BR-2024-000761 - [2025] EWHC 2900 (Ch)

It is not in dispute that an individual (not a company) may apply to have a statutory demand set aside, as the Rules provide for such an application: Rule 10.5. The ground relied upon is genuine and substantial dispute. In Crossley-Cooke v Europanel (UK) Ltd [2010] EWHC 124 (Ch)) the court gave some clarity of the test to be applied. The onus is on the party seeking to set aside the statutory demand: Dowling v Promontoria (Arrow) Ltd [2017] 9 WLUK 135. As regards the evidence, a witness statement supported by documents demonstrating a consistent case that is not inherently implausible, is generally sufficient: Collier v P & M J Wright (Holdings) Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 643.

The parties are not in dispute as to the test for promissory estoppel. Chitty on Contracts (35th Ed.) explains at 7-031:

“For promissory estoppel to operate there must be a legal relationship giving rise to rights and duties between the parties; a promise or a representation by one party that they will not enforce against the other their strict legal rights arising out of that relationship; an intention on the part of the former party that the latter will rely on the representation; and such reliance by the latter party. Even if these requirements are satisfied, the operation of the doctrine may be excluded if it is, nevertheless, not “inequitable” for the first party to go back on their promise.”

Again, the parties are not in dispute about the elements required to demonstrate an actionable misrepresentation. Chitty On Contracts 10-006:

“‘(i) A must have entered the contract after a statement of fact or law has been made on which it was reasonable to believe A was intended to rely;

(ii)

the statement must have been at least substantially untrue;

(iii)

a statement of opinion or of intention will not amount to a misrepresentation unless the person making it does not in fact hold that opinion or intention, though a statement of opinion may carry the implication that the person making it has reasonable grounds for believing what is stated is true;

…

(viii)

the statement must have induced A to enter the contract. It need not have been the sole cause of A entering the contract but in most cases A must show that it would not have entered the contract, or would not have entered it on the same terms, “but for” the misrepresentation…”

Lastly it is argued that in the alternative there was a collateral contract: see Chitty on Contracts at 16-018.