Case No. EWFC-136

. 28.The Husband’s Open Offer was made on 25 October 2021. At the time, he was acting in person. His case was that the Marriage Contract prevented sharing. The Wife’s claim should therefore be dealt with on the basis of her needs. He proposed a total award, including the Wife’s own assets, of £7,000,000. She would receive half of the net proceeds of sale of the two English properties and a lump sum which, at the time, he calculated at £2.5 million. As the two English properties have sold for more than the valuations on which he calculated this lump sum, he has since revised the lump sum downwards to £2.33 million. The Law29.I must apply section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as amended, in deciding what orders to make pursuant to sections 23 and 24. It is the duty of the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case. I must give first consideration to the welfare, while a minor, of C, although I note that he is only a minor for a further nine months. I must then have particular regard to the matters set out in subsection (2), namely:-(a)The income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity, any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire;(b)The financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;(c)The standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;(d)The age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;(e)Any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;(f)The contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family;(g)The conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it; and(h)The value to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit which, by reason of the dissolution …of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring. 30.The overall requirement in applying section 25 is to achieve fairness. It was made clear in the seminal House of Lords decision of White v White [2000] UKHL 54; [2001] 1 AC 596 that there is to be no discrimination in financial remedy cases between a husband and wife. This was expanded upon in K v L [2012] 1 WLR 306, CA when Wilson LJ reiterated at [15]:-“what is unacceptable is discrimination in the division of labour within the family, in particular between the party who earns the income and the party whose work is in the home, unpaid.” 31.He went on to say that it is the essence of the judicial function to discriminate between different sets of facts and thus between different claims. I have to say that I prefer use of the word “differentiate” to “discriminate” but it is clear what he meant.32.In the case of Miller/McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24; [2006] 2 AC 618, the House of Lords identified three principles that should guide the court in trying to achieve fairness, namely:-(a)The sharing of matrimonial property generated by the parties during their marriage;(b)Compensation for relationship generated disadvantage; and(c)Needs balanced against ability to pay. 33.It follows that my first task is to assess the matrimonial property generated by the parties during the marriage. There are assets in this case that are clearly non-matrimonial, namely those inherited by the parties or gifted to them. In my view, there is absolutely no question in this case that I should completely exclude them from consideration and I do so. The really significant issue, however, is whether I should also exclude from the matrimonial property all the assets held by the parties separately on the basis of the Marriage Contract.34.The leading case remains Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42; [2010] 3 WLR 1367. The majority of the Supreme Court held at paragraph [75] that:-“The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement”.35.Although the Court declined to lay down rules as to the circumstances in which it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement, saying it would not be desirable to fetter the flexibility that the court requires to reach a fair result, it is fair to note that Mr Granatino was, in effect, held to an agreement that most English family lawyers prior to Radmacher would have considered unfair. 36.Moreover, the Court clearly took the view that it would be easiest to show that an agreement was not unfair if it excluded sharing but did not prevent the court from providing for the reasonable needs of the applicant. At Paragraph 81, the majority say that it is “…needs and compensation which can most readily render it unfair to hold the parties to an ante-nuptial contract”. 37.At Paragraph 82, they add:-“Where, however, these considerations do not apply and each party is in a position to meet his or her needs, fairness may well not require a departure from their agreement as to the regulation of their financial affairs in the circumstances that have come to pass. Thus it is in relation to the third strand, sharing, that the court will be most likely to make an order in the terms of the nuptial agreement in place of the order that it would otherwise have made”.38.Indeed, Lady Hale, agreed at Paragraph 178 in a judgment in which she otherwise dissented, saying:-“In the present state of the law, there can be no hard and fast rules, save to say that it may be fairer to accept the modification of the sharing principle than of the needs and compensation principles.”39.Mr Boydell, who appears on behalf of the Wife, has drawn my attention to the comments of Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers at paragraph [81] where he said:-“…needs and compensation can most readily render it unfair to hold the parties to an ante-nuptial agreement… [but] Equally if the devotion of one partner to looking after the family and the home has left the other free to accumulate wealth, it is likely to be unfair to hold the parties to an agreement that entitles the latter to retain all that he or she has earned”40.That is not, of course, the exact position here as the Wife did continue to work and earn her own money as well as develop a successful business but I entirely accept that the Husband earned infinitely more money than her during the marriage and she was held back by her commitments to the children. I do, however, make the important point that a generous needs assessment in this case would undoubtedly mean that the Husband will not be able “to retain all that he or she has earned”.41.Mr Boydell also draws my attention to the observations of Mostyn J in Kremen v Agrest [2012] EWHC 45 (Fam) where he said that “it will only be in an unusual case where it can be said that, absent independent legal advice and full disclosure, a party can be taken to have freely entered into a marital agreement with a full appreciation of its implications…”42.There are two difficulties with this. The first difficulty is that the Court of Appeal has, in effect, dealt with this argument in the case of Versteegh v Versteegh [2018] EWCA Civ 1050; [2019] Fam 518 where Eleanor King LJ said at paragraph [65]:- “In my judgment, when an English court is presented with a PMA such as the present one; signed in a country where they are commonplace, simply drafted and generally signed without legal advice or indeed disclosure, it cannot be right to add a gloss to Radmacher to the effect that such a spouse will be regarded as having lacked the necessary appreciation of the consequence absent legal advice to the effect that some of the countries, in which they may choose to live during their married life, may operate a discretionary system. As Lord Philips said in Radmacher:"[78] The reason why the court should give weight to a nuptial agreement is that there should be respect for individual autonomy. The court should accord respect to the decision of a married couple as to the manner in which their financial affairs should be regulated. It would be paternalistic and patronising to override their agreement simply on the basis that the court knows best. This is particularly true where the parties' agreement addresses existing circumstances and not merely the contingencies of an uncertain future."43.Indeed, I took a similar view in Z v Z (No 2) [2011] EWHC 2878 (Fam); [2012] 1 FLR 1100 in relation to another French case where there had been a “separation de biens” agreement. I rejected all the arguments that it would not be fair for me to uphold the agreement but I made it very clear that it might have been very different if the agreement had purported to exclude maintenance claims in the widest sense but I noted that the agreement there, as here, does not do so. 44.The second difficulty with the approach in Kremen v Agrest is that it flies in the face of the decision in Radmacher itself. Mr Granatino was, essentially, held to an agreement which even contained a waiver of any claim for maintenance. Like this Wife, he was highly intelligent and embarking on a career in business but he had not had independent legal advice or full disclosure. This court cannot be sexist. I will have to assess whether this Wife did have a full appreciation of the implications of the agreement. 45.Mr Boydell referred me to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Brack v Brack [2018] EWCA Civ 2862 where Eleanor King LJ said the following at paragraph [103]:-“Even where there is an effective prenuptial agreement, the court remains under an obligation to take into account all the factors found in s25(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, together with a proper consideration of all the circumstances, the first consideration being the welfare of any children. Such an approach may, albeit unusually, lead the court in its search for a fair outcome, to make an order which, contrary to the terms of the agreement, provides a settlement for the wife in excess of her needs. It should also be recognised that, even in a case where the court considers a needs-based approach to be fair, the court will, as in KA v MA, retain a degree of latitude when it comes to deciding on the level of generosity or frugality which should appropriately be brought to the assessment of those needs”.46.There is not much doubt that, if I reject the Marriage Contract as being operative, it is likely that the matrimonial assets will be divided equally, subject to the small issue as to whether there should be any allowance for post-separation accrual. Issues concerning liquidity would be dealt with by a combination of the value to be ascribed to the asset or the possibility of deferred sharing. 47.If, on the other hand, I find that the Marriage Contract does exclude sharing in this case, I must go on to consider the other two limbs of the Miller/McFarlane test, namely compensation and needs. There is no question of compensation for relationship generated disadvantage in this case. The Wife continued to work and has recently been able to create and sell a very successful business. I do accept that she might have earned more if she had not had child-care responsibilities but any such shortfall will be more than made up for in her needs claim. 48.Finally, I would have to consider her needs. It is clear to me that this is a case where I do not need to consider issues such as whether she will be reduced to “a predicament of real need” as referred to in Radmacher. There is nothing in this Marriage Contract that prevents an award based on needs. As Eleanor King LJ said in Brack, in deciding on her needs, I would have to consider all the section 25 factors. This was a long marriage where the Wife made a full and complete contribution in every respect. There are very significant resources available. The standard of living enjoyed during the marriage was high. The Husband’s income was very high and large capital resources were generated. I am quite clear that any award based on need should be generous and complete. 49.Turning to pension sharing, my attention was drawn to the decision of Nicholas Francis QC, sitting, at that point, as a deputy High Court Judge in SJ v RA [2014] EWHC 4054 (Fam) where he said:-“Why should someone receive more just on the basis of gender? There may have been an explanation when rules required the purchase of an annuity. However, to give the wife more than the husband, on account of either age or gender would seem to me to be unacceptable discrimination unless it is a case which is governed solely by needs. If a person should receive more of a pension fund under the modern rules simply because she (or he in the case of a marriage where the husband is much younger) is likely to live longer, then such an approach would logically extend to all capital assets. Moreover, European Union judgments and rules are rapidly outlawing discrimination on account of gender. In cases where distribution is being made on a basis which is not guided by need it is, in my judgment, incorrect to distribute a pension fund on the basis of equality of income…”50.I could not agree more. If assets are to be divided equally, they should be divided equally. In general, there is no justification for awarding more to one party because they are younger or have a longer life expectancy. Both parties should share the fruits of the marriage equally. Moreover, in my experience, the only thing that can be said is that life hardly ever goes to plan, whether it be one party living far longer than expected or another remarrying immediately. It follows that I have become very troubled by directions that ask a pensions actuary to calculate a division on the basis of equality of income in retirement. Apart from the fact that such reports tend to be very expensive, the simple fact is that such a direction almost enshrines the Duxbury paradox into practice. It cannot be right, in general, that the younger you are, the greater your award. In any event, it has no place whatsoever in equal division cases. 51.Finally, I have to remember the potential language barrier in this case. The first language of both these parties is French not English, although I make it clear that both speak English extremely well as one would expect given that they have lived here so long. Nevertheless, I must take great care in assessing both parties’ evidence as processing information provided in a foreign language may put the participant at a disadvantage. I must guard against the very real possibility that questions or answers or both are misunderstood or, at the least, nuances and shades of different meaning are lost in the process. I have taken all this into account in assessing the evidence in this case. The evidence I heard52.The only oral evidence that I heard was from the two parties. In some respects, the evidence of both was unsatisfactory. The Wife’s answer to just about any question that Mr Leech KC, who appears on behalf of the Husband, put to her about the Marriage Contract, was that she could not remember. I entirely accept that it is very difficult to remember detail from twenty-eight years ago but this Marriage Contract was important and I find it hard to accept that she has absolutely no recollection of what the Notary told the parties. She told me that the purpose of the contract was to allow them “to separate what came from our families”. Whilst true, I accept that this would have been the default situation anyway. She then said that it did not occur to her as to what would happen on a divorce and that she did not ask herself the question. I accept that, when you are young and in love, it is not something that you wish to contemplate but the Notary had a duty to explain the effect of the Marriage Contract to the parties and this would have been a fundamental part of that explanation. After all, there is no point in a Contract that declares “separation de biens” whilst you are happily married as, in such circumstances, you can do anything you like. Other than on death, it is really only on divorce or separation that it has an effect. It follows that I cannot accept her answer that she did not know that it would affect provision on divorce.53.She was asked how they ended up going to see a Notary from the firm used by her family. She said that they had asked her parents to recommend a Notary and her parents had said “of course”. She did not accept that a draft of the Marriage Contract would have been sent out but I am clear that it must have been, given that the parties only had one appointment and signed the concluded agreement at that meeting. I find some limited support for that in the fact that the document said that it was executed before M Morin, when we know that was not the case. I suspect it was drafted on the basis that he would be the Notary but for some unexplained reason, Agnes Braun stepped in. The fact that it was drafted in advance means that someone must have instructed the Notary to draft a “separation de biens” agreement. She accepted that it was the Notary’s function to take her through the Contract. She said it had been “lost in the memory over the years” and that she could not “invent a memory she did not have”. It was then put to her that she would not have signed a contract she did not understand. She said that this was incorrect and that she had signed many things without understanding, claiming that she did not have “rigour”. It may, indeed, be that she has signed documents without reading them carefully over the years, but I am satisfied this Marriage Contract would have been explained to her over the previous hour so I cannot accept that she signed it without understanding it. Indeed, it is the Husband’s case that she asked a significant number of questions to the Notary. Given her personality, I am sure that would have been the case. She accepted it was not a difficult commercial contract but said she did not really pay attention, as contracts bore her. I cannot accept that either. She added that she thought they understood it but claimed it only involved separation of property if the assets came from their respective families. She said that, if you build together, you share. I am sure she has convinced herself of this but I will have to make findings as it is central to the case. 54.She was asked about putting €35,000 into the purchase of the French Alps apartment. She said that they did not consider how much each was putting into any of the properties, including the former matrimonial home and P House as it was “irrelevant”. She accepted that she could have put into the purchase of the French Alps apartment, all the money she had received from the sale of an apartment she had been given by her family in Paris. She had sold that property in September 2010 for €180,000. She was then asked about the time in 2016 when she asked the Husband for £150,000 to invest in her new business. She told me it had become a major issue in the marriage as he wanted to impose all sorts of conditions on the investment. She then said that she had access to all the Husband’s accounts via a number of cards. Mr Leech asked her about that. It transpired that four of the cards on which she relied were for Air Miles or the equivalent and that the rest did not give her unfettered access to the Husband’s money. She added that she would use the cards for purchases not transfers. She accepted that she could not call the bank to move money as her name was not on the accounts. 55.She was then asked about her earning capacity. She was taken to a job advertisement for the Managing Director of a “fantastic branded consumer products business” with a salary of £180,000 plus benefits. There had been 174 applicants. She said that the job specification was not describing her abilities, other than being ambitious and an innovator. I am absolutely clear that she would have no realistic prospect of obtaining such a job. She has not been employed since 2007. She is now 54 years of age. She has recently been an entrepreneur. I am not finding that she could not obtain some sort of a job but I am clear that it would not be anything like this particular one. 56.I then heard from the Husband. I have to say that I found his recollection of the background to the Marriage Contract to be much more convincing and plausible than that of the Wife. He told me that he had not been involved in making the arrangements for the meeting. He had been sent a brochure about marriage contracts, which he had read and a draft of the Contract, which he had not read. Whilst I find that surprising, particularly as it is a short document, he had nothing to gain from lying to me about that. He said that Agnes Braun explained the consequences of the Contract to them. She said that, if they wanted to buy an asset together, they could but it would need to be specified. They could buy it in uneven shares. She then started to talk about the impact of the Contract on divorce. He said words to the effect of “let’s not talk about divorce” but he was given a ticking off and the Notary proceeded to do so. I find that this evidence has the ring of truth and I accept it. He added that they were told they had to pay attention. He said he vividly remembered it. He added that it was very clear as to where the assets would go on divorce. Again, I accept this evidence. The Notary had an obligation to explain this and I consider it inconceivable that she would not have done so. 57.He was taken to his Form E where he had said that his family have a tradition of passing on assets from one generation to the next and that this is an important part of French culture and family structure. Mr Boydell then referred him to a comment that “anything our respective families have or (sic) gifted to us is entirely separate from our other assets”. His response was that they had discussed the preservation of inherited assets but there was no need to sign a Marriage Contract to achieve that as that is the default regime in France in any event. He added that marriage contracts are relatively common within their social set. Their significance is well-known and everybody knows what they do. They knew that, if they separated, the finances would be divided according to who owns what. He said that it was important to the Wife. Her mother had suffered from having given up work. The Wife had sworn that she would never relinquish that independence. She wanted a full ability to work and to retain the proceeds of her endeavours. He gave her that reassurance. I remind myself that the Wife had, at that point, been working for C Group for approximately three years in a responsible role, whereas the Husband had been a student, even if he had, by then, secured a job at A Bank. The Husband added that the whole point of a Marriage Contract is driven by what would happen on a separation. It was discussed by them outside the meeting with the Notary but he did not believe they discussed the position if they had children. 58.It was then suggested to him that Article 2 of the Contract undermines his case. Article 2 provides that personal effects, jewellery and furs shall be presumed to belong to the spouse who makes personal use of them. This would not, however, apply to family jewellery inherited or gifted even if used by the other spouse. I cannot accept Mr Boydell’s point in relation to this. I consider it supports the Husband’s case. This clause is necessary to prevent the “separation de biens” being used, for example, to prevent the Wife keeping her wedding ring or engagement ring if bought for her by the Husband. Mr Boydell made much of the fact that the document did not mention divorce. I accept that but I do not take the view that it takes the matter forward, given that I accept the evidence that the Notary explained the consequences of divorce to the parties. The Husband said that the document was in a standard form and there was no other contract available in France. He also made the point that the French Courts consider this to be a perfectly valid marriage contract that will be enforced on divorce. Moreover, I am clear that, if it was not intended to include the position on divorce, there really would be no point in entering it at all. He then stressed that the Wife asked a number of questions during the meeting with the Notary although he could not remember what she asked. 59.Mr Boydell then turned to other aspects. The Husband said that there were tax disadvantages of acquiring the French Alps apartment in joint names. There was the problem if the proceeds of sale were remitted to the United Kingdom but there would also be UK Capital Gains Tax on any increase in value of the Wife’s share. Mr Boydell asked him about SCo. He accepted that he told the Wife that he did not believe in her business plan. He felt the projections were overly optimistic. The product had been delisted from a number of supermarkets and the management structure was inadequate. He felt it was too risky. He acknowledged that it was a small sum for him but he said he is very careful with his money. I have to contrast this with his recent investments in OCap and NCap that he says are replete with risk and that I should take as net liabilities. He said he treated his Wife as he would any potential investment. He had imposed four conditions before agreeing to advance the money. I said in evidence that I considered this all to be incredibly ungallant of him. It upset the Wife enormously. This was a relatively small sum and he should have just paid up. As it was, he was entirely wrong as the Wife made a success out of it. I do accept that he subsequently transferred the shares to her but the evidence did appear to indicate that this was in part to save tax on sale, as she could take advantage of entrepreneur’s relief on Capital Gains Tax whereby she would only pay 10% on the first £1 million of gains. 60.He was asked about an asset schedule that did not appear to distinguish between assets in his name, assets in her name, and assets in joint names. He said that the previous tab on the Excel Spreadsheet did do so. He accepted that the family was worth around €21 million in 2016/2017. Not surprisingly, Mr Boydell asked him about the OCap and NCap investments that he has included in his Asset Schedule as liabilities. I have already made my point about that. I did ask him if he would transfer the assets to the Wife at these valuations and all he could say was that it was not permitted. He was then asked about further discounts he had included such as 30% in relation to money already received from B Bank shares. He said that the Bank could claw the money back if it lost money as a result of his decisions or reputational damage. I consider this is pretty close to fanciful despite his evidence that he had received two written warnings for mistakes in compliance. He was then asked why he had excluded entirely his B Bank unvested shares. He said that this was because the Bank would be entitled to cancel the shares if he left the Bank but set up in competition to it. Whilst this may be right, it is pretty clear to me that some of these shares would vest before he left the Bank. Moreover, if he was to decide to compete with the Bank, it would be his decision that he would presumably take on the basis that he would make more money from his new venture than he would lose from the unvested shares. I remind myself of his own evidence that he is very careful with money. 61.The one area that does need careful consideration is the question of latent tax on the sum of €4,561,211 held offshore in Julius Baer accounts. If that was remitted to the United Kingdom, income tax would be payable at 45%. This would amount to around £1.8 million. I appreciate that the Husband is very careful with his money and he would do everything possible to avoid such tax. Having said that, if there was to be an equal division of everything, it is difficult to see why one party should be left at a disadvantage with a significant latent tax liability. Moreover, he did say that he was expecting that he would have to use a lot of the money to pay the Wife the award that I will be making. Finally, in relation to future property purchases, Mr Boydell took him to his own comment in his section 25 statement that they would both need to “buy a three bedroom house in London”. I realise that it would be unfair to hold a party to such a statement in the face of a necessity to purchase more economically but, in a case where the assets are significantly in excess of £20 million, it is relevant that he was previously of that view. My findings as to the Marriage Contract62.I first turn to the question of the Marriage Contract. There is no doubt whatsoever that it was freely entered into by each party. I do not consider that the lack of independent legal advice or full disclosure is fatal. First, they did get advice from the Notary. Second, the parties were well aware of their respective positions at the time. Did they have a full appreciation of the Contract’s implications? I have come to the clear conclusion that they did. It is important to remind oneself that such Marriage Contracts are very common in France. In reaching my conclusion, I have been very struck by the fact that the parties went to the firm of Notaries used by the Wife’s family. It is difficult to say with certainty how this came about but nobody has suggested that it was the Husband or his family that were pressing for this Marriage Contract. After all, the Husband was a student studying for his exams, albeit that he did have a good job offer with A Bank up his sleeve. Moreover, somebody must have asked the firm to prepare the first draft of the Contract and I find it almost impossible to believe it was the Husband. 63.In general, I have found the evidence of the Husband considerably more persuasive on this issue than that of the Wife. There is no doubt in my mind that the Notary would have explained the Contract and its ramifications to the parties in detail. It was her obligation to do so and it is inconceivable that she would not have done so. I was particularly taken with the Husband’s evidence that, when the Notary started talking about the consequences on a divorce, he tried to stop her but was “given a ticking off”. This can only have been because the Notary knew she had to deal with it. 64.This Wife is extremely intelligent. She had been working for three years in responsible employment. I cannot accept that she would not have known that the whole point of such Contracts was to deal with the position on divorce or separation given that there is no real need for them otherwise. In any event, even if she did not, the Notary told her. At the time, she was earning more than the Husband. She wanted to retain her career and keep the rewards from that career. Whilst I cannot be entirely sure of the motivation of her or her family, I am clear that the Radmacher test for upholding this Contract is satisfied. Those who sign marriage contracts must understand that it is a significant step with very important consequences. These contracts will be enforced in France and will not simply be torn up in this jurisdiction. 65.There is no doubt that this Marriage Contract would have failed the Radmacher test if it had attempted to exclude a needs based award as it would not then have been fair but the Contract does no such thing. It follows that I must go on to consider the correct needs based award to make to this Wife following this long marriage in which she has made as full a contribution as she could possibly have made. The quantification of the assets66.Before deciding on the correct award, I must quantify the assets. I realise that this is not quite as important now that I have decided against sharing but it is still a necessary exercise to perform in the overall section 25 exercise. I make it clear that I exclude completely the inherited/gifted assets that came from the respective families. In the Wife’s case, this is £219,298 for her interest in the Brittany property occupied by her parents. In the Husband’s case, this is £1,556,411, namely interests in five separate French properties plus some inherited funds. I recognise that there may be more to come, particularly on the Wife’s side, but this is certainly not a case where such assets should be taken into account as part of the respective needs of each party. Indeed, neither counsel has suggested I should do so.67.The Wife has liquid assets of £4,120,574. I take her bank accounts at their latest balances even though this may have reduced her outstanding costs somewhat. Overall, any change would be de minimis. In addition, she has pension assets of £255,796. I include her Malakoff Humanis pension, generated during her employment with C Group, at £229,784. Overall, this means she has assets of £4,376,370. 68.The Husband claims matrimonial assets of only £14,909,989 as against a figure of £21,231,269 asserted on behalf of the Wife. I resolve the disputes as follows:-(a)For these purposes, I reject the suggestion that post-separation bonuses or compensation should be treated differently. I am not dividing up these assets in accordance with sharing so it really does not matter where on the schedule they are placed. Moreover, there has been no significant delay in getting this case to court.(b)I reject the reduction of 30% on the proceeds of sale of his B Bank stock. This Husband has been incredibly successful in business. He is very careful with his money. He will do everything in his power to avoid any reclaim by the Bank and the chances of one being successfully obtained are so low that it should be ignored. (c)I accept his figure for the proceeds of sale of his boat. This reduces the Wife’s figure by £87,719.(d)I completely reject his contention that I should deduct future cash calls on his CCap, OCap and NCap by treating them as liabilities. First, when invested, these amounts will increase the value of the investment. Second, he is a very astute financier. He has only recently invested in NCap. It was his decision to do so. He must take on the financial responsibility that goes with having done so.(e)I propose to allow the tax on remittance of the Julius Baer offshore capital in the sum of (£1,800,478) in full. For these purposes, I should compare like with like. I need to know the true net position of each party. I do, however, proceed on the basis that the ability to defer/avoid this tax is a significant advantage to this Husband. (f)I ignore the potential past tax on past US earnings, claimed in the sum of £516,368. There is absolutely no evidence of HMRC seeking this money. To do so, they have to establish dishonesty and the period in which they can do so is limited. (g)Turning to the Husband’s unvested B Bank shares, I reject his contention that I should ignore them all on the basis that he may lose them if he sets up in competition to the Bank after retirement. First, many of the shares will have vested by then. Second, if he does lose them, it will be because of a conscious decision that he is better off doing so than retaining them, because he believes he will earn more in his new business than he will lose.(h)Finally, I take the long-term investments in CCap, OCap and NCap at their current values. I do, of course, accept that they will not be received for a considerable period of time. For example, CCap will not mature until somewhere between 2027 and 2029. I will therefore distinguish these assets from the liquid assets but they are included at their current values. Having said that, the Husband tells me that the CCap investment has fallen 20% due to falls in the market since it was last valued. I accept that evidence and reduce the figure to £1,104,739, a reduction of £276,184.69.The cumulative effect of these findings is that the Husband’s assets reduce from the Wife’s figure of £21,231,269 to £19,979,387. Of this, £13,985,865 is liquid. The figure increases to £16,695,366 if the illiquid assets are included but the value of his pensions excluded. The total liquid assets is £18,110,752 including the sum of £4,313,000 held in the joint accounts. 70.There are also the pensions. The Husband’s pensions have a combined value of £3,284,021. I accept there will be some tax to deduct from this due to the fact that the totals exceed the Life Time Allowance. Added to the Wife’s pensions worth £255,796, the total pension assets are £3,539,817.71.Overall, the total assets are:-(a)Wife liquid £ 4,120,574(b)Husband liquid £13,985,865(c)Husband illiquid £ 2,709,502(d)Wife pensions £ 255,796(e)Husband pensions £ 3,284,021Total £24,360,070The Wife’s needs72.I now turn to the question of the Wife’s reasonable needs. They fall into two main categories, namely housing and income needs. 73.It is agreed that the Wife needs a property in London. Given the capital available and the standard of living during the marriage, I am quite clear that it should be a house, albeit materially smaller than the former matrimonial home. It should also be in Central London where the parties spent their entire married life. 74.I reject the Husband’s contention that a flat at a cost of less than £3 million is appropriate. Equally, the Wife’s particulars are more expensive than the former matrimonial home on a pound per square foot basis. She may simply have to move slightly further out of Central London but there is no reason why she should not do so. I have decided that an appropriate level for housing for the Wife is £3,500,000 to which I must add stamp duty at £331,250 and costs of purchase/moving at £10,000. 75.I accept that the very small apartment in the French Alps owned, in effect, by the children is not appropriate for the Wife going forward. I have decided that she should have a property to the same value as that owned by the Husband, namely €1,095,000. The total cost, including purchase expenses, will be £1,068,541 as sought by the Wife.76.I have found the issue of a third property more difficult. I entirely accept that the parties had three homes during the marriage and that P House was a substantial property worth £2.75 million when sold. I reject the suggestion that the Wife should have a property costing over €3 million in Cap Ferret on the Bay of Biscay. I cannot ignore the fact that she does have access to the property at Brittany, although it is occupied by her parents. I have decided that it is appropriate for her to have her own holiday home but at the same cost as the property in the French Alps, namely £1,068,541. 77.In terms of pension, it is appropriate that she should have a pension share. After all, a significant proportion of the Husband’s assets are held in pensions. Moreover, it will assist with reducing the tax burden caused by the Life Time Allowance. I have decided that she should have half of the husband’s A Bank Directors’ Pension Scheme. As the CEV is £2,279,490, she will receive £1,139,745. Combined with her own pensions, she will have a pension entitlement of £1,395,541. In so far as there are any tax consequences of her exceeding the Life Time Allowance, she will be responsible for that tax. 78.Finally, I turn to her income provision. She gave some very frank and helpful evidence about her future income needs that the court accepts in full. She considered that her income needs would reduce as she got older. She told me that she felt that her current income needs were £200,000 per annum but this would reduce to £160,000 per annum at the age of 60 and £120,000 at the age of 68 onwards. I consider this to be realistic and appropriate. I take those figures.79.She then assesses her earned income at £48,000 per annum gross from the age of 55 to 58 and then self-employed income at the rate of £80,000 per annum from age 59 to 67. I have been slightly troubled that these figures may be too high. I have rejected the Husband’s case that she could obtain a high-flying senior management role. Equally, whilst I recognise that her SCo business was very successful, it is amazing how many similar business fail, even when the entrepreneur has great experience of the industry and has been very successful in other ventures. Nevertheless, I take the view that I should accept her figures as she is very determined and does know the bottled water industry extremely well.80.Finally, she takes her pension receipts at being £40,500 per annum. Although this may be slightly reduced by the fact that I have awarded her slightly less by way of pension share, overall it is good enough. The resulting Duxbury calculation shows a capital sum required of £2,092,579. I accept that figure.81.This gives an overall need of:-(a)London home £3,841,250(b)Ski apartment £1,068,541(c)Holiday home £1,068,541(d)Duxbury sum £2,092,579(e)Pensions £1,395,541Total £9,466,452Cross-check82.If the Wife exits the marriage with a total sum of £9,466,452 plus her interest in the Brittany property, she will have received 38.9% of the total matrimonial assets. The liquid assets, however, are £18,110,752. Of that sum, she will receive £8,070,911 or 44.56%. Taking into account the Marriage Contract and all the section 25 circumstances, I am satisfied that this is a correct and appropriate division of the assets. 83.The parties will have to check my arithmetic but I calculate that she already has liquid assets of £4,120,574. She will therefore require a lump sum of £3,950,337 to bring her up to £8,070,911 plus 50% of the Husband’s A Bank Directors’ Pension Scheme. I can see no legitimate reason why the lump sum could not be paid to her offshore but, given that I have taken into account the latent tax on the Guernsey funds, I do not require her to give any undertaking as to the money’s future use. It is therefore up to the Husband how and where he pays the money.Occupational rent84.I have to say that I consider the claim for occupational rent in the sum of £100,000 to be without any justification at all. I do accept that occupational rent is an important element of TOLATA and bankruptcy claims but it has no place whatsoever in financial remedy proceedings. The court simply cannot investigate the parties’ respective conduct to see if the party who vacated was forced out or went voluntarily. Moreover, it does not matter. If one party has incurred rent, it will have reduced his or her assets. If the assets are shared equally, the liability will have been shared. If it is a needs case, the fact the money has been spent will be taken into account in assessing the needs of the party who paid the rent.Ms D85.Both parties have expressed a concern to provide a pension for the family’s long-standing employee, Ms D. I do not consider I need to resolve this issue. If the parties want to provide for her by agreement, they can. If they cannot agree, they will both be very wealthy after my judgment. They can use their own resources to do so if they wish.