[2025] EWHC 1254 (Fam)

It is helpful to begin with the judgment of Bodey J dealing with his reasons for making a periodical payments order on 1 March 2013 in the annual sum of £ 204, 000 adjusted annually for inflation (“index linked” – see paragraph 98 (4) and see the formulation at paragraph 9 of the order of 1 March 2013)). Bodey J spelt out his reasons at paragraphs 88 to 93. I have studied them. He was careful to ensure the Applicant was not provided for as if she were a former wife of the Respondent. Bodey J was characteristically careful to alight on an annual budget focused on the Child’s needs and the mother’s role in being the principal carer, appropriately calibrated to the enormous wealth of the Respondent, given he is a member of a very wealthy family. At paragraph 90 Bodey J scrutinised the Applicant’s then proposed budget and in particular he considered both a driver/bodyguard and holidays. He took the view a driver/bodyguard was not required and also significantly trimmed down the Applicant’s budget on holidays. Bodey J described the award as a “colossal” sum of money for a five year old.

I also remind myself that Bodey J gave careful consideration to the length of the periodical payment order. Paragraph 8 of his order deals with this. The periodical payment was ordered to be made until “ [the Child] attains the age of 18 years or, if later, [they] complete [their] full time education (including up to one academic ‘gap year’ between the completion of [their] secondary education and the commencement of [their] tertiary education) to the end of a first undergraduate degree or equivalent or further order.” No party seeks to vary the length of the order, only the amount. It follows that Bodey J carefully scrutinised the periodical payments for the period of school education, the gap year and during university years. He did not vary the quantum of the orders. This seems to be entirely in keeping with the discretionary and broad brush nature of the periodical payment award, having appropriate regard to the wealth of the Respondent.

On 11 December 2013, Bodey dismissed an application by the Applicant to vary the quantum of the periodical payments award.

The periodical payment orders were the subject of an appeal heard on 7 November 2014. Macur LJ (with the agreement of Lewison LJ and Sir Stanley Burnton) dismissed the appeal. Macur LJ set out her reasons for dismissing the challenge to the periodical payment order at paragraphs 31-33. She noted the judge’s “faultless” exercise of his discretion. Lewison LJ conclude the award was very generous but did not interfere in the exercise of Bodey J’s discretion.

I remind myself that I am looking at matters afresh in 2025. I must have regard to all the circumstances of the case. The periodical payment now stands at £ 283, 733 per annum. I remind myself that school and university fees, a car and property repairs etc are all additionally provided for in the order of Bodey J. I note the terms of the statute do not require the court to find any change of circumstances. I am not bound to find a change of circumstances from March or December 2013 to May 2025. Rather I must look at all the circumstances and exercise my discretion on the evidence presented to the court in May 2025.

Since 2013, the Child has grown up and their circumstances have evolved with their developing age. However, their relevant circumstances have changed very little. The Child lives in the property Bodey J arranged at the trust property and lives with the Applicant mother. As Bodey J anticipated the Child is at school, will take a gap year and will likely attend university. I detect nothing in the Applicant’s or Respondent’s evidence that the Child’s mother’s caring role has changed. Rather it has simply evolved as Bodey J would have anticipated. It seems to me wrong to conclude that because the Child is seventeen, the mother’s caring role has very significantly diminished. That is not her evidence and indeed she seeks an increase in the periodical payment and refutes the Respondent’s application her role qua carer has reduced. The Respondent’s evidence is not focused on the Child and their needs as a seventeen year old and how the Applicant mother meets her child’s needs as a caring mother. The Respondent’s evidence tells me nothing or very little about the Applicant’s caring role. I am not prepared to assume just because the Child is seventeen, and is almost an adult, that it follows the Applicant mother’s caring role is very much reduced. I have almost no evidence of the Child’s emotional state or dependence on the mother. I note Ms Pollock’s evidence is that a gap year: “is usually considered part of the …… experience that [the Child] learns to stand on [their] own two feet.” With respect to Ms Pollock, she knows nothing or very little about the Child and their relationship with the mother as their carer. For example, I do not know whether the Child will become homesick (albeit they are a weekly boarder) if travelling alone on the other side of the world. I do not know if they will need to regularly see their mother and as a result she will plan to meet them at regular and frequent intervals. The Respondent’s written evidence, through his solicitor, is speculation and not rooted in the Child and their needs.

Neither party has presented any proper evidence about the Child and their needs as a seventeen year old young person and their relationship with their mother and her role as the ‘carer’. The Child, as a young person, is almost invisible in the evidence. That is how the parents have chosen to present their cases. I draw the inference that much of the mother’s motivation in pursuing the application is driven by her own financial interest. I also draw the inference that the Respondent does not really know the Child and the relationship with the mother but has, understandably enough, taken the opportunity to reduce the payments in response to the Applicant’s application. This is the background context, but my task remains to consider the applications and to assess all the circumstances to consider whether the payments should be varied up or down for the reasons suggested by the parties. I must adopt that principled approach to each application.

The mother’s request for an increase is driven by: (i) security; (ii) the need for a driver; and (iii) increased holidays. I have considered the totality of the evidence and there is no evidence to demonstrate the order of Bodey J is insufficient to meet the Applicant’s role qua carer to her seventeen year old child. I find there is no evidence that demonstrates either the Child or the mother need a bodyguard or other further security measures which require expenditure. There is no evidence from the Child’s school that their safety is at risk. The mother’s written and oral evidence falls well short of demonstrating this, on the balance of probabilities. She told me in evidence there had been seven attempts on her life in the last few months and all had been reported and all were being investigated by the Metropolitan police. There is no objective contemporaneous evidence to support this. Much like Bodey J concluded twelve years ago, it may be the case the Applicant believes these ‘attacks’ have happened, but I conclude she has not discharged the burden that is on her to demonstrate this and thereby demonstrate the need for payments to be increased to provide for security. There is no need therefore to increase the payment to provide for security.

The Child is a weekly boarder. The mother’s evidence is that she cannot drive because of a recent knee procedure. I was not addressed on the issue of whether the Child has a driving licence or soon wishes to obtain one. The Child does not require a driver for ‘emotional support’ as the mother suggested. Nor does the Child and/or the mother as carer, require a full time driver. The award made by Bodey J fully and generously covers the cost of taxis or occasional drivers. If transport by applications like Uber is also required, this too can easily be met by the generous 2013 award. There is no requirement to increase it for a full time driver.

Mr Glaser took the court to the Applicant’s evidence on holidays and submits she has not been spending the money on holidays for the Child. The Applicant states she forgot to include some holidays in the list provided in her evidence. She also seeks a payment of £ 750, 000 for the gap year. I have no doubt the generous Bodey J award more than covers the appropriate level of a periodical payment, now, on the gap year and at university. The sum claimed for a gap year is an incredible one. Looking at all the circumstances and having particularly in mind the Respondent’s wealth and his likely luxurious travel, I conclude the 2013 award continues to meet the relevant needs for travel and holidays and need not be varied.

Those are my reasons for dismissing the Applicant’s application for a variation upwards.

The Respondent applies to reduce the periodical payments. I have firmly in mind what was said by Mostyn J in Collardeau-Fuchs at paragraph 129 (c) and that the periodical payments must not include an element directly personal to the mother without reference to her role as a carer of the child (or young adult in education). Peel J rightly observed in Y v Z that in the exercise of the discretion it is not always easy to draw a bright line between budgets for discharge of the caring role and purely personal budgets for the claiming parent.

Chief amongst the Respondent’s reasons for a reduction is the fact the mother married. She gave evidence she married her husband in an Islamic ceremony in 2023 and they separated in 2024. She was given a car and £ 360, 000. This is her personal money and need not be used to care for her child. I must, however, have regard to her financial resources. I have done so. The Applicant’s overall evidence nonetheless is that she requires an uplift. Whilst I have rejected that application, I have the Child’s welfare firmly in mind and do not consider after having regard to this brief marriage and the money provided to the Applicant that the periodical payment should be reduced for the 5-6 years that the periodical payments will likely continue. The marriage is over and the financial resources this provided have stopped. It would be wrong for the Child’s future welfare to be disadvantaged going forward simply because of the financial benefits of this short marriage. The Respondent also submits the mother can obtain employment. Her evidence is that she has a business but it is not financially successful. I have had regard to the fact she could earn, but having regard to all the circumstances and the Child’s welfare, I conclude the Respondent has not made out the case the award should be reduced for this reason. There is nothing to suggest Bodey J did not have the Applicant’s future ability to obtain employment in mind. The award is a very generous one, but this has already been upheld on appeal. The mother’s business may in the future make profits. Furthermore, the Child may be impacted by pressures on the mother and overall exercising my discretion with the Child’s welfare in mind the Respondent has not made out a case the award should be varied.

Secondly the Respondent submits the monies have not been spent on holidays and much of the money has not been spent generally. The Applicant says she forgot to add certain further short holidays. Mr Glaser invites to conclude this is untrue. I give the benefit of the doubt to the Applicant that she may have failed to list some holidays that have taken place, in the context of the fairly disorganised presentation of her evidence and case generally. The Child is likely to want to travel more as they become more independent and wishes to explore with developing age. It would be wrong to reduce the periodical payments now.

I have Mr Glaser’s helpful spreadsheet which contains a comparative analysis of three budgets. First, the Applicant’s proposed budget (which I have dismissed) which amounts to an annual sum of £ 1, 070, 617 (Applicant and household £ 674, 631 and £ 395, 986 for the Child). Second, the Respondent’s reduced budget proposal of £ 138, 000 (applicant and household on £ 81, 000 and the Child £ 32, 000). Thirdly is the Respondent’s analysis of the 12 months of disclosure which was ordered by the court based on the Applicant’s bank statements. This amounts to £ 231, 703 in total with £ 185, 048 spent on the Applicant and household and £ 46, 665 spent on the Child.

It is also on this basis, that the Respondent seeks a reduction. I am however cautious about using the one year snapshot to make important decisions for the Child and the household over the next five to six years. I am not suggesting further disclosure is required, but a 12 month snapshot is just that. The snapshot is not the firmest prediction of needs going forward. The £ 231, 703 is not far from the Bodey J order. In any event, the Applicant’s evidence was that her then husband provided her with cash and this was used to pay for various things, including holidays. Therefore, paying due regard to the expenditure analysis as part and parcel of all the circumstance, the spreadsheet budget does not persuade me the order should be varied.

Although Mr Glaser has logically broken down the future payments into distinct periods: school; gap year and university, I am not persuaded the Respondent has demonstrated the carer’s allowance should be reduced as is proposed for those three periods, or at all. First, Bodey J carefully considered these matters and considered (and predicted) the future life path of the Child. Secondly, the Respondent has no proper evidence of the Applicant’s current or future predicted caring role. The Applicant’s role in caring for the Child, the 17 year old school child; the 18 year old gap year traveller and the 20 year old university student, has not been identified in the evidence to justify a variation of the periodical payment. I reject the contention that the Child’s mother’s caring role can be so easily compartmentalised and identified through her bank statements. To take such a short cut would be to underplay the importance of the Child’s welfare in the overall discretionary exercise having regard to all the circumstances in 2025. For these reasons I reject the Respondent’s application for a variation of the Bodey J order.