AC-2025-LON-000160 - [2025] EWHC 3006 (Admin)

I will introduce these together, as Mr Horne did, although each of grounds 5(i), (ii) and (iii) will need to be dealt with separately.

These grounds of appeal were formulated as follows:

“Ground 3:

The Committee erred in finding dishonesty under Charge 7(b) in relation to the findings of fact made under Charge 5. As part of its reasoning the Committee opined:

You could not offer any explanation to the Committee for the change in dates in respect of Patients B, F and K, save to suggest that it was the result of administrative error ...

And

In reaching its decision, the Committee could identify no other reasonable explanation for the alteration of dates.

Under Ground 3, it is submitted that the Committee erred as it applied the wrong legal test, shifting the burden on proof onto the Appellant. It was for the General Dental Council to prove their case on the Balance on the Probabilities, rather than for the Appellant to prove. As such, the Committee erred in law.”

“Ground 5(i):

In respect of Patients B, F and K

The Committee in finding dishonesty under Charge 7(b) in relation to the findings of fact made under Charge 5, relied on the motivation and reasoning of the Appellant was to ensure that the yearly NHS Contractual Targets were met. This was in error as:

a.

The Committee failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that that the claims in respect of these patients would have had a negligible effect on achieving the yearly targets as all of the alleged overclaiming amounted to only 0.28% of the yearly target; and/or

b.

The Committee failed to properly set out how this alleged reasoning allowed the Appellant to meet the requirement to meet the NHS Contractual Target.

Ground 5(ii):

In respect of Patient C and D in Charge 7(b)

The Committee erred in failing to consider or weigh into the balance:

a.

Whether a second Band 3 claim, for the same treatment within 6 weeks of an earlier claim, would in fact have been eligible for any separate award of UDA points as against the yearly contractual target.

b.

That the Appellant did not require to attempt to submit incorrect duplicate claims to reach his yearly NHS Contractual Target; and

c.

The Committee erred in placing the burden of proof upon the Appellant by determining that he had failed to prove an administrative error, when the burden was on the GDC to prove dishonesty.

Ground 5(iii):

In respect of Patient I in Charge 7(b)

The Committee erred in failing to consider or weigh into the balance:

a.

That there was no evidence led by the GDC that he needed to attempt to submit incorrect duplicate claims to reach his yearly NHS Contractual Target; and

b.

The Committee erred in placing the burden of proof upon the Appellant by determining that he had failed to prove an administrative error, when the burden was on the GDC to prove dishonesty.”

Ground 3 was said to be based on an error of law, being a contention that the PCC had reversed the burden of proof and effectively required Mr Mobasseri to prove his innocence. It was acknowledged by Mr Horne that grounds 5(i) to (iii) were challenges to finding of fact (although grounds 5(ii)(c) and 5(iii)(b) were really reflections of ground 3, and I will treat them as such).

The PCC, in considering the question of dishonesty, first referred to the following passage from paragraph 74 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2018] AC 391 at paragraph 74:

“When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of the individual’s knowledge or belief as to the facts. The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief is a matter of evidence (often in practice determinative) going to whether he held the belief, but it is not an additional requirement that his belief must be reasonable; the question is whether it is genuinely held. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is established, the question whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be determined by the fact-finder by applying the (objective) standards of ordinary decent people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he has done is, by those standards, dishonest.”

The PCC went on to say that it accepted the advice of its Legal Adviser that:

“…the dishonesty alleged in respect of charge 5 must be considered entirely separately on its own: the fact that you admit dishonesty in respect of charges 4 and 6 has no bearing in the Committee’s decision making on whether your conduct was dishonest in respect of charge 5…”.

The PCC also stated, in respect of dishonesty under charge 5:

“The dishonesty alleged under charge 5 depends on whether you submitted, or caused to be submitted, the inappropriate claims in the knowledge that they were dishonestly inappropriate and submitted for financial gain as opposed to doing so as the result of administrative or computer error.”

It does not appear to me that, in so stating matters, the PCC was seeking to impose upon itself a requirement in law to find motive, which both parties on the appeal agreed was not necessary in order to find dishonesty, but rather setting out the opposing factual positions that had been advanced in support of the parties’ respective contentions as to whether the conduct had been dishonest or not and what, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, would indicate dishonesty.

I will explain the background to, and deal with the facts relating to, each of grounds 5(i), (ii) and (iii) separately and will deal with ground 3 as it relates to each of them.