![AC-2024-LON-001764 - [2025] EWHC 2355 (Admin)](https://backend.juristeca.com/files/emisores/logo_fi51A75.png){kind=logo}
Introduction
Introduction
On 30 April 2025, I granted permission to the Claimants to apply for judicial review in relation to the Defendant’s policy governing the deployment of Live Facial Recognition technology (“LFR”) in the Metropolitan Police District. The policy is dated 11 September 2024. As the policy itself states, it concerns the Defendant’s deployment of overt LFR technology to locate persons on a watchlist.
The claim was launched on 24 May 2024 in relation to an earlier policy but was stayed by order of Sheldon J pending the Defendant’s policy review. Following that review, the earlier policy was withdrawn and the September 2024 policy came into force. The claim was amended in order to deal with the September 2024 policy. The grounds of challenge relating to the earlier policy were withdrawn by consent.
The grounds on which permission has been granted may be summarised (with renumbering) as follows:
Ground 1: Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”): The Defendant’s ongoing use of LFR since the introduction of the September 2024 policy breaches the Claimants’ right to respect for private life under article 8 of the Convention because, contrary to article 8(2), it permits the deployment of LFR in a way that is not “in accordance with the law.”
Ground 2: Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention: The Defendant’s ongoing use of LFR since the introduction of the September 2024 policy breaches the Claimants’ rights to freedom of expression under article 10 of the Convention because, contrary to article 10(2), it permits the deployment of LFR in a way that is not “prescribed by law.” Further or alternatively, it breaches the Claimants’ rights under article 11 of the Convention (freedom of assembly and association) because it breaches the “prescribed by law” element of article 11(2).
It will readily be seen that both grounds of challenge raise the question whether the September 2024 policy has the quality of law.
The Defendant’s case is that the September 2024 policy is lawful. The Defendant accepts, however, that the court’s scrutiny at a substantive hearing of the claim is likely to serve the public interest and, in particular, the interests of “policing by consent.” Acknowledging the importance of the issues raised, the Defendant did not resist the grant of permission.
When granting permission, I directed that the following interim applications, made by the Claimants, should be determined at a hearing:
An application to rely on expert evidence, namely a report by Professor Martin Utley (“the expert report” or “the report”).
An application for a costs capping order under sections 88 and 89 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 (“the Act”); and
An application to rely on Ms Carlo’s Third Witness Statement.
At the hearing, Mr Dan Squires KC, Mr Aidan Wills and Ms Rosalind Comyn appeared on behalf of the Claimants. Ms Anya Proops KC and Mr Raphael Hogarth appeared on behalf of the Defendant.
After the parties’ submissions, I announced my decision that all three applications would be allowed for reasons that I would hand down at a later date. This judgment contains my reasons.