement between the IJA (France) and the EJA (the UK). The Article 26/624 deduction is the post-extradition function of the IJA. And yet the requested person’s entitlement to have that deduction made can become a matter of direct concern for the EJA. The answer is the same one as was given by the Divisional Court in A at §39. The UK court as EJA itself has “an obligation not to act in such a way as to cause a disproportionate interference with the relevant ECHR rights of a person whose extradition is being sought”. The “question whether the Appellant has served his sentence” can be “directly relevant and necessary for the English court to consider in order to guard against it breaching its primary obligations to a person who is subject to an extradition request” (see A at §40).
So, where the requested person has been remanded in custody and in detention (deprived of their liberty), the EJA’s assessment of Article 8 proportionality may have regard to the period which left to be served when Qualifying Remand is deducted: see Dobrowolski v Poland [2023] EWHC 763 (Admin) at §§7-8. That does not mean an appeal will succeed simply because only a period of a few weeks remains to be served; nor does it mean that the question for the extradition court becomes whether the requested person “has or has not served enough of” the sentence: see Molik v Poland [2020] EWHC 2836 (Admin) at §11. It does mean, however, that there is a bright-line once the period of qualifying remand in custody (detention) reaches the same duration as the sentence of imprisonment in respect of which extradition is sought. In that situation, for the purposes of the Article 26/624, the requested person will be entitled to have their sentence recognised by the IJA as being served in full. Where that bright-line point is imminent, the Court can make a deferred discharge order: Molik at §18. Where the bright-line has already been crossed, the answer is to discharge the requested person. That is so whether or not the IJA agrees to withdraw the ExAW. It is so whether the IJA maintains that extradition should take place so that it can exercise its “prerogative” under the Article 26/614 mechanism.
As the Divisional Court explained in Newman v Poland [2012] EWHC 2931 at §19:
it would be an abuse of the process of this court and the court below to continue to seek the extradition of a person who has, in effect, served his custodial sentence in full, as a result of the application of Article 26, solely for the purpose of enabling the management decision for the discharge of the appellant to be taken in Poland [and] it would be a disproportionate interference with the appellant's right to a private and/or family life under Article 8 to extradite the appellant for the same purpose.
- Heading
- FORDHAM J
- PART 2. THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT
- Qualifying Curfew in UK and French Domestic Law
- Four Components
- A and Doga
- Expert Evidence and the Chance to Respond
- Further Information and a Reply
- Background
- Evidence Ventilated in Previous Cases
- A Sole Viable Point
- The Article 26/624 Mechanism
- Deprivation of Liberty
- Article 716-4 of the French Code
- “Detention” and ‘Exclusive Competence’ of the IJA
- Responsibilities of the EJA
- These EMCs are not a Deprivation of Liberty
- Restriction of Liberty
- Article 142-11 of the French Code
- The French Appellate Courts
- The French Supreme Court’s Review Role
- Qualifying Curfew and ‘Exclusive Competence’ of the IJA
- EMHA is an Evaluative Question
- Article 142-11 is a Duty
- Very Clear Cut
- The Evidence
- This Case
- Conclusion
- PART 3. THE RESPONDENT’S REQUEST
- Andrysiewicz
- The Request
- Injustice
- Very Clear-Cut
- Conclusions
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