AC-2025-LON-002122 - [2025] EWHC 2013 (Admin)

The detriment in the present case is that, in the period between proscription and the date of the final decision about its legality, the order will have an impact on the claimant’s and others’ freedom of expression and freedom to protest on an issue of considerable importance to them and, whether one agrees with them or not, to the country as a whole. If, as the claimant says, the proscription order is likely to have a significant chilling effect on the legitimate political speech of many thousands of people, that would do considerable harm to the public interest. A decision requiring the Home Secretary to lay an order to deproscribe PA, given sometime in the middle of 2026, could not repair that injury in the way that a payment of interest could on the facts of the Glencore case.

This point had some substance even before the proscription order came into force. At [100] of my interim relief judgment, I said this:

“It is possible that some who have been protesting legitimately under the banner of PA will be deterred from continuing to protest for fear of incurring criminal liability (for example on the basis that continuing their protest might be perceived as expressing support for PA or as organising on its behalf). The evidence I have seen establishes that the broad criminal prohibitions imposed by the 2000 Act, and the very long sentences potentially available for breach of them, can cast a long shadow over legitimate speech. This, however, is the inherent consequence of a regime which aims to disrupt and disable organisations which meet the threshold for proscription and which the Secretary of State and Parliament decide to proscribe.”

The evidence filed by the claimant since the interim relief judgment suggests that some of the claimant’s predictions about the effects of the proscription order have been borne out by events.

First, there are cases where persons protesting against what they consider to be Israel’s genocide and in support of Palestine or Gaza—who are not on any view expressing support for PA—have attracted various kinds of police attention, from questioning to arrest. An example can be found in the witness statement of Laura Murton, who was questioned by armed officers from Kent Constabulary for holding a sign with the words “Free Gaza” and a Palestinian flag. She videoed the interaction and has produced a transcript. There are other reports of similar incidents. For example, the human rights campaigner Peter Tatchell posted on social media that he had been stopped by security staff at a concert in Trafalgar Square because he was wearing a badge in the colours of the Palestinian flag, bearing the words “Palestine Solidarity Campaign – Free PALESTINE” and the web address of that organisation.

On one level, it is important not to draw too much from the fact that police and others appear to have misunderstood the law on some occasions. It may be anticipated that the number of such misunderstandings will diminish over time and that, if they do not, the criminal courts will make matters clear in due course. As I said at [97] of my interim relief judgment, it remains lawful to express one’s opposition to Israel’s actions in Gaza and elsewhere, including by drawing attention to what some regard as Israel’s genocide and other serious violations of international law. This can be done lawfully in private conversations, in print, on social media and at protests. It also remains lawful to express one’s support for Palestine, Palestinians, or pro-Palestinian organisations not connected with PA. Nonetheless, reports of the kind of police conduct referred to in [35] above are liable to have a chilling effect on those wishing to express legitimate political views. This effect can properly be regarded as an indirect consequence of the proscription order.

Secondly, and more importantly, there are numerous examples of speech which have attracted police attention where the line between legitimate and proscribed speech is more difficult to draw. Here, the police have the unenviable task of distinguishing between those seeking to express support for PA without saying so in terms and those whose intention is simply to call for action of one kind or another in relation to the situation in Palestine. Criminal courts may have to make decisions in individual cases about instances such as these. It would not be appropriate for me to say anything here about these cases, save that the existence of a large category of cases that are close to the line demonstrates that the proscription order is likely to have a significant deterrent effect on legitimate speech. This shows that the proscription order is likely to give rise to a substantial interference with rights guaranteed by the common law and by Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).

Third, there are cases where individuals who have clearly expressed support for PA have been arrested and in some cases charged with offences under ss. 12 and 13 of the 2000 Act. In these cases, the individuals concerned have chosen to do something that—on the assumption that the proscription order is itself lawful—they know is now a criminal offence. As I said at [98] of the interim relief judgment, it would be wrong to accord significant weight to the interests of those who plan deliberately to flout the law. This category of affected persons seems to me to be relevant in another way, however. Persons charged with offences under ss. 12 and 13 of the 2000 Act may wish to test the assumption that the proscription order is lawful. I consider the relevance of this to the “alternative remedy” argument as factor 3 below.