CA-2024-00277 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1000

Fecha: 24-Jul-2025

Appeal ground 8 and respondents’ notice ground 6: infringement of the easy.com mark

124.

Appeal ground 8 is contingent on appeal ground 4. Because the judge revoked the easy.com mark for non-use, he did not consider infringement. easyGroup contends that this Court should find that the easy.com mark has been infringed. The Defendants contend that this Court should find that it has not been infringed.

125.

easyGroup argues that there is a likelihood of confusion for the following reasons:

The distinctive and dominant element of the easy.com mark is the word “easy”.

ii)

That is the first part of each of the Defendants’ signs complained of, save that in the case of the sign “@easyuk” the judge correctly held at [229] that the only distinctive element of that sign was the word “easy”.

iii)

The easy.com mark and the signs are similar. A factor in that similarity is that the “FUNDRAISING” and “SEARCH” elements of the signs allude to the services at issue, and so will have less significance in the average consumer’s perception. The “@easyuk” sign is similar to a very high degree.

iv)

The email services for which the easy.com mark are registered are at least similar to the Defendants’ provision of email notification alerts, hosting of digital content and/or offering an online platform for creating online profiles. Consumers would be likely to believe they are types of services that a provider of email services would also provide. In particular, they overlap in their customers, trade channel (the internet) and purpose of use (the provision of online information or communication).

The average consumer of the Defendants’ services and the services for which the easy.com mark are registered is a normal member of the public, and will pay a low to average level of attention to detail in selecting these free or low-cost and relatively commonplace services.

126.

The Defendants argue that there is no likelihood of confusion for the following reasons:

The distinctive and dominant component of the easy.com mark is the combination of the two elements. “Easy” is a common descriptive adjective in everyday use, while “.com” is generic. The combination of the two has the minimum distinctive character to be validly registered, but no more.

ii)

The judge made no finding that the Defendants provided the services relied upon by easyGroup, and the allegation of infringement should be dismissed for that reason alone.

iii)

In any event, the word “easy” is the only common element between the mark and the signs complained of. Since it is of low descriptiveness, that points against there being a likelihood of confusion.

iv)

The fact that the word “easy” is used by a substantial number of unconnected undertakings provides further support for that confusion.

The average consumer would pay a normal level of attention, not a low to average one.

127.

I am unimpressed by the Defendants’ second point. The absence of a finding by the judge is explained by the fact that he did not consider infringement of the easy.com mark at all. In their Defence the Defendants admitted carrying out the acts in question, but they denied that the acts constituted a discrete category of service in relation to which they used the Signs. The significance of this distinction, if any, was not explained to us. On the other hand, it is clear that, as discussed above, the sign “@easyuk” was only used as a social media handle to promote the Defendants’ main services.

128.

Subject to that, I find the Defendants’ arguments more persuasive. easyGroup’s strongest case is probably in relation to @easyuk, but on balance I conclude that the difference in the services and between the easy.com mark and the sign mean that there is no likelihood of confusion. For completeness, I note that four of the instances of alleged confusion relied upon by easyGroup at trial concerned @easyuk, but even taken at their highest none of these suggested confusion with easy.com (as opposed to, at least in two cases, easyJet).

Overall result

129.

The overall result is that, although the appeal succeeds in certain respects with respect to revocation, it fails in relation to infringement.