The Issues as at the Start of the Hearing
The Issues as at the Start of the Hearing
Paras. 94-95 of the Claimant’s Statement of Facts and Grounds read as follows:
“94. In summary, section 55, taken with Article 3(1), requires that – in formulating and maintaining [emphasis supplied] her position in relation to family reunion for refugee children – the Secretary of State must:
(1) identify with reasonable accuracy and assess the best interests of refugee children in the United Kingdom (R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v SSHD, §96);
(2) treat these interests as a ‘primary consideration’, outweighed only by strong countervailing factors (MM, §§91-92; R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v SSHD, §82); and
(3) show how these interests have been weighed against other considerations (R (JS) v Work and Pensions Secretary [2015] 1 WLR 1449, §108) – or, otherwise put, show that she has evaluated the impact of her position on the group of children concerned (MM (cited above); R (DA) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2019] 1 WLR 3298, §178 per Lord Kerr; R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v SSHD, §112).
95. On the basis of the evidence presently available, there is nothing to suggest – let alone show – that the Secretary of State has complied with any of these obligations in the context of family reunion for refugee children.”
(Paras. 96-97 amplify the statement in para. 95 but I need not set them out.)
The essence of that case is that the Secretary of State has never “in formulating and maintaining” her policy as regards family reunion in the case of child refugees conducted a section 55 exercise. That case is reflected in the terms of the relief sought in section 7 of the Claim Form.
The Secretary of State’s response to that case, pleaded at paras. 27-34 of the Detailed Grounds of Defence (“the DGD”), was twofold:
First, she relied on the statements in the Family Reunion Guidance that each case “must … include consideration of the best interests of the child in the UK” (see para. 46 above). That was said to be a complete answer to the section 55 case because it was legitimate for the Secretary of State to discharge her duty under section 55 by giving guidance to caseworkers requiring them to consider the best interests of the child in each case rather than by making specific provisions in the Rules.
Second, it is said at para. 32 that “in any event, the SSHD considers that her family reunion policy promotes the best interests of children generally” because, as it is put in para. 33, “allowing children in this position to become sponsors could have the unintended consequence of incentivizing some families to send their children alone on long and dangerous journeys to the United Kingdom to act as ‘anchors’ to facilitate later asylum applications by older family members.
- Heading
- INTRODUCTION
- THE POLICY
- THE OLD RULES AND GUIDANCE
- THE NEW RULES AND GUIDANCE
- SUMMARY OF THE POLICY
- THE EFFECT OF THE POLICY
- CRITICISM OF THE POLICY
- GROUND 1: SECTION 55 OF THE 2009 ACT
- THE EVOLUTION OF THE ISSUES BEFORE THE JUDGE
- The Issues as at the Start of the Hearing
- The Hearing
- The Post-Hearing Submissions
- THE APPEAL
- The Claimant’s Case
- The Secretary of State’s Response
- Discussion and Conclusion
- The Claimant’s Case
- The Secretary of State’s Case
- Discussion and Conclusion
- CONCLUSION ON GROUND 1
- GROUND 2: DISCRIMINATION
- LAVENDER J’s JUDGMENT
- THE ISSUES ON THE APPEAL
- DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
- The Secretary of State’s Case
- The Claimant’s Case
- Decision
- GROUND 3: IRRATIONALITY
- LIMB (iii): THE RATIONALITY OF THE POLICY
- Anchor children
- The incentivising effect of allowing automatic family reunion
- The balance of benefit and harm
- Mr Husain’s submissions
- Conclusion on limb (iii)
- LIMB (ii): FAILURE TO REVIEW
- Conclusions
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