The father’s extension application
20.The sole criterion for determining an application for an extension of a civil restraint order is appropriateness: see FPR PD 4B para 3.10 and 4.10 which state that the court may extend an extended or general CRO for a further two years on each occasion “if it considers it appropriate to do so”21.The father argues that it is strongly foreseeable, if the ECRO is not extended, that the mother will resume with zeal her issue of meritless applications against him. He cites the content current application for permission made by the mother as an example of what he would be likely to face if there were no extension.22.The mother opposes the father’s extension application on two grounds. First, she believes that if the order is extended it will in some indirect way undermine the validity of her own permission application. Second, she complains that my previous order was weaponised by the father, and indeed by Judge Oliver. She says that she has been assailed repeatedly by its terms to demonstrate her vexatious nature; she says she has in effect been stigmatised by it.23.To be clear, the existence of a civil restraint order does not mean that every application for permission made by a litigant subject to such an order is to be regarded as prima facie unreasonable. On the contrary, each application for permission must be judged fairly and individually on its own merits. In Nowak v The Nursing and Midwifery Council and Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust [2013] EWHC 1932 (QB) Leggatt J held at [59]:“It is important to note that a civil restraint order does not prohibit access to the courts. It merely requires a person who has repeatedly made wholly unmeritorious claims or applications to have any new claim or application which falls within the scope of the order reviewed by a judge at the outset to determine whether it should be permitted to proceed. The purpose of a civil restraint order is simply to protect the court’s process from abuse, and not to shut out claims or applications which are properly arguable.” 24.I therefore reject the mother’s first ground of defence. 25.I turn to her second ground. I note that on 6 November 2019 Judge Oliver described my original ECRO thus:“It is one of the most powerful civil restraint orders I have ever seen” and on 24 March 2022 thus: “This type of order is far stronger than a section 91(14) Children Act order and one of the most powerful orders I have ever seen.”In fact, my order was expressed using the standard order language. There was nothing remarkable or exceptional about it.26.I am satisfied that it would be appropriate to extend the ECRO to 13 October 2024. I accept the father’s submissions. The ECRO has been extended on an interim basis to this hearing. There is no doubt that the court has power under the terms of PD 4A paras 3.10 and 4.10 to order the extension to commence on the date of the decision. It is appropriate for the extension to run for the full two-year period as I am satisfied that the father needs the maximum protection from prospective unmeritorious claims by the mother which I believe are likely to be made having regard to:a)the background facts which led to the grant of the original ECRO;b)the findings made by Judge Oliver (which the mother is to be treated as having accepted when she withdrew her appeal against them);c)the nature and terms of the mother’s written material that she has placed before the court in support of her permission application; and d)the content of her oral submissions which were made to me with great articulacy but which were extremely emotional and melodramatic, such that they were neither reasonable nor accurate.27.I reassure the mother that my decision to extend the ECRO will have no impact whatsoever on my decision on her permission application, to which I now turn.