Case No. FD21F00053

47.The Family Law Act 1986, section 55A(2) provides: ‘A court shall have jurisdiction to entertain an application under subsection (1) above if, and only if, either of the persons named in it for the purposes of that subsection -(a) is domiciled in England and Wales on the date of the application, or (b) has been habitually resident in England and Wales throughout the period of one year ending with that date, or(c) died before that date and either – (i) was at death domiciled in England and Wales, or(ii) had been habitually resident in England and Wales throughout the period of one year ending with the date of death.’48.I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to entertain the application on the basis of Ruth’s domicile in England and Wales on 22 September 2021 and/or her habitual residence in England and Wales throughout the period of one year ending with 22 September 2021. 49.I do not need to consider Patrick’s circumstances in any detail, but I note that it appears he was habitually resident in England and Wales for the requisite period prior to his death. I am less confident as to whether Patrick was domiciled in England and Wales at the time of his death as he was born in Ireland and there is no evidence before me that he had subsequently acquired, and then retained, a domicile of choice in England and Wales. 50.In any event, nothing turns on Patrick’s circumstances in this respect as I am satisfied there is jurisdiction to entertain the application on the basis of Ruth’s circumstances alone. 51.Sub-sections (3) and (4) provide:(3)Except in a case falling within subsection (4) below, the court shall refuse to hear an application under subsection (1) above unless it considers that the applicant has a sufficient personal interest in the determination of the application (but this is subject to section 27 of the Child Support Act 1991).(4)The excepted cases are where the declaration sought is as to whether or not – (a) the applicant is the parent of a named person; (b) a named person is the parent of the applicant; or (c) a named person is the other parent of a named child of the applicant. 52.This is an “excepted case” pursuant to sub-section (4)(b) because Ruth seeks a declaration that Patrick is her father. Ruth does not need therefore to show that she has a sufficient personal interest in the determination of the application, although I am well satisfied that she does53.Sub-sections (5) and (6) are not relevant to the application.54.Section 58 of the Family Law Act 1986 contains general provisions as to the making and effect of declarations. Sub-section (1) provides: ‘Where on an application to a court for a declaration under this Part the truth of the proposition to be declared is proved to the satisfaction of the court, the court shall make that declaration unless to do so would manifestly be contrary to public policy.’ 55.I read that provision to mean that I must be satisfied on the ordinary civil standard (i.e. the balance of probabilities) on the evidence before me that Patrick is Ruth’s father. If I am so satisfied, then I am required to make such a declaration to that effect unless to do so would be manifestly contrary to public policy. Once the facts are proved then, subject to the question of public policy, the court has no discretion to withhold the declaration. 56.What evidence is needed to make a declaration of parentage?57.If Patrick were alive, I could, whether upon an application by a party or indeed of my own motion, direct scientific tests be undertaken to ascertain whether Patrick is or is not the father of Ruth pursuant to the Family Law Reform Act 1969, section 20(1)(a). 58.As Patrick is dead I could order, pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction, scientific tests to the same end if DNA samples could be obtained. Such a direction would not be in breach of the Human Tissue Act 2004: Anderson v Spencer [2018] 2 FLR 547, CA. 59.However, as Patrick died more than 13 years ago I have doubts as to whether adequate DNA samples could be obtained.60.There is no requirement that such scientific testing must be undertaken on an application for a declaration of parentage. I am entitled to determine the application on the basis of the evidence before me. That evidence amply satisfies me that it is far more likely than not that Patrick was Ruth’s true father. 61.Finally, I cannot see any reason why it would be manifestly contrary to public policy to make the declaration sought. As I noted during the hearing, I consider, if anything, that it would be manifestly contrary to public policy if I were to refuse to make the declaration sought. 62.I am therefore satisfied that I can and should make the declaration sought, namely that Patrick was Ruth’s father.63.Section 55A(7) of the Family Law Act 1986 provides:‘Where a declaration is made by a court on an application under subsection (1) above, the prescribed officer of the court shall notify the Registrar General, in such a manner and within such period as may be prescribed, of the making of that declaration.’64.Ruth has explained that she seeks the amendment of her birth certificate. I do not have the direct power to order that such amendment be made. However, in accordance with the provision stated above, a court officer will send a copy of the order arising from this hearing to the Registrar General for Births and Deaths within 21 days of the date of the order so that he may consider the re-registration of the birth of Ruth under the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953, section 14A.65.I do say, however, that it would be most surprising if the Registrar General for Births and Deaths declined to amend Ruth’s birth certificate in the light of my declaration. 66.There shall be no order as to costs on the application. 67.That is my judgment._____________________________