Claim No: IL-2025-000064 - [2025] EWHC 2545 (Ch)
Fecha: 06-Oct-2025
If material at all, this is a question of fact; but, in any event it is extremely difficult to understand how an expert would be able to opine on this matter: it suggests that there would be some reco
If material at all, this is a question of fact; but, in any event it is extremely difficult to understand how an expert would be able to opine on this matter: it suggests that there would be some recognised body of expertise, or that the expert would have detailed information about the way Citadel Securities, and every other business – presumably limited to those who do or might engage in algorithmic trading - operate. The defendant will be entitled to assert before the trial judge that the claimants’ ‘confidential information’ would be of no interest or use to any other business; and the trial judge will be able to take a view about that, including by reference to what the defendant said at the time, such as that “With my expertise in NLP and the valuable insights I’ve gained at G-Research, I know I can make an impact from day one – whether by replicating and refining successful approaches … ”;and“GR is very advanced when it comes to NLP, already fine-tuning models back in 2019. I have an overview of everything they’re doing in that space. It could be replicated and refined for other use cases…”, and so on.
The claimants acknowledge that they will, of course, give appropriate disclosure, and address these matters, as required, in their witness evidence (by people with first-hand knowledge of such matters). In his turn, the defendant will clearly be well able to address these matters himself.
For all these reasons, the claimants invite the court to dismiss the defendant’s application to adduce expert evidence. It is not necessary. It is not reasonably required. It would not even be potentially useful (which is not the test in any event). To the contrary, it is more likely to be an unwelcome distraction, both in the preparation for a speedy trial, and for the trial judge at trial. It will, in reality, serve substantially to increase costs, and for no material benefit. If, notwithstanding the claimants’ submissions, the court were against them, then directions would be needed: (i) in respect of each and every issue (which would need to be carefully defined) in relation to which the court considers that expert evidence is reasonably required, (ii) for the exchange of reports (which, contrary to the defendant’s position, should plainly come after, and not before,factual witness evidence), (iii) a joint without prejudice meeting, (iv) a joint statement, and so forth. I have already referred (in the section of this judgment dealing with case management issues) to the claimants’ post-hearing submission that if (contrary to their primary position) the court were to determine that expert evidence is reasonably required, a number of consequential matters would arise for determination at a further hearing.
In her recently filed, further written submissions, Ms Goodman begins by submitting that this is an appropriate case for a single joint expert. This would be more proportionate. Whilst the matters which that evidence would address are controversial, they are appropriate for determination by a single expert. Referencing observations of Birss LJ (with the agreement of Sir Geoffrey Vos C and Arnold LJ) in Stellantis Auto SAS v Autoliv AB [2024] EWCA Civ 609, [2024] 1 WLR 4742 at paragraphs 62 and 63, Ms Goodman points out that: (i) "the utility of single joint expert evidence is not confined to uncontroversial matters"; and (ii) separate experts may well be appropriate where there are "multiple schools of thought", but that is “a quite specific state of affairs, very different from the kinds of differences of opinion one sees with expert evidence generally”. The defendant also submits that, given the constrained time-frame before the trial is scheduled to take place in February 2026, there is considerable sense in single joint expert evidence, which will be a swifter process than the typical directions for separate expert evidence require.
Ms Goodman invites the court to hold that this is a case in which considerations of proportionality must take centre ground. The defendant submits that a single joint expert is more proportionate (as it represents a significant costs saving), and accordingly ought to be ordered in these proceedings. Two considerations arise with respect to proportionality: (i) the fact that the primary remedy which the claimants seek is unrealistic; and (ii) the parties' staggeringly different financial means. As regards proportionality, first and foremost the claimants seek injunctive relief. That is the primary remedy they seek because they say that damages would not be adequate as a remedy. The defendant submits that the injunctive relief which the claimants seek is both unrealistic and unprecedented because it would put the claimants in a better position than if there had been no misuse of the claimants’ confidential information. The claimants are seeking, in essence, for the defendant to be restrained by a non-competition covenant lasting two years beyond the end of his year’s garden leave - in circumstances where his employment contract does not itself contain any non-compete covenant. Self-evidently, the claimants will be placed in a better position than they would otherwise have been but for the defendant's actions. This is said to be unrealistic, and to lack any basis in precedent. Accordingly, considerations of proportionality ought to be tempered by the unrealistic position adopted by the claimants in these proceedings. A second consideration is the financial asymmetry between the parties. This is relevant to both limbs of the overriding objective. Ms Goodman says that the claimants' propensity, and ability, to incur eye-watering costs will be readily apparent to the court. The defendant is a private individual of limited means. A single joint expert will enable the defendant to be able to participate in the proceedings on a more level playing field. It is therefore more just, and will limit the overall costs of the proceedings.
Ms Goodman then moves to consider the five topic headings for expert evidence, as follows:
- Heading
- Introduction
- Background
- Case management issues
- Disclosure: legal principles
- The first three of these propositions may be distilled from McParland , the fourth from Lombard North Central , and the fifth from PRS v Qatar Airways Group
- Multiple, and overlapping, issues for disclosure should be avoided wherever possible
- Disclosure: Submissions, analysis and conclusions
- I have not yet decided whether this should form one of the issues for disclosure. But if it were to do so, then it would seem to me to eliminate all need for disclosure issue 4 since it makes it unnec
- To the claimants’ knowledge, the defendant could not have replicated Humber elsewhere. Accordingly, the claimants’ case with respect to any Springboard relief (insofar as it is based on the possibilit
- The defendant cannot see that this possibility has been considered by the claimants. The defendant is therefore concerned about the nature of any searches the claimants will have undertaken concerning
- Further, I consider that the claimants place too much emphasis upon the defendant’s own repeated assertions, in contemporaneous documents, that he could (and would) ‘replicate’ Humber (as reproduced a
- Expert evidence: legal principles
- The burden of establishing that expert evidence is both (i) admissible and (ii) reasonably required (in the sense that it is not just ‘potentially useful’ ) is on the party which seeks permission to a
- Barings is authority for propositions (1) and (2); Clifford for proposition (3); The RBS Rights Issue Litigation for proposition (4); British Airways for propositions (5) to (9); and Astex for proposi
- At p. 11, the tribunal described the respondents’ experts’ evidence as “ independent, impressively detailed and completely credible ,” and further that
- Ms Goodman submits that this arbitral decision demonstrates the utility of an expert in this type of assessment as lawyers are obviously ill-equipped to know, and the court will be ill-equipped to adj
- In Henderson & Jones Ltd v Salica Investments Ltd [2025] EWHC 475 (Comm) , Calver J (at paragraph 236) is said to have ordered expert evidence to assist in determining “ (i) whether the allegedly conf
- The decision tells the court nothing about whether or not expert evidence should be ordered in a case governed by the Civil Procedure Rules. That case involved an arbitration. Mr Craig KC rightly says
- Practical utility of confidential information The defendant proposes to rely on the expert evidence of Mr Colin Knight, a qualified trader with over 20 years’ experience in trading strategies. Ms Goodman points out that algorithmic trading was ac
- The claimants have themselves relied on the expert report of Mr Winrow to analyse the coding data extracted from the defendant’s electronic devices, as evidenced by A & O Shearman’s letter of 5 Septem
- It is the claimants who bear the burden of proof in this case, which concerns the nature, and value, of technical descriptions of algorithmic trading strategies and actual code. They are required to p
- Stage in trading strategy development – identifying which stage in the trading strategy development process each piece of ‘confidential information’ (as defined in the particulars of claim) pertained
- The assertion that there are a certain number of stages in the development of a trading strategy at G-Research is the defendant’s own construct , in the sense that it is not said to be a framework ref
- Public domain assessment – assessing whether the ‘confidential information’ was, as a matter of fact, generic and/or widespread industry knowledge within the field of quantitative investment, such tha
- The claimants emphasise that the defendant well knows that the information in issue in this case is not generic and/or widespread industry knowledge. That is precisely why he admits to saying (in an u
- Valuation of confidential information – determining the value of the ‘confidential information’ to a competitor, including with reference to various dates The claimants’ case is that the defendant well knows that Humber is highly valuable: see the co
- Retention of value – Assessing whether, and to what extent, the ‘confidential information’ is likely to retain its value over time, including over a one-year period of garden leave Quite apart from the disproportionate nature of the exercise (not lea
- Practical utility of confidential information – Assessing whether, and to what extent, other businesses (including Citadel Securities) could utilise the ‘confidential information’ in their business ac
- If material at all, this is a question of fact; but, in any event it is extremely difficult to understand how an expert would be able to opine on this matter: it suggests that there would be some reco
- Stage in trading strategy development The claimants submit that the assertion that there are a " number of stages in the development of a trading strategy " is a mere construct. The defendant contends that there is a logical difference be
- Public domain assessment
- The defendant submits that, at most, he referred to Humber at the highest degree of generality, and that the summary to which the court was referred was of minimal value. The parties are, accordingly
- Valuation of confidential information At paragraph 3 of their particulars of claim, the claimants plead that the claim " concerns the defendant's misuse and copying of the claimants' extremely valuable and sensitive confidential informati
- Retention of value Even if the defendant had the requisite knowledge and ability to ‘replicate’ Humber, establishing when Humber is likely to lose its value (through the process of alpha decay) will be the primary consi
- Practical utility of confidential information Conclusions