AC-2025-LON-001949 - [2025] EWHC 2425 (Admin)

The submissions of the Parties

The Claimant

Mr Nabi submitted that the Claimant had been treated appallingly by the Defendant. Although the Defendant had apologised for the delays in its pleading, no such apology was contained in the witness evidence from the Defendant. The Claimant is in an “intolerable” situation facing eviction where his medical needs as well as those of Issa are acute.

Mr Nabi submitted that it was for the Defendant to persuade the court why relief should not be granted and that it had failed to show that it had taken all reasonable steps. In particular, he drew attention to the fact that the witness evidence from the Defendant had completely failed to address the Ombudsman’s report. Mr Nabi submitted that this omission was critical, as the Defendant had agreed with the Ombudsman that it would provide suitable temporary accommodation to the Claimant within one month of the Ombudsman’s final decision. No explanation had been provided as to why it was now said to be impossible to provide suitable accommodation within that timeframe. Mr Nabi submitted that the Defendant’s evidence lacks adequate particularity for the court to be satisfied that it is impossible for it to secure suitable accommodation for the Claimant.

Mr Nabi submitted that the proper course was to make a mandatory order that suitable temporary accommodation be provided within 14 days or, as an alternative, within 28 days. That latter period would reflect what the Defendant had agreed with the Ombudsman in March 2025.

Mr Nabi relied upon the evidence from Mr Panayi that indicated that there was potentially suitable private rental accommodation available to the Defendant. There was Part VI accommodation available to the Defendant which it could decide to use in this case. Finally, Mr Nabi argued that the Public Sector Equality Duty was relevant to whether the discretion should be exercised to grant a mandatory order. Here the Claimant and Issa have the protected characteristic of disability and that weighed in favour of the exercise of discretion.

The Defendant

Mr Peacock accepted at the outset of his oral submissions that the Defendant was in breach of the s.193(2) duty. Having done so, he argued that no purpose would be served by granting declaratory relief although he accepted that the court may well conclude that there was a need for the Claimant at least to be granted the remedy of a declaration.

Mr Peacock accepted that there were points in favour of the grant of a mandatory order. The Defendant accepted that the handling of the Claimant’s case was very far below what could reasonably be expected. The Defendant had been found guilty of maladministration by the Ombudsman. Mr Peacock repeated the apology that had been made in the pleadings. He accepted that the agreement with the Ombudsman that the Defendant would provide suitable accommodation within one month was a factor in favour of the grant of mandatory relief. Similarly, the Defendant accepted that the evidence showing an exacerbation of the Claimant’s psychiatric condition was a factor pointing to the grant of mandatory relief.

Mr Peacock submitted that there were a number of factors which nonetheless militated against the grant of a mandatory order. Although the Defendant accepted that the facts here indicated that it was a “particularly serious” case, it was relevant that the Claimant was currently in suitable accommodation (albeit accommodation from which he is due to be evicted).

The Defendant had not been in breach of the duty for a significant period of time: it was measured in months rather than years (as in Imam and Elkundi). He submitted that the Defendant had taken all reasonable steps to secure temporary accommodation. Mr Peacock disputed the Claimant’s reliance on the Public Sector Equality Duty as a factor that went to discretion. In Mr Peacock’s submission, that might be a factor in whether the Defendant had taken all reasonable steps. The priorities that the Defendant had set in relation to allocating temporary accommodation (set out above at paragraph 34) were compatible with the Defendant’s Public Sector Equality Duty.

Mr Peacock submitted that if the court was not satisfied that the Defendant had taken all reasonable steps then any mandatory order should require the provision of suitable temporary accommodation within a period of 12 weeks (which was the period ordered by Hill J in R (oao Bell) v Lambeth LBC [2022] EWHC 2008 (Admin); [2022] H.L.R. 45. Alternatively, the order should require compliance by not less than eight weeks.