Conclusions
OVERALL CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, I would allow this appeal on the basis of ground 1 and hold that the Secretary of State is obliged to reconsider her policy as regards family reunion for child refugees as it stood prior to 4 September 2025. I would not determine the issue of justification arising under ground 2 and would invite the parties’ submissions as to whether that issue should be remitted to the High Court or whether ground 2 should be dismissed. I would dismiss ground 3.
That outcome does not involve any decision by this Court about what the Secretary of State’s policy ought to be about family reunion for child refugees. It means only that she has not, in formulating her current policy, gone through the exercise prescribed by section 55 of the 2009 Act for decisions in the immigration field which affect the interests of children. She will now have to do so, in the context no doubt of the review of family reunion policy which she has recently announced. Whatever decision about child refugees she reaches as a result of that reconsideration, including a decision to maintain the current policy, will be a fresh decision that is capable of being challenged by judicial review if arguable grounds are shown: such grounds could in principle include a challenge under article 14.
I should finally say that I regret the length of this judgment and, which is related, the time that it has taken to produce it. However, it will be apparent that the case has been bedevilled, both before the Judge and on appeal, by difficulties in identifying the real focus of the issues. The procedural history summarised at paras. 8-9 above, and particularised at paras. 77-83, 93 and 168, speaks for itself. Those difficulties may also account for the absence of witness evidence from the Secretary of State on some points where it would have been useful. I will not try to attribute blame, and I acknowledge that, with the best will in the world, the process of arguing a case at first instance and on appeal will sometimes produce new insights. Nevertheless, the case illustrates the importance of rigorous analysis of the issues, by both parties, before the case reaches a hearing in order to minimise the risk of this kind of problem.
Newey LJ:
I agree.
Lewis LJ:
I also agree.
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- THE POLICY
- THE OLD RULES AND GUIDANCE
- THE NEW RULES AND GUIDANCE
- SUMMARY OF THE POLICY
- THE EFFECT OF THE POLICY
- CRITICISM OF THE POLICY
- GROUND 1: SECTION 55 OF THE 2009 ACT
- THE EVOLUTION OF THE ISSUES BEFORE THE JUDGE
- The Issues as at the Start of the Hearing
- The Hearing
- The Post-Hearing Submissions
- THE APPEAL
- The Claimant’s Case
- The Secretary of State’s Response
- Discussion and Conclusion
- The Claimant’s Case
- The Secretary of State’s Case
- Discussion and Conclusion
- CONCLUSION ON GROUND 1
- GROUND 2: DISCRIMINATION
- LAVENDER J’s JUDGMENT
- THE ISSUES ON THE APPEAL
- DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
- The Secretary of State’s Case
- The Claimant’s Case
- Decision
- GROUND 3: IRRATIONALITY
- LIMB (iii): THE RATIONALITY OF THE POLICY
- Anchor children
- The incentivising effect of allowing automatic family reunion
- The balance of benefit and harm
- Mr Husain’s submissions
- Conclusion on limb (iii)
- LIMB (ii): FAILURE TO REVIEW
- Conclusions
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