Case No. FD20F00034-and-FD19P00380

71. Despite HH not attending before me to give evidence and be cross-examined, I am of the view that I should consider HRH’s budget carefully and make any adjustments that are appropriate. If I did not do so, I would, in effect, be giving HRH carte blanche to include any item however inappropriate or unreasonable, in her figures. Equally, however, I am absolutely clear that I must do so with a very clear eye to the exceptional circumstances of this case, such as the truly opulent and unprecedented standard of living enjoyed by these parties in Dubai and the fact that I have not heard HH cross-examined on the many pertinent matters that Mr Cusworth would wish to put to him, including, in particular, his expenditure and lifestyle. It follows that I have decided that I must go through the budgets line by line to decide the appropriate figure to award in each area whilst taking into account the many factors involved, including those set out above. Before doing so, however, I intend to consider the other matters of principle which I must decide in reaching my overall award. In particular, once I have decided the appropriate quantum of the security budget and the children’s maintenance budget, I must decide whether to capitalise either or both. I must also deal with the whole question of the children’s allowances and, if I consider they are appropriate going forward, whether these should be capitalised. Finally, I must deal with HRH’s claim for a lump sum for herself. This will require me to consider a number of specific areas, including jewellery, haute couture, horses, legal fees and a future legal fees fund. This will also involve consideration of backdating of the figures I find appropriate for maintenance and, potentially, the security budget. 72. Before I come to such conclusions, I am clear that there are a number of different issues on which I must make findings. In particular, I must consider the conduct of both HH and HRH and how this impacts my award. I have already indicated that I will have to factor the failure of HH to attend to give evidence and be cross-examined into my consideration of quantum of maintenance and the lump sum, if any, to which HRH is entitled. In one other respect, however, I am absolutely satisfied that his conduct is extremely relevant. The President has found that he constitutes a grave risk to the security of HRH and the children, as a result of his kidnapping of Sheikha Shamsa and Sheikha Latifa; his attempt to acquire the Parkwood Estate, as well as the way in which the court was misled as to that; and in relation to the hacking of the phones of HRH, some of her staff and some of her lawyers. I am entirely satisfied that this means that, although HRH and the children would require security provision in any event, given their status and the general threats of terrorism and kidnap faced in such circumstances, they are particularly vulnerable and need water-tight security to ensure their continued safety and security in this country. Most importantly in this regard, and absolutely uniquely, the main threat they face is from HH himself not from outside sources. This is compounded by the full weight of the State that he has available to him as seen by his ability to make use of the Pegasus software, which is only available to governments. I recognise the force of many of the points that Mr Dyer makes as to the bank guarantee offered by HH to secure ongoing income provision but I consider the magnetic feature here is that it is the payer himself who is the main threat to the payee. I am absolutely clear that, in such circumstances, it would be quite wrong for the security payments to be made over many years by the source of the main threat. Not only would it be in his interests to reduce the quantum of the payments to save himself money but it would also be in his interests to do so if that weakened the defences of HRH against him. Even leaving to one side my duty to consider a clean break in general, I consider it would be intolerable for HRH to be dependent on such ongoing provision. She is entitled to know that her security budget is written in stone; it is controlled by her, not HH; and she is able to direct how to use that budget without any fear or concern of continuing oversight by HH or his advisers. 73. I do, of course, recognise the points that Mr Dyer makes about future uncertainty as to the level of threat; the costs of such security potentially decades in the future; the potential for huge changes in society; the death of his client; and the possibility that the children may become reconciled to him or not be under threat of abduction in the years ahead. I have decided that I can deal with these matters in a way that does justice to both HH and HRH as follows. There is to my mind a clear and ever present risk to these children that is almost certain to persist until they attain their independence. Thereafter, there will remain a clear and ever present risk to HRH for the remainder of her life, whether it be from HH or just from the normal terrorist and other threats faced by a Princess in her position. I am equally satisfied that HRH is entitled to rely on HH to cover her need for security for life, given the marriage and HH’s assumption of the burden of providing such security for her, together with the fact that he has turned out to be the main threat to her. Moreover, I am entirely satisfied that I can quantify those budgets with sufficient certainty to make capitalisation fair and just. In any event, if there was a change of circumstances, HH will only have himself to blame for having had to finance this element of security for the life of HRH, given his conduct to date, particularly when the scrutiny of the court was on him at the time of the hacking and the Parkwood incidents. The position, however, is very different with the children. I do not know what threat will be faced by the children after they have attained their independence. There may be reconciliation with their father. Perhaps more significantly, I cannot be clear as to how the death of their father at some point in the future will affect their security needs. It may be, as Mr Dyer submits, that they will then be able to travel to Dubai with impunity. Equally, they may not be able to do so and may require continuing security over and above that which I am providing for their mother. The answer, however, in relation to them is clear. Whatever I decide in relation to the capitalisation of their general maintenance, there will be a continuing order for periodical payments in place that will not terminate on their attaining their majority or completing their education, which will deal with their security provision for the rest of their lives and can be varied should circumstances change. I make it clear that they are entitled to rely on HH’s concession of exceptionality given to this court and referred to in this judgment to give jurisdiction to such a claim many years hence. It follows that, provided I am satisfied as to her conduct, there will be a capitalisation on a clean break basis of HRH’s claim for security for herself for her life and for the children during their dependence, but not for the children after they have attained independence. 74. I now turn to consider the allegations of conduct made against HRH. I accept that they are, potentially, relevant to the issue of whether I can trust HRH with a capitalised sum and whether it is relevant to any other aspect of the award I intend to make, such as in relation to backdating. I am entirely clear that her conduct has not been such that I should take it into account as conduct that it would be inequitable to disregard. First, I accept her evidence that the allowances paid into the accounts of herself, Jalila and Zayed were not to be ring-fenced for the long term benefit of the individual into whose account the money was paid. This is, of course, very relevant to her claim for those allowances to continue into the future but I am clear that this was money, very generously provided by HH, that was available either to be spent or to be saved as circumstances dictated. It was not a requirement that it be saved, although at times, savings were made. Hence, the money was used to assist with the acquisition of HRH’s home near Kensington Palace, a property to which HRH was as much entitled as Jalila and Zayed. I am equally clear that HH did not restrict the use of the money to projects that benefited the children. He agreed that the pot, which I accept included the money paid direct to HRH, could be used for the purchase of horses, or for the support of Prince Ali , or for the TUA charity to alleviate poverty in Jordan. I have already recognised that it would have been better if HRH had used her own funds to deal with the blackmailers but I accept that she was in a very difficult position indeed. She would have been desperate for HH not to find out. I do not consider that this error of judgment casts any serious doubt on her general level of responsibility with her finances. 75. In relation to the purchase of horses after the separation, I am satisfied that this was no more than continuing what had happened during the marriage. In any event, HRH accepts that money is owed to the children in this regard. Moreover, HRH had, overnight, lost her own allowance of approximately £10 million per annum. HH had ceased all direct payments as soon as she left for London. I take the view that she had to use the money in the children’s accounts to fund her commitments, which included those related to her as well as those concerning the children. Indeed, HH, via his lawyers, submitted to the President that she should do so. I consider the mistake in relation to the ownership of Aralyn Blue was no more than a mistake. I would not criticise her for that, nor for paying the money to Prince Ali . I am clear that HH and HRH had agreed, without reservation, that he should be funded. HRH felt a moral obligation and she was concerned that she might not be able to meet that obligation if she did not meet the payment upfront from the resources available to her. It is also of real significance that she had been cut-off financially. If HH had carried on paying as had been agreed during the marriage, she could have met her obligations from the sums he was paying her, but he did not pay. It follows that I have come to the conclusion that she can be trusted with a capitalised payment. I am satisfied she will protect the interests of the children in the years ahead. Indeed, if she did not, she would be left in the very difficult position of having no resources to fund her security needs. I am clear that she would not be in a position to approach this court again, so she has an enormous incentive to conserve what I award. 76. My findings in this regard do, however, have one important consequence. I am clear that the money provided by way of allowances was not savings for the children. It was part of the overall spending pot, albeit that HRH could save a proportion if she wished. It follows that the payment of this money cannot now be converted into a pot for savings for the children to justify a payment of £20 million per annum, until they attain their majority, capitalised at £208 million and paid by HH. This is the case regardless of the legal arguments as to whether such provision is possible in the light of the authorities. I accept that the availability of the money during the marriage is something that I should take into account in deciding the appropriate level of general maintenance but, otherwise, this claims fails. 77. I have had some concern as to the ability of HRH to meet her own needs in the years ahead, given that the vast majority of her, admittedly significant, resources are tied up in the two properties, HRH’s home near Kensington Palace and Castlewood. I make it clear from the outset that HH should be meeting the costs of the upkeep of Castlewood in addition to HRH’s home near Kensington Palace. Castlewood is, at present, used by his children as their country home in England. It is thoroughly appropriate for them to have two properties in England, one in London and one in Egham. If their parents were still happily married, they would have numerous properties to enjoy, including very substantial ones in Dubai. Although having two properties in England cannot possibly be questioned, if HRH was not looking after the children, she could arrange her affairs in a very different way. She might well not retain her home near Kensington Palace as well as Castlewood, which would free up considerable capital. She is not asking for an award for herself other than for security and to compensate her for chattels that she has lost as a result of the marital breakdown. Once the children are independent, the additional assets in the C Trust will be available to maintain the property but she should not have to use them whilst it is a home for the children. 78. I now come to the question of whether the general children’s maintenance should be capitalised. I have decided, despite some reservations, that it should not. I have already noted that capitalisation is extremely unusual. This is for very good reasons. HH should have a continuing financial responsibility for his children. I recognise that HRH has been concerned about the uncertainty of not knowing if the maintenance will be received, although that is true for many payees. I do, however, consider the proposals for an irrevocable bank guarantee from HSBC cover any possible concern in that regard. I accept that HSBC only has to pay if HH has not applied to the court but I consider that the opportunity for dispute about the general level of maintenance for the children is limited, once I have determined the quantum and I have index-linked it, particularly when there is absolutely no issue about ability to pay. Mr Dyer has pointed to the fact that HH has paid all the interim awards I have made without fail. I am satisfied he will pay the general maintenance and, if he does not, the guarantee will be invoked. HRH need not therefore be concerned, particularly as she will have had her security budget capitalised and she will have received a substantial lump sum in relation to chattels together with backdating of the general maintenance that I also intend to make. I will turn to the quantum of the guarantee when I have determined the exact level of the appropriate provision but I accept that the form of the guarantee is appropriate and that this court can rely on HSBC entirely in this respect. I am equally satisfied that HH has not paid sufficient since the separation. He cut HRH off completely at the time of separation. The general maintenance for the children to date has been £84,000 per month but that has been solely to cover the expenses of HRH’s home near Kensington Palace and, in any event, is only some 25% of HH’s own Open Offer. The maintenance order will be backdated to the date of the Schedule 1 application, creating significant arrears, which will enable HRH to deal with some of the liabilities she has incurred during this period. 79. It follows that the structure of the award will be as follows:- (a) A capitalised payment to HRH to cover her security needs for herself for life and for the children during their dependency, to include during tertiary education; (b) A lump sum to compensate HRH for the chattels she has lost as a result of the ending of the marriage and to deal with other aspects such as the costs of the litigation; (c) A secured periodical payments order to cover the general maintenance of the children to the completion of their tertiary education and to continue thereafter to cover their security needs as adults, irrespective of the death of HH, secured by bank guarantee from HSBC, backdated, at least in part, to the date of the Schedule 1 application; and (d) An education fund in the sum of £3.04 million, which I accept should be administered by independent accountants.