[2025] EWHC 1254 (Fam)

An order under sub-paragraph (2)(a) or (b) may be varied or discharged by a subsequent order made on the application of any person by or to whom payments were required to be made under the previous order.

In deciding whether to exercise its powers under paragraph 1 or 2, and if so in what manner, the court shall have regard to all the circumstances including—

the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each person mentioned in sub-paragraph (4) has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each person mentioned in sub-paragraph (4) has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

the financial needs of the child;

the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources of the child;

any physical or mental disability of the child;

the manner in which the child was being, or was expected to be, educated or trained.

6(1) In exercising its powers under paragraph 1 or 2 to vary or discharge an order for the making or securing of periodical payments the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any change in any of the matters to which the court was required to have regard when making the order.

The power of the court under paragraph 1 or 2 to vary an order for the making or securing of periodical payments shall include power to suspend any provision of the order temporarily and to revive any provision so suspended.

Where on an application under paragraph 1 or 2 for the variation or discharge of an order for the making or securing of periodical payments the court varies the payments required to be made under that order, the court may provide that the payments as so varied shall be made from such date as the court may specify, except that, subject to sub-paragraph (9), the date shall not be] earlier than the date of the making of the application.

The first claim is that of HRH pursuant to Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989.

It has, in many respects, been overtaken by the claim HRH makes pursuant to

Part III of the 1984 Act, so I need only deal with it briefly. Section 1(2) gives

the court power to make financial orders by way of periodical payments,

secured periodical payments, lump sums, settlement of property orders, or

transfer of property orders but, in each case, the payment or transfer is to be

either to the child himself/herself or to the applicant for the benefit of the child.

Section 1(5) permits the court to make further orders for periodical payments,

secured periodical payments or lump sums, at any time if the child has not

reached the age of 18. Whilst orders normally end on either the child’s 17th or

18th birthdays, this does not apply, pursuant to s3(2), if the child continues in

education or there are special circumstances which justify the making of an

order thereafter. Whilst an order shall, in general, cease to have effect on the

death of the person liable to make the payments, this is not the case with a

secured periodical payments order. The matters the court is to have regard to in deciding whether to exercise its powers and, if so, how to do so, are set out in s4. The court shall have regard to all the circumstances, including:-

The financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which (each

The financial needs of the child;

Any physical or mental disability of the child; and

The manner in which the child was being, or was expected to be

There are three points of law arising. The first is that the court has, repeatedly,

permitted a personal allowance for a caring parent in assessing the quantum

of periodical payments orders. This started with cases such as Haroutunian v

Jennings (1980) 1 FLR 62 but has more recently been endorsed by the Court

of Appeal in Re P (Child: Financial Provision) [2003] EWCA Civ 837….”

When determining a child maintenance application, the welfare of the child must be a constant influence.

A child maintenance award can extend beyond the direct expenses of the children. It can additionally meet the expenses of the mother’s household, to the extent that the mother cannot cover, or contribute to, those expenses from her own means. Such an award might be referred to as a Household Expenditure Child Support Award (‘a HECSA’). The essential principle is that it is permissible to support the child by supporting the mother.

But a HECSA cannot meet those expenses of the mother which are directly personal to her and have no reference to her role as carer of the child. An example is a subscription to a nightclub. However, the award can meet the expenses of the mother which are personal to her provided that they are connected to her role as a carer. Examples are the provision of a car or designer clothing.

The reasonable level of the mother’s household expenses should be judged by reference not only to the present standard of living of the respondent but also, if applicable, to the standard of living enjoyed by the family prior to the breakdown of the relationship. The object of a HECSA is not to replicate either such standard, but to ensure that the child’s circumstances “bears some sort of relationship” to them. The standard of living in the parties’ home prior to the breakdown of the relationship is “as good a baseline” as any other.

(As will be seen, Moor J in the later Maktoum case, expressed the test as being that the children should be entitled to a lifestyle that is “not entirely out of kilter” with that enjoyed by them before the breakdown of the marriage, and that currently enjoyed by the father and his family).

The HECSA must be set at such a level that the mother is not burdened by unnecessary financial anxiety.

When assessing the mother’s budget, the court should paint with a broad brush and not get bogged down in detailed analyses. Rather, the court should achieve a fair and realistic outcome by the application of broad common-sense to the overall circumstances of the particular case.”

ix) Child maintenance can be interpreted sufficiently broadly to include elements referable to the claimant in his/her capacity as the child's carer; Re P (supra) at paras 48-49. For many years this proposition, or concept, was known as the carer's allowance. More recently, at para 129 of Fuchs (supra) Mostyn J has suggested referring to it as a Household Expenditure Child Support Award [HECSA]. Whatever terminology is applied, the principle is clear, although its application is highly discretionary. It is not always easy to draw a bright line between budgetary items to which the claimant has no entitlement as being exclusively personal to him/her, and personal items which may reasonably be claimed as being necessary to discharge the carer's duties, including items which help sustain the carer's physical/emotional welfare; Re P (supra) at para 81. The court "… has to guard against unreasonable claims made on the child's behalf but with the disguised element of providing for the mother's benefit rather than for the child"; J v C (supra) at 159H.