Case No. ZE17P01593

. On the 5th January 2022, F issued an application for permission to appeal my judgment to the Court of Appeal and an accompanying application to adjourn the final hearing pending the outcome of this appeal. Inevitably, I had to yield to the adjournment application. 9.The Court of Appeal granted the application to appeal out of time and gave permission to appeal. On the 28th February 2022, Peter Jackson LJ invited the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and/or Secretary of State to consider making representations to assist the Court of Appeal with regard to the legislative differences identified in the appeal, concerning the application of Section 98 of the Children Act 1989 in private and public law proceedings. The DPP accepted the invitation and was joined as an intervenor in the appeal hearing on 31st March 2022. 10.On the 21st April 2022, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Lord Burnett of Maldon CJ concluded: “[42] We see nothing unfair in expecting the father to make his case in the family proceedings to secure the outcome he desires and, if he considers it to be the case, to seek to persuade the judge that contact is in the best interests of his two children. He played a full part, including giving evidence, in the fact-finding hearing. If he has decided that his evidence in that earlier hearing was untrue and wishes to qualify or change it there is nothing unfair in letting him choose to do so. We observe that even section 98 of the 1989 Act provides no protection in the case of perjury. The Strasbourg Court generally looks at the totality of proceedings before determining whether they have been fair for the purposes of article 6. It does not exclude the possibility that a single step may render them unfair. Yet it is inconceivable that the refusal of a pre-emptive blanket order of this sort could amount to a violation of article 6. We are satisfied that the approach to disclosure from the family proceedings found in Re EC (Disclosure of Material) (see para. 17 above) provides appropriate protections and ensures that the family law proceedings would, in this respect, be fair.”11.An application to the Court of Appeal for permission to apply to the Supreme Court was rejected. The application was renewed before the Supreme Court. On the 30th September 2022, F applied to adjourn the directions hearing before me pending the Supreme Court’s decision on F’s application. With very great reluctance, I did so. However, having heard nothing at all, from either of the parties, I caused my clerk to contact the parties’ solicitors, informing them that I had listed the case on the 5th December 2022 for a final hearing. For completeness, I record that on the 2nd November 2022, the Supreme Court, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Hamblen, and Lord Stephens refused the permission to appeal having concluded that the application raised no arguable point of law. 12.The order of the Court following the fact-finding judgment on 15th January 2021, records the following findings: i.That the applicant father coercively controlled the respondent mother throughout the relationship by preventing her access to ante-natal care, isolating her from her family, friends and peers, controlling her money and food and deliberately curtailing her freedom, also amounting to emotional abuse;ii.That the applicant father raped the respondent mother, probably on more than one occasion, during their marriage;iii.that the applicant father’s conduct during the relationship, resulted in [Y] being exposed to emotional harm.”13.I do not believe that the mother’s legal team were successful in their attempts to ensure that the Home Office saw either this order or my judgment. In any event, in November 2021, I am told F received a letter from the Home Office, granting him a period of 30 months limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom. I am told that this is predicated on F’s pursuit of the ‘10-year partner route’ to secure eligibility for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. It is clear from my judgment that I have found F to be a serious danger to the physical and emotional safety of women and children. His evidence at this hearing revealed him, once again, to be narcissistic, arrogant, and entirely devoid of empathy for his former partner and the children. On this occasion, I propose to send a copy of this judgment and my earlier judgments to the Home Secretary for her personal consideration. Decisions relating to immigration are, of course, entirely for her. I forward the judgments simply to reassure myself that she has the full information before her. 14.On the 11th October 2021, the Cafcass Officer filed a report setting out her recommendations. She concluded that it would not be possible to safeguard the children from F’s emotionally and psychologically abusive behaviours until he has undertaken behaviour change work. She noted that in my January judgment, I considered that F had caused emotional harm to children in the other relationship that I analysed. Nonetheless, she recommended that there be indirect contact by way of a letter once per year, to the children, which should be stored by their mother in a safe place, “until such a time that they are able to read his letters”. The Cafcass Officer had not revisited her report during the course of the intervening delay, nor had anyone requested her to. 15.On the 30th November 2022, F’s solicitors contacted my clerk, informing me that “the parties are in the process of preparing a consent order to adjourn the final hearing”. The email went on to say that “we believe that the time estimate for the final hearing can also be reduced… as it is hoped that the parties are able to narrow down some of the remaining issues by consent. The agreed consent order will be with the Court at the earliest opportunity”. Reference was also made to the unavailability of M’s Counsel. Via my clerk, I responded immediately, refusing the application to adjourn. I regarded that application as, at very best, misconceived. The case remained in the list and a different Counsel was instructed for M. Mr Matthew Stott was able to prepare the case thoroughly and has presented M’s case with care, sensitivity and skill. If I may say so, Mr Julien Foster has provided similarly impressive representation for F. 16.I had noted that no application had been filed by either party for any order pursuant to Section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989. I therefore signalled, again via my clerk, that I should like the parties to consider it and address me upon it. On the morning of the hearing, the following protective provisions had been agreed between the parties. Additionally, there appeared to be a consensus as to indirect contact as recommended by the Cafcass Officer: