Case No. FD15F00053

1.Before me are:a)the application by Jason Galbraith-Marten (“the father”) issued on 18 October 2021 to extend an extended civil restraint order (“ECRO”) made by me on 21 October 2019 (“the extension application”), and b)the application by Catherine de Renée (“the mother”), dated 28 July 2022, for permission pursuant to the ECRO to issue an application under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 (“Schedule 1”) for financial provision for the parties’ daughter, A, who is now aged 15¾ (“the permission application”).2.There is a very lengthy history to this case. Proceedings between the parties began in Australia in March 2009, when A was merely 15 months old. Furious litigation has continued ever since, both in Australia and England. The background facts and events up to July 2016 are described with typical clarity by Cobb J in his judgment MG v FG (Schedule 1: Application to strike out; Estoppel; Legal Costs Funding) [2016] EWHC 1964 (Fam). At that time the father was living in England; while the mother and A were in Australia. 3.In his 2016 judgment Cobb J recorded that by then there had been extensive litigation both in Australia and in England. In Australia there had been: a)a divorce;b)financial remedy proceedings resolved by the parties entering into binding agreements;c)an application by the father for parental responsibility and contact;d)applications by the mother to vary the agreements, alternatively to set them aside, on the grounds of duress, fraud, unconscionable conduct and non-disclosure. The latter applications by the mother had generated swathes of written material from her, most of which was ruled to be inadmissible. Ultimately, Federal Magistrate Scarlett, sitting in Sydney, dismissed the mother’s applications.4.In England, the mother had made an application for permission under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, which was refused and unsuccessfully appealed. Undeterred by that rebuff, in April 2016 the mother made her second application under Schedule 1 and applied for legal costs funding. (The mother’s first Schedule 1 application had been made on 1 August 2011 and dismissed by consent a week later). In his judgment Cobb J, with some hesitation, held that he did not have power to strike out the mother’s Schedule 1 claim but nonetheless refused to made a legal costs funding order. The mother’s application for permission to appeal was dismissed by King LJ and certified as being totally without merit.5.In 2017 the mother and A relocated to England. Following her arrival the mother made extremely serious allegations to the police against the father of rape and sexual abuse. In the absence of contact to A, the father made an application for a child arrangements order in February 2018. In her evidence filed in response the mother gain accused the father of attempted murder, threats to kill, rape and fraud. A fact-finding hearing was ordered.6.Meanwhile, on 21 June 2018 the mother’s Schedule 1 application came on for trial before District Judge Aitken. Inexplicably, the mother did not attend. The court decided to proceed in the absence of the mother. 7.The mother’s claim was for annual periodical payments for A of £92,000. This included school fees. It is unclear whether the mother’s written evidence averred that there had been an understanding between her and the father that A would be privately educated. The father himself had not been privately educated. In contrast, the mother had been to a private school in Queensland.8.In her judgment District Judge Aitken held:“127.She appears to have spent large amounts on private schooling for A in Australia although there was no provision in the 2009 agreements for any payment to be made by the father. It is the father's evidence that he would never have chosen private schooling for A , his two other children attend state schools and he could not afford private school fees for three children on his income. I accept this evidence. …142.Capitalised education fund. Private education is not affordable in this case. The father's two other children attend state school and I accept his evidence that he never intended any of his children to be privately educated”9.The court awarded child maintenance in such an amount as when added to any CMS calculation reached £1,315 per month. The father has paid this amount punctually for the last 4 years.10.The mother sought to appeal, but permission to appeal was refused by Judge Everall on 10 January 2019.11.Meanwhile, on 20 December 2019 the mother made her third Schedule 1 application, coupled with an application to re-open the Part III proceedings.12.Those applications came before me on 21 October 2019. The father attended in person. The mother did not attend. After hearing the father, I gave a judgment in which I explained that the mother’s applications were duplicative and would be struck out as abuses of the court’s process. I made the ECRO of my own volition, with an expiration date of 21 October 2021. 13.The fact-finding hearing took place before Judge Oliver. The mother did not attend. The father was represented by counsel. A had been granted party status. She had a NYAS guardian, and was also represented by counsel. NYAS had notified the local authority of their concerns about the upbringing of A, and two social workers from the local authority were present in court when judgment was read out on 6 November 2019.14.Judge Oliver dealt comprehensively with the 27 allegations made by the mother against the father recorded in a Scott schedule. The allegations could scarcely have been more serious. They included allegations of aggravated rape, grievous bodily harm, attempted murder, aggravated fraud, threats to sexually abuse the child, attacks on the mother’s cat, and threats to kill. 26 out of those 27 allegations were found not only to be “not proved” but “fabricated by the mother.”1 The court thus found in these numerous respects that the mother had been deliberately untruthful when making accusations of the utmost seriousness. 15.The mother applied for permission to appeal this judgment; that was refused by Sir Jonathan Cohen on 20 January 2020, and the application was certified as being totally without merit.16.Unsurprisingly, following Judge Oliver’s judgment the local authority commenced care proceedings. The mother told me that she regarded this as having been maliciously incited by the father, when it is obvious that the steps were taken as a result of NYAS performing its professional duty and notifying the local authority of its concern. Ultimately the father confirmed that he did not seek to pursue A’s removal from the mother and on 20 August 2021 the local authority was given permission to withdraw its application.17.Meanwhile the mother applied to Judge Oliver that he recuse himself from trying the final hearing listed for 17 December 2020. That application was refused on 11 December 2020. The final hearing was then adjourned. The mother applied for permission to appeal the recusal refusal; that was refused on 20 January 2021 by King LJ.18.On 18 February 2021 the mother applied to reopen the fact-finding judgment. Judge Oliver refused to permit her to do so on 9 April 2021. The mother applied to the Court of Appeal for permission, but on 6 September 2021 withdrew her appeal against the fact-finding judgment. This step by the mother is highly significant. She thereby accepted that the findings made against her were true and correct. Yet, before me, the she dramatically denounced the entire child arrangements application made by the father as malicious, threatening and unprecedented.19.On 18 October 2021 the father issued his extension application. On 28 July 2022 the mother filed her application for permission to issue her fourth Schedule 1 application.