AC-2025-CDF-000062 - [2025] EWHC 2619 (Admin)
Administrative Court

AC-2025-CDF-000062 - [2025] EWHC 2619 (Admin)

Fecha: 10-Oct-2025

MPT’s approach to insight and remorse

MPT’s approach to insight and remorse

54.

Secondly, the appellant submits that the MPT placed excessive weight on his denial of the allegations underlying his criminal conviction. He concedes that the MPT directed itself that, as a matter of principle, denial of the offence did not equate to lack of insight. However, he submits that, upon analysis, the MPT did not follow its self-direction and effectively treated his denial of the offence as decisively demonstrating a lack of insight.

55.

Mr Anderson submits that the MPT’s impairment and sanction decisions were well-reasoned. He submits that the MPT did not fall into the sort of error posited by the appellant. He emphasises that the appellant’s attitude to the conduct underlying the criminal conviction was properly to be taken into account when weighing up insight: any assessment of ongoing risk must pay close attention to a doctor’s attitude to what he or she has done (Sayer, para 25, above).

56.

I agree with Mr Anderson. As I have set out above, the MPT expressly accepted at para 72 of its impairment decision that a denial of wrongdoing is not an absolute bar to the development of insight. It accepted that the appellant had insight into the gravity of the offence of which he had been convicted in so far as he understood the way in which society views his conduct as found proved. As set out above, the Tribunal accepted in para 77 of its impairment decision that the appellant understood that “there were things that he could and should have done differently.” On this basis, the Tribunal was willing to accept that he had some limited insight.

57.

It cannot realistically be maintained that the Tribunal automatically treated the ongoing denial of criminal conduct as entailing that the appellant lacked insight. The Tribunal properly considered the evidence before it and reached a conclusion on insight that was open to it. There are no grounds for suggesting that the MPT’s conclusion that the appellant had limited insight is wrong.

58.

Furthermore, as Mr Anderson submits, the appellant in his written and oral submissions continues to demonstrate limited insight. He says in his skeleton argument:

“Where violence has always been denied altogether, what can still be agreed on is that, at the very least, it was not disproportionate or mindless abuse leading to significant bodily harm.”

59.

Even in a case where violence is denied, this description of the underlying allegations is hard to reconcile with insight into the seriousness of (for example) kicking a pregnant woman in the back, causing her to fall on her stomach; or with hitting someone on the head against a car window; or with hitting someone with a belt (to mention just three of the underlying allegations).

60.

The appellant’s skeleton argument describes his criminal conviction as “based on concerns raised by a single individual.” Even if the appellant disagrees with the verdict of the jury, this description fails to demonstrate any appreciation of the seriousness and number of the events underlying the criminal conviction and their considerable timespan. I would agree with the MPT that the appellant’s insight is limited. He was properly sanctioned on that basis.

61.

Against this background, I turn to the grounds of appeal