The respondent’s position
The respondent’s position
The respondent’s letter to the court dated 24 July 2025 says this in part:
“I have made no claim to ownership, and I assert no rights over the assets in question. If any of my communications have been construed otherwise, I can only say that such implication would have been unintentional and does not reflect my position in good faith.
For the avoidance of doubt, I understand that contempt requires a deliberate and wilful breach. My classification under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 was not made to challenge the court’s authority, but to discharge a statutory duty in the public interest. I am here not to assert, but to inform … ”
The respondent’s witness statement in support of the application of 13 August 2025 says this:
“7 … (iii) Good faith compliance and purge: Without prejudice to my position that no intentional breach occurred, I now purge any such breach in full. This is consistent with my prior correspondence, including my letter of 25 July 2025, and reflects my ongoing willingness to comply with any lawful order of the Court. Acceptance of a purge is recognised as strong mitigation: Crystal Mews Ltd v Metterick [2006] EWCA Civ 1740 confirms that a genuine purge can justify suspension or reduction of any custodial penalty, and JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko [2011] EWCA Civ 1241 affirms that a purge removes the coercive element of civil contempt.”
(I may say in passing that I do not understand the reference in that passage to Crystal Mews Ltd v Metterick [2006] EWCA Civ 1740. That reference indicates a decision of the Court of Appeal. So far as I am aware there is no such decision. There was a decision in a case of that name at first instance, by Lawrence Collins J, under neutral citation number [2006] EWHC 3087 (Ch). On the other hand, the neutral citation number [2006] EWCA Civ 1740 refers to a decision of the Court of Appeal in a case about costs in the Lands Tribunal, irrelevant to the matters arising in this case, called Winter v Traditional & Contemporary Contracts Ltd.)
The respondent’s supplementary witness statement of 2 September 2025 includes the following:
“There is no commercial motive for me personally. Any proprietary right, if it existed, would vest in the 2019 bankruptcy estate controlled by Kaupthing, the vendor of AllSaints to Lion Capital in 2011. My correspondence and statutory notices were issued in the honest belief that they complied with the injunction and were directed solely to ensuring that regulated parties discharged their statutory duties under POCA 2002 and the Money Laundering Regulations 2017.
I have already placed my purge on the record. On 25 July 2025, in a letter to Proskauer copied to the Court, I confirmed that if any part of my conduct were found to constitute contempt, I sought to purge it immediately. On 31 July 2025, by a CPR 40.12 submission to the Court, I reaffirmed that I remain willing to comply with any lawful order under due process. These assurances pre-date the reserved judgment of 1 August 2025 and demonstrate that my purge was contemporaneous and consistent, not tactical, or belated.
To the extent that the Court nonetheless finds a technical breach, I have already purged it and I undertake to comply fully with all future orders.”
- Heading
- Introduction
- The respondent’s further applications
- Dealing with the applications
- The application of 13 August 2025
- The application of 4 September 2025
- Sentencing in the absence of the respondent
- The respondent’s further application
- The position of the applicant in the contempt application
- Discussion
- Conclusion on the application
- Sentencing decision
- The respondent’s position
- The mental element in contempt
- Purging contempt
- Starting point
- Aggravation and mitigation
- Decision in principle
- Fine?
- Suspended sentence?
- Conclusions
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