Case No. BV20D11362

71.I now turn to the second aspect, the assertion that post-separation endeavour is a good reason for departure from equality. Again, I have come to the conclusion that it is not. Perhaps inevitably, I take the view that some of the points raised above in relation to special contribution apply equally in relation to post-separation endeavour. 72.I propose to consider in turn the various situations where Mr Marks says that post-separation endeavour has been held to apply, before looking to see whether there are any other reasons for applying it in this case, as I take the view that Mr Marks’ list is not exhaustive.73.Some of the situations where post-separation endeavour might be a good reason to depart from equality do not apply in this case. There is no more to do to “harvest” the asset, as it has already been sold. There is no element of earn-out or lock in as, unlike some of the trading company executives, the Husband is no longer employed there. Third, there is no question that the Wife has already been bought out. That leaves two potential reasons raised by Mr Marks, namely undue delay or the development of a truly new venture. 74.Dealing first with delay, I am prepared to take the date of separation as being January 2019 for these purposes. The sale was completed on 30 September 2022, some three and three-quarter years later. I must, however, make the point that delay works both ways. The Husband could have petitioned for divorce earlier than the Wife did so. He did not. The Wife did so in June 2020. She issued her Form A only just over a month later. Thereafter, the case followed a relatively conventional path without undue delays, with a final hearing listed in April 2022. It could equally be said that it was extremely sensible to wait until the trading company had been sold, given that a sale had been planned for a long time. Significant injustice could have been done to one party or the other if the case had been heard before a sale. The final hearing in April 2022 did have to be adjourned until March 2023 but that was certainly not the fault of the Wife. The adjournment was caused by a combination of the failures of the product batches and the Husband’s ill-health. All in all, I am clear that there has not been sufficient delay in this case to justify invoking a post-separation endeavour departure from equality. In fairness, Mr Bishop did not press this ground. 75.I now turn to the nub of Mr Bishop’s argument, namely that there was a truly new venture that the Husband had created and developed since the breakdown of the marriage. I am clear that there was no such new venture. The trading company was a producer of the product during the marriage and it, the company, was sold as a producer of the product. I accept entirely that the purchaser may well have viewed the product as a potentially vital component in specialised therapy, but it was the product they wanted. As the Press Release says UK-based, the trading company is a leader in the field of solutions using the product as well as being “a highly innovative and profitable company”. It goes on to say that the product is a critical component in the manufacture of innovative products, particularly for modalities such as specialised therapies and vaccines. It is not the Husband, however, who has developed new ground breaking specialised therapies. It will be the scientists at the purchaser, or other competitors, who, hopefully, will do so. It is not certain that the product will be essential to these therapies, but, if it is, the trading company will just be the producers of the product, not the producers of the specialised therapy. I have said that I am prepared to accept that the Husband first sent the trading company in this direction but, even then, the work was done by others, such as Mr M, from whom I have not heard. The purchaser, for whatever reason, did not think that the Husband was sufficiently crucial for him to be kept on after the takeover. Finally, in this regard, it seems inconceivable that a company like the purchaser would not have identified the potential of the use of the product in specialised therapy themselves, even if the Husband had not done so. If the purchaser had then attempted to buy the company on the cheap, it would have been for the investment bankers to work out why a company like the purchaser would be interested. I am confident they would have done so. The new laboratory may have assisted to a certain extent, but it is inconceivable that the purchaser does not have such facilities many times over already, or at least the capability to do the work without constraint.76.I have indicated that I am not prepared to accept Mr Marks’ submission that his identified circumstances for establishing post-separation endeavour are exhaustive. I must therefore consider whether there are any other grounds for departure in this area. I am satisfied that the three other areas in which significant changes were made to the trading company after the MBO, namely closing the research and development department, renegotiating with Q Co and rebuilding the plant and machinery, were all conceived during the marriage. The second Q Co renegotiation did come later, but I do take the view that this was just the Husband’s job, for which he was very skilled and able. Thereafter, the Husband did point the company in the direction of specialised therapy, but he did not consider it sufficiently important to tell Mr Taylor. Moreover, in terms of his actual workload, he was working three days per week from 2019. From mid 2020, he was only working one day per week, after he handed over as CEO to Mr S. He frankly accepted that his health was inhibiting his performance during this period. Whilst I accept that post-separation endeavour does not require the person claiming it to have been working 100 hours per week in the business, it could certainly be said that the Husband’s hands were no longer on the tiller in this case. 77.Perhaps most importantly, the argument that he was trading his spouse’s undivided share is particularly relevant here. At the time of the MBO, their former matrimonial home had been charged to assist with the finance for the share purchase. The Wife thought everything they had was at stake, regardless of whether it actually was or not. They were sharing the risk. In the summer of 2021, this possibility became very real. The company could have failed with everything lost. The Wife was told she would have to go to “the Municipality”. I cannot ignore the dire warnings from both the Husband to the Wife direct and the Husband’s then solicitors to the Wife’s solicitors. If the company had been lost, the Wife would have been quite unable to say she should receive £16.5 million, namely one-half of the value of the business at the date of separation. There had been no ring fencing of that sum to protect her from disaster. The fact that the Husband suggested external consultants be brought in to solve the problem and avert disaster, cannot, in my view, enhance his share in such circumstances. Once the problem was solved, it appears that potential buyers were falling over themselves to acquire the business, so he cannot rely on the effort required or the responsibility incurred in the process of the sale. All in all, I conclude that any possible argument that he has in relation to post-separation endeavour fails. He has, for understandable reasons, concentrated on the new venture argument. I am quite clear that this argument, first raised substantively on 13 January 2023, fails. The business, as sold, was not a new venture. It remained first and foremost a producer of the product. It follows that the assets of the parties are to be divided equally. 78.I agree that the lump sum should be denominated in DKK. It should be based on the Husband’s figure of DKK 2,382,785,841 for the overall assets, as this figure takes into account his Nykredit loan, which undoubtedly exists. I do accept that it could be said that he has already incurred the costs of purchase of the property in Spain, whereas the Wife still has to buy her properties, but such arguments are de minimis in the context of this case. 79.There are a few consequential matters I must deal with briefly. I have divided the assets equally and the Husband is no longer working. It therefore follows that the children’s school fees should be paid by the parties equally. I do accept that there could still be a justification for a child periodical payments order based on the children being based with their mother but, in the circumstances of this case, I take the view that such an order would be wrong and I decline to so order. 80.In the case I did the week before I heard this case, I praised the lawyers in the case for the way in which it had been conducted. Not a cross-word had been said. I made the point that this was so refreshing for a judge. Exactly the same can be said in this case and I repeat my praise. I also make it clear that nothing more could have been said or done on behalf of either party, such was the very high quality of representation that they each had.