PT-2025-000379 - [2025] EWHC 2628 (Ch)

The Application Notice refers to an interim injunction requiring the Defendants to supply heating to the Hangar with alternatives being either to allow the Claimants to install their own heating system or to appoint an interim receiver. The focus at the hearing was on the first of these – the mandatory order – and the draft order prepared by the Claimants sought relief in respect of the heating of the Hangar as follows:

“4.

By 4 p.m. on [the date 7 days from the date of this Order] the Respondents shall restore or procure the restoration of gas heating to the East Half of the Hangar as follows:

4.1

Heating shall be provided by DH daily between the hours of 6 a.m. and 7 p.m. for the duration of the Respondents’ occupation of the Hangar and to ensure the minimum temperature is 16 degrees Celsius.”

As with the roof, I have considered this application against the test described in section III above.

I am satisfied that there is a serious issue to be tried as to Claimants’ case that they are (or at least one of them is) owed an obligation by the Defendants (or at least one of them) to provide heating. The Defendants themselves accepted in their skeleton argument that “It is possible that there is a serious issue to be tried” on this point (¶62) and I have already set out the relevant terms of the Defence at paragraph 7 above which accepts that, even on their own case, the licence they accept extends in principle to the provision of adequate heating. I am fortified in this conclusion by the fact that the Defendants were providing gas-powered heating until October 2024 and, since then, have continued to charge the Claimants for utilities, including gas and to heat the Hangar (even though there is a dispute about the adequacy of the substitute heating). Further, the evidence from the Claimants presents a strong case that the alternative heating since October 2024 has not been adequate to deal with low temperatures.

Equally, I am not satisfied that damages would be an adequate remedy for the Claimants. Although the Defendants are right to point the fact that the Claimants have sought to quantify the losses suffered so far and particularly those said to have been caused by the shutdown of operations in the period of very low temperatures in January 2025, the impact of future very low temperatures in the Hangar in the future will be difficult to quantify precisely. There may also be aspects of that impact, such as on the morale and productivity the Claimants’ workforce, which are intangible and not amenable to quantification. In addition the EASA requirements include operating at an adequate temperature and there is, in my opinion, some risk to Jet Support’s accreditation even if the risk does not appear as serious as suggested by the Claimants. As I have referred to above, the EASA audit did identify issues with the temperature in the Hangar even if those were related to painting.

As regards the balance of convenience, I am satisfied that a mandatory order relating to the restoration of the gas-powered heating is justified but not in the precise terms sought by the Claimants. Indeed, it seems to me that the balance points firmly in favour of an order even without considering the merits of the Claimants’ case. However, as far as necessary, I am satisfied to a high degree of assurance in relation to the Claimants’ case as to the obligation to provide heating and the breach of that obligation.

I have already referred to the potentially significant impact of the low temperatures on the Claimants in paragraph 53 above. By contrast, it is hard to identify what prejudice the Defendants would suffer by reason of the order which I intend to make. Their own evidence is that they are actively seeking to restore the gas supply and they are already charging Jet Support for their share of the utilities including gas. If restoring the gas supply causes the Defendants to incur any additional costs or losses, they will be protected by the cross-undertaking offered by the Claimants, the adequacy of which was not questioned by the Defendants.

Turning to form of the order, I am not prepared to make an order which requires the Defendants to heat the Hangar to a particular temperature. While I accept that, in drafting this order, the Claimants were seeking to identify a sufficiently precise form of order which reflected the factual situation when the Hangar was heated through the gas-powered system, the proposed order is too prescriptive. The Hangar is a huge building with massive doors the opening of which will inevitably cause the temperature to fluctuate from time to time and there is not sufficient evidence that the temperature was always 16 degrees or above when the gas heating was being used.

Moreover, as I said in the course of the hearing, it seemed to me that the Claimants were really seeking the restoration of the gas-powered heating as that had proved to be adequate prior to October 2024. This remains my view and, subject to one point, the order will simply require the restoration of the gas-powered heating system.

The qualification is that, as the Defendants submitted, the restoration of the gas supply depends on the actions not just of the Defendants but also the supplier with whom they are negotiating. In these circumstances, where an unqualified mandatory order could be thwarted by the actions of the third party supplier, the appropriate order is that the Defendants shall use their best endeavours to restore the gas-powered heating. I note that qualifying a mandatory order in this way was approved by the Court of Appeal in the Peninsular case referred to above. Since this judgment was sent the parties in draft, I have clarified that I intended to apply the same wording as in that case.