[2025] EWCA Civ 1134

We were rightly reminded of the well-known observations of the House of Lords in Hadmor Productions v Hamilton [1983] 1 AC 191 at [220] where Lord Diplock said:

“An interlocutory injunction is a discretionary relief and the discretion whether or not to grant it is vested in the High Court judge by whom the application for it is heard. Upon an appeal from the judge's grant or refusal of an interlocutory injunction the function of an appellate court, whether it be the Court of Appeal or your Lordship’s House, is not to exercise an independent discretion of its own. It must defer to the judge’s exercise of discretion and must not interfere with it merely upon the ground that the members of the appellate court would have exercised the discretion differently. The function of the appellate court is initially one of review only. It may set aside the judge’s exercise of his discretion on the ground that it was based on a misunderstanding of the law or of the evidence before him or upon an inference that particular facts existed or did not exist, which, although it was one that might legitimately have been drawn upon the evidence that was before the judge, can be demonstrated to be wrong by further evidence that has become available by the time of the appeal; or upon the ground that there has been a change of circumstances after the judge made his order that would have justified his acceding to an application to vary it. Since reasons given by judges for granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions may sometimes sketchy, there may also be occasional cases where even though no erroneous assumption of law or fact can be identified the judge's decision to grant or refuse the injunction is so aberrant that it must be set aside upon the ground that no reasonable judge regardful of his duty to act judicially could have reached it.”

Somani, however, submit that the judge made four errors of principle which are set out in its grounds of appeal:

As earlier mentioned, the SSHD seeks permission to appeal on two grounds. The first is against the refusal of the judge to join her as an intervener (see above). The second and substantive ground, which overlaps to some extent with Somani’s substantive grounds (i) and (ii), is that the judge erred in law in deciding that the balance of convenience favoured granting interim relief both in his approach to the factors relevant to planning control and as to the impact of the relief on the statutory duty of the SSHD to accommodate asylum seekers.