Very Clear Cut
Very Clear Cut
Mr Swain for the IJA reminds me that the extradition court will not generally get involved in contested questions as to the correct interpretation of provisions of the domestic law of an IJA. An example of this is the line of cases on limitations periods: see Troka v Albania [2021] EWHC 3424 (Admin) at §18. But in the present context, the Divisional Court answered that point in A, pointing at §39 to the “necessary proviso” where the position is “very clear cut”.
The position will be very different if the requested person’s evidence is unclear or unsatisfactory, or if the IJA has put forward a positive case. That was the case in relation to Hungarian domestic law and Qualifying Curfew in Vidak v Hungary [2023] EWHC 1108 at §§39-40. There, Chamberlain J said this:
There is clear evidence from the respondent judicial authority that no period beyond the six months served in custody would fall to be deducted… This case is therefore quite different from A v France …, where the respondent judicial authority had said nothing about whether the appellant had served his sentence. Here, the respondent judicial authority has said something very clear about that: he has not. Does Dr Kádár’s evidence enable me to reach a contrary view? The terms of his evidence suggest a negative answer. Dr Kádár himself considers that “not all types of criminal supervision are deducted from the sentence to be served” and that the situation is “not clear cut”. Although he describes one case in which the court was persuaded to take into account time served on an equivalent curfew, he properly adds that he cannot say whether this case “can be regarded as standard practice” and expresses a particular doubt about whether the procedural device used in the one case of which he is aware would be available here. The evidence is not sufficiently clear to enable me to reach a finding about Hungarian law that is directly contrary to the express view of the Hungarian judicial authority.
- Heading
- FORDHAM J
- PART 2. THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT
- Qualifying Curfew in UK and French Domestic Law
- Four Components
- A and Doga
- Expert Evidence and the Chance to Respond
- Further Information and a Reply
- Background
- Evidence Ventilated in Previous Cases
- A Sole Viable Point
- The Article 26/624 Mechanism
- Deprivation of Liberty
- Article 716-4 of the French Code
- “Detention” and ‘Exclusive Competence’ of the IJA
- Responsibilities of the EJA
- These EMCs are not a Deprivation of Liberty
- Restriction of Liberty
- Article 142-11 of the French Code
- The French Appellate Courts
- The French Supreme Court’s Review Role
- Qualifying Curfew and ‘Exclusive Competence’ of the IJA
- EMHA is an Evaluative Question
- Article 142-11 is a Duty
- Very Clear Cut
- The Evidence
- This Case
- Conclusion
- PART 3. THE RESPONDENT’S REQUEST
- Andrysiewicz
- The Request
- Injustice
- Very Clear-Cut
- Conclusions
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