Knowledge and understanding
Knowledge and understanding
Mr Riley submitted that the judge was wrong to hold that it was necessary that URE should not only know of clause 10.2(d), but should understand that the clause gave it the right to terminate the contract in the event of a solvent amalgamation which had not been approved in advance. In my judgment this submission sets up a false distinction. What matters is whether a party knows that it has a right to choose between inconsistent courses. On the judge’s findings, URE in the person of Mr Ensor did not have that knowledge. For this straightforward reason, I would reject ground 1(b).
- Heading
- LORD JUSTICE MALES
- The background
- The contract
- Rollout of AMR meters
- The amalgamation
- Breakdown of the parties’ relationship
- Termination of the contract
- The summary judgment application
- The judgment
- The issues on appeal
- Is URE’s case of ‘deemed knowledge’ open on appeal?
- Election and estoppel
- Peyman v Lanjani
- Criticisms of Peyman v Lanjani
- Mitigations of Peyman v Lanjani
- Deemed knowledge of contractual terms?
- Knowledge and understanding
- Obviously available means of knowledge
- Lapse of time
- Quantum
- Conclusions
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