Protective Measures
Protective Measures
I therefore turn to consider the protective measures that have offered by the father in this case. His evidence is that he is impecunious and this limits the financial assistance that he can provide for the mother and child. He therefore offers:
$6,000 to meet the costs of the air fares and initial financial support on arrival; and
A continuation of child support in the sum of $224 per week.
The father is not able to offer separate accommodation, and says he is unable to move out of the property that he is currently renting so as to let the mother live there. However, he has identified a number of individuals who, he says, would be willing to provide accommodation for the mother within their home. He also points to the fact that as an Australian Citizen, the mother, upon returning to Australia would be able to make applications for benefits and financial support. It is also pointed out that the mother and D will both be entitled to free medical care (in the mother’s case for both physical and mental health) under the Australian health system.
The father offers other standard protective measures, including:
Not pursuing civil or criminal proceedings against the mother in relation to the abduction;
Not attending the airport on the mother’s return;
Not going within 200m of the mother’s address (save by agreement for contact); and
Without admissions, not to use or threaten violence against the mother or harass or pester her.
I have considered carefully the protective measures that have been offered by the father and have concluded that they do not adequately protect D against the risks that I have identified above.
The total sum that the father is able to make available to the mother is $6,000. There is a dispute between the parties as to the costs of flights, with the father pointing out that the flight can be cheaper if two stopovers are made. Given this will be a flight taken by a mother with mental health issues and a three year old child, I do not consider this is a realistic proposal. A sensible flight duration with a single stopover would in my view me more appropriate, and this would place the costs at around a minimum of $2,000 and in all likelihood rather more.
This would leave the mother with the weekly child support and lump sum of perhaps $3,000 to $3,500 to meet accommodation and other costs for the period until she was able to obtain access to state benefits in Australia, I have no evidence as to how long such a process may take, but it seems unlikely that the process would be immediate.
I do not consider the accommodation proposals put forward by the father to be realistic. Little or no detail has been provided about the individuals with whom he proposes the mother should live or the accommodation that they can provide and in some instances the mother does not event know who they are. Dr McDermott did not consider that it would be appropriate to require the mother (given her anxieties and diagnoses) to stay with friends of the father, and I share this concern.
As such, the limited funds that would remain after the air fares have been purchased would need to be used in obtaining short term accommodation. It is far from clear that these funds would be sufficient to meet the mother’s needs, even until the first hearing of proceedings relating to D before the Australian court or until the mother was able to obtain state benefits. As Dr McDermott indicated, without adequate housing and adequate financial resources, the mother’s mental state would be likely to deteriorate further and rapidly.
Equally, it is unclear how long it would take for the mother to be able to obtain access to appropriate mental health services. I note that Dr McDermott considered that it would be “crucial” for the mother to have immediate access to proper support, and she identified that a deterioration in the mother’s condition was likely to cause her to withdraw, making it less likely that she would seek it.
For the father, Mr Crosthwaite sought to argue that the court should not seek to impose a barrier that would prevent an impecunious applicant who could not afford to pay for accommodation for a returning parent from obtaining a return order. I am clear that I am not doing so. In other cases an offer of accommodation from a friend or relative might suffice to remove the risks to the child that the court had identified in that case. However, here I am looking at the specific risks that are posed to D as a result of his mother’s mental health condition as identified by Dr McDermott. On the specific facts of this case I am not satisfied that the accommodation offered by the father, the limited financial support that he proposes or the need for the mother to obtain and rely on state benefits are adequate to meet the risks that I have identified above.
As to the risk of the mother and child being exposed to further domestic violence, the fact that it is not suggested that the parents should live in the same household and that D would be living with his mother, would reduce the risk of such incidents occurring. Mr Evans sought to argue that comments made by the father in text messages that he would not abide by the mother’s “made up rules” meant that he would simply not abide by the DVPO. I do not accept that this was the meaning of these texts, which I consider were referring to conditions that the mother was seeking to impose in relation to contact.
In any event, I consider that the undertakings offered by the father, coupled with the remedies available to the mother before the Australian courts for a breach of DVPO means that the mother and child could be protected against these risks for so long as the mother herself remains in Australia. I recognise that the mother has lived in Australia for some period of time and has in the past sought to bring a complaint about a breach of the DVPO to the attention of the police.
However, I am concerned about the practical situation which could arise should the mother wish to return to the UK to visit her mother. In those circumstances, the father proposes that D should be returned to his care. Of course, I have no doubt that the Australian courts will act promptly to protect D’s welfare, but am concerned that the mother could still be placed in the invidious position of having to choose between returning to the UK to see her mother and placing D in the father’s care for a significant period of time in circumstances where the domestic abuse allegations have not been properly tested before any court, but there is prima facie evidence (from both parties) that D has previously witnessed at least one violent incident.
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