CA-2024-001698 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1136

The background facts to this case can be found in each of the three previous reported judgments: namely, Potanina (FD2) at [3] to [10]; Potanina (CA1) at [5] to [17]; and Potanina (SC) at [11] to [17].

For ease of reference, I rehearse here briefly those facts which are particularly relevant to our determination.

The parties are now aged in their 60s; they are Russian nationals. They were married for approximately thirty years; they were divorced by court order in Russia in 2014. They have three adult children. Throughout the marriage the couple lived in Russia. The parties were not always wealthy, but they became “massively rich” (per Cohen J: Potanina (FD2) at [4]); indeed, the husband is said to be one of the richest men in Russia. Their lifestyle during the marriage (described by the wife’s lawyers as “spectacular”) was congruent with their extreme wealth.

Financial remedy proceedings in the Russian courts followed the breakdown of the marriage. These proceedings were bitterly contested and protracted; many of the orders were appealed to the highest Russian courts. The wife also launched proceedings relevant to her financial remedy claim (for disclosure and otherwise) in both Cyprus and the USA. It was said by Cohen J, with some justification, that in the aftermath of the divorce, there was “a blizzard of litigation” (Potanina (FD2) at [10]).

By its final financial remedy order, the Russian court divided all of the “marital property” equally between the parties. In this regard, only those assets legally owned by one or both parties were included in that computation and division. Apart from some cash held in the husband's name, almost all of the wealth which he had accumulated during the marriage was/is held by various trusts and companies; the husband has acknowledged that he is indeed the ultimate beneficial owner of significant assets held in this way (see Potanina (SC) at [16]). It was the wife’s case that she received less than 1% of the marital assets and had been denied an award of approximately US$6 billion. Lord Leggatt recognised that:

“… the sum awarded by the Russian courts is only a tiny fraction of the sum which the wife would have received if the property divided had included assets beneficially owned by the husband.” (Potanina (SC) at [17], and see §90 below).

In early 2014 the wife purchased a sizeable and valuable property in the USA, where the parties’ youngest child was then studying. In June 2014, the wife obtained a United Kingdom investor visa, and later in the same year purchased a property in London.

At the first hearing of the wife’s Part III 1984 Act application before Cohen J in January 2019, which was conducted without notice to the husband, the wife was represented by Mr Howard KC and Mr Nagpal. The Judge heard submissions and read the documentation filed. The Judge found on the facts as then presented that the wife had had her principal home in London since at least January 2016; in the judgment explaining his reasons for granting the wife leave (Potanina (FD1)), he added that: “I have not asked for any diarisation going further back before that date” (this part of the original judgment is reproduced at [56] of Potanina (CA1)). He added that “[the wife] has plainly established a connection with England and Wales. She did have a strong connection with Russia, but that connection now has been very largely severed…”. Notably, these facts were not materially challenged by the husband at the later hearing.

The husband issued his application to set aside the grant of leave on 21 February 2019; the application was supported by written evidence. At a case management hearing on 5 June 2019, the wife applied to file further evidence to respond to the husband’s case. The Judge limited her right to reply only to deal with asserted financial misrepresentations set out in the husband’s recently filed witness evidence. The hearing of the husband’s set-aside application was listed for three days in October 2019; it was accepted that the wife’s application for leave would be re-considered in the event that the order obtained without notice was set aside.