BL-2021-002235 - [2025] EWHC 2367 (Ch)

In these documents, the respondent makes a number of points. One is that contempt requires a deliberate and wilful breach, but any breaches of the order in this case were unintentional. Another is that he has now purged his contempt. The first point is wrong in law, and, even if he never intended to commit a contempt of court, that would be irrelevant to liability, though potntially relevant to sentence. The second point is simply wrong.

As to the first, the respondent knew of the order of 5 April 2022. The acts which the respondent did, which I have held amount to breaches of the order and thus contempt of court, were acts deliberately done by the respondent. He had a choice whether to do them or not, and he chose to do them. He may say that he did not know that they would amount to breaches. But this is irrelevant. The mental element of this kind of contempt of court is clearly stated in the judgment of Rose LJ (with whom Lewison and Stuart-Smith LJJ agreed) in the recent Court of Appeal decision in Atkinson v Varma [2021] Ch 180:

“54.

… once knowledge of the order is proved, and once it is proved that the contemnor knew that he was doing or omitting to do certain things, then it is not necessary for the contemnor to know that his actions put him in breach of the order; it is enough that as a matter of fact and law, they do so put him in breach.”