Objective approach
Objective approach
I recognise that one must adopt an objective approach to the assessment. Objectivity permeates contract law, and indeed many aspects of the other branches of private law. It would be largely meaningless to apply a subjective approach to this question because by definition the parties thought the clause was acceptable – they accepted it, in this case with the benefit of legal advice on both sides.
The point that I was seeking to make in my First Judgment is that LCL had not advanced any reasons, in its factual evidence, for why it had imposed the Default Rate uniformly to all instances of default, such that it was not possible for the experts to comment on or for me to assess whether those reasons, objectively assessed, meant that the rate was not extortionate. I note that the same issue was raised in Cargill (where there was such evidence) and Ahuja (where there was not).
- Heading
- Richard Farnhill (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge of the Chancery Division)
- Factual Background to the Dispute
- The witnesses
- Factual developments since my First Judgment
- The Counterclaim
- Interpretation of the express terms
- Implication of terms
- Equity
- The offers
- Is the Default Rate a penalty?
- The law on penalties
- The question remitted by the Court of Appeal
- Objective approach
- Primary or secondary obligation?
- What were the legitimate interests?
- Was the Default Rate extortionate by reference to the primary obligations that triggered it?
- The counterclaim for statutory interest under the Senior Courts Act 1981
- Conclusions
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