CH-2025-000101 - [2025] EWHC 2975 (Ch)

The authoritative guide as to how to approach statutory interpretation is now provided by what was said by Lord Hodge DPSC in Regina (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3, [2023] AC 255, at [29]:

“29

The courts in conducting statutory interpretation are “seeking the meaning of the words which Parliament used”: Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591, 613 per Lord Reid. More recently, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead stated: “Statutory Interpretation is an exercise which requires the court to identify the meaning borne by the words in question in the particular context. (R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex p Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349, 396.) Words and passages in a statute derive their meaning from their context. A phrase or passage must be read in the context of the section as a whole and in the wider context of a relevant group of sections. Other provisions in a statute and the statute as a whole may provide the relevant context. They are the words which Parliament has chosen to enact as an expression of the purpose of the legislation and are therefore the primary source by which meaning is ascertained. There is an important constitutional reason for having regard primarily to the statutory context as Lord Nicholls explained in Spath Holme, p 397: “Citizens, with the assistance of their advisers, are intended to be able to understand parliamentary enactments, so that they can regulate their conduct accordingly. They should be able to rely upon what they read in an Act of Parliament.”

Mr MacLachlan highlighted that each Act has a purpose, and that each enactment within an Act has a purpose, to be understood within the larger purpose of the Act. He therefore submitted that, in order to construe any enactment, it is necessary to ascertain its purpose. He cited what was said by Lord Nicholls in Barclays’s Mercantile Finance Ltd v Mawson [2004] UKHL 51, [2005] 1 AC 684 at [28]:

“The modern approach to statutory construction is to have regard to the purpose of a particular provision and interpret its language, so far as possible, in a way which best gives effect to that purpose.”

In considering the purpose, the court may consider the “mischief” which the enactment is intended to remedy. In R v Z (Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference) [2005] UKHL 35 at [17], Lord Bingham said:

“… the interpretation of a statute is a far from academic exercise. It is directed to a particular statute, enacted at a particular time, to address (almost inevitably) a particular problem or mischief.”

Mr MacLachlan identifies that a recognised canon of construction is the rule against absurdity. He cites what was said by Lord Briggs JSC in Settlers Court RTM Co Ltd v FirstPort Property Services Limited [2022] UKSC 1, [2022] 1 WLR 519 at [54]:

“It is well established that the court will lean against a construction of legislation which produces absurd or unworkable results, if there is an available alternative construction which does not do so.”

With regard to the ordinary meaning of words and phrases, I note that Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation say this at paragraph 22.1:

“(1)

The starting point in statutory interpretation is to consider the ordinary meaning of a word or phrase, that is its proper and most known signification.

(2)

If there is more than one ordinary meaning, the most common and well established is preferred (other things being equal).

(3)

Other interpretive criteria (including the purpose of the enactment and the context) may, however, quickly drive the interpreter to one of the other meanings.”