Claim No: IL-2024-000036 - [2025] EWHC 2172 (Ch)

Having carefully reviewed the various documents to which I was taken at the hearing, I am unable to accept the Defendants’ counsel’s submissions as to the meaning of the Part 36 Offer, nor that this is an issue suitable for summary judgment in favour of the Defendants. I do not consider that the words of the Part 36 Offer clearly have the interpretation she urges on the Court such that Mrs Lish has no real prospects of success. The second bullet point of the Part 36 offer makes no references to typefaces, either those defined in the draft Amended Particulars of Claim or otherwise. It refers only to “relevant sub-licences”. That could readily apply to sub-licences of typefaces which fall within the definition of Typefaces in the 2012 Agreement, and/or the typefaces named in paragraphs 9 and 16 of the draft Amended Particulars of Claim, and/or the definition of “C’s Typefaces” from the draft Amended Particulars of Claim and/or the typefaces referred to within paragraph 17A of the draft Amended Particulars of Claim where Neusa Next is clearly put in issue. In any event, it seems to me that the Neusa Next typeface falls squarely within the first bullet point of the Part 36 Offer, being a typeface “as particularised in [Mrs Lish’s] draft [A]mended Particulars of Claim served on 04 May 2023”. Neusa Next appears in that document multiple times, within the allegations of infringement and the prayer for relief. It is not listed in paragraphs 9 or 16, but it is particularised in other parts of the document. Further, the first bullet point of the Part 36 Offer seeks to include amongst the relevant typefaces “obviously, every font/glyph within the relevant typeface family”. This clearly includes those glyphs in Neusa Next that are the same as glyphs in Neusa.

Whilst both parties urged me not to conduct a mini-trial, that is, in essence, what happened at the hearing, with both counsel significantly exceeding their time estimates with detailed submissions (in addition to the written submissions with which I had been provided). I was taken well into the detail of the matter, as these paragraphs demonstrate. Despite (or perhaps because of) that, it is clear to me that Mrs Lish has real prospects of success on the question of the meaning of the Part 36 Offer, and it would not be appropriate for me to determine the issue summarily in the Defendants’ favour. The issue of no other compelling reason therefore does not arise.

I therefore reject the Defendants’ application for summary judgment in relation to the Neusa Next Claim.