Case No. FD21F00053

20.Section 55A(1) of the Family Law Act 1986 explicitly permits a declaration of parentage application to be issued in either the High Court or the Family Court. Ruth issued the application at the Royal Courts of Justice although the form that she filed did not state in which court she was issuing it. The application was impressed with seal of the High Court. The order dated 25 October 2021 is headed “In the High Court of Justice”. 21.However, it would have been wrong to have allowed Ruth to issue this application in the High Court. This is because FPR rule 5.4 provides:‘(1) Where both the Family Court and the High Court have jurisdiction to deal with a matter, the proceedings relating to that matter must be started in the Family Court.(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply where –(a) proceedings relating to the same parties are already being heard in the High Court;(b) any rule, other enactment or Practice Direction provides otherwise; or(c) the court otherwise directs’The President’s Guidance - Jurisdiction of the Family Court: Allocation of cases within the Family Court to High Court Judge level and transfer of cases from the Family Court to the High Court dated 24 May 2021 does not require this application for declaratory relief to be issued in the High Court. This is because the application is made under Part III of the Family Law Act 1986 and is therefore excepted from Item No. 3 of the Schedule to the Guidance.22.Therefore, the application had to be issued in the Family Court. The use of the High Court seal on the issued application, and the heading of the order of 25 October 2021, does not affect that requirement. I heard the case sitting in the Family Court; I give this judgment in the Family Court; and the order giving effect to this judgment shall be made in the Family Court.23.An application under s55A of the 1986 Act is governed procedurally by FPR Part 8 Chapter 5. FPR rule 8.1 states:“Subject to rules 8.13 and 8.24, applications to which this Part applies must be made in accordance with the Part 19 procedure.”24.In Dunkley v Dunkley & Another [2018] 2 FLR 258 I somehow overlooked the terms of rule 8.1 but at para 3 surmised that the Part 19 procedure applied by virtue of the reference to aspects of it in rules 8.20(3) and (6).25.Rules 8.13 and 8.24 are not relevant to this application. Therefore it is made pursuant to, and governed by, the Part 19 procedure.26.An application under the Part 19 procedure is heard in private under FPR rule 27.10, although members of the press and legal bloggers are entitled to attend under rule 27.11. I duly heard the application in private on Microsoft Teams, and no journalist or legal blogger attended.27.Had a member of the press or a legal blogger attended I consider that they could have reported everything that they heard during the proceedings. There are no minor children affected even peripherally by the application. It is impossible to see on what basis a reporting restriction order could have been made. In H v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 1646 at para 21 the Master of the Rolls stated:‘(1) The general rule is that the names of the parties to an action are included in orders and judgments of the court.(2) There is no general exception for cases where private matters are in issue.(3) An order for anonymity or any other order restraining the publication of the normally reportable details of a case is a derogation from the principle of open justice and an interference with the Article 10 rights of the public at large.(4) Accordingly, where the court is asked to make any such order, it should only do so after closely scrutinising the application, and considering whether a degree of restraint on publication is necessary, and, if it is, whether there is any less restrictive or more acceptable alternative than that which is sought.(5) Where the court is asked to restrain the publication of the names of the parties and/or the subject matter of the claim, on the ground that such restraint is necessary under Article 8, the question is whether there is sufficient general, public interest in publishing a report of the proceedings which identifies a party and/or the normally reportable details to justify any resulting curtailment of his right and his family's right to respect for their private and family life.’28.In my judgment there are no aspects of this case whereby the privacy right in Article 8 trumps the principle of open justice in Article 6 and the general Article 10 rights of the public at large.29.If the case could have been fully reported had journalists attended, then any suggestion that this judgment should be anonymised is untenable. In any event, I cannot discern any good reason to depart from the principle of open justice which is implicit in a full judgment. To anonymise the actors would be to provide a disembodied version with all the disadvantages identified by Lord Steyn in Re S (A Child)(Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2005] 1 AC 593, HL at [34] and Lord Rodger in re Guardian News and Media Ltd at para [63]. 30.I record that Ruth, Constance, Simon and Jane were all given by me the opportunity to make any submissions in writing opposing the publication of this judgment in full without anonymisation. Ruth, on behalf of all members of the family, sent an email stating that ‘we do not wish to make any submissions in writing as to the judge’s intentions’.31.Therefore consistently with the principles I outlined in BT v CU [2021] EWFC 87 at [113] and in A v M [2021] EWFC 89 at [104] – [106], I shall give this judgment in full without anonymisation.32.Having dealt with these procedural matters I now turn to the substance of the application.