ZZ21D58773 - [2025] EWHC 1659 (Fam)

I must have at the forefront of my mind the section 25 factors and my primary consideration, the parties’ youngest child. In this case, it will be of no utility to run through those factors. My view is that an award which leaves W with about 43% of the total assets and about 40% of the assets created by the LM project is a fair result which appraises the post separation accrual holistically and comfortably meets both parties’ needs.

So, my order on a clean break basis (deferred until payment of the lump sums, but with interim provision ending immediately) will be as follows:

This will give W a total of £13,103,256 which is about 43% of the total assets. Deducting her housing at £3,395,000, the award gives her £9,708,256 in free funds. I have no hesitation in finding that such a sum will meet her needs. H will have £17,368,302 from which he will have to meet £410,678 in penalties and interest on the tax liability. I have no doubt this will meet his needs and represents a fair solution to this case taking into account all issues, to which I have alluded, holistically.

The contractual documents with the private equity firm make it clear that the further LM payment will be paid to H in October 2025. No contingencies are identified. The private equity firm is a successful international business. There is no doubt in my mind that the money will be paid. I do not consider it appropriate for W to share in the potential risk (which I find is very low) that some or all of the money will not be paid. I have found many deficiencies in H’s approach to this litigation, and I do not consider it appropriate that W should share in the risk created by H’s decisions to make no provision for tax and to deploy the money received from the first payment as he sought fit. In a different case, I might have considered contingent reverse lump sums but I do not consider such a course appropriate in this case. H has sought to obscure the truth and has made evaluating the assets in this case incredibly difficult. I have to a very large extent erred in his favour in my approach to the value of DEF where he has prevented any proper investigation into its true current value.

Mr Molyneux KC has asked for clarification of the nature of the lump sum payment to be made by 31 October 2025 and invites me to make it a lump sum payment amenable to variation. He posits delay in respect of payment of the further LM monies or the possibility that the amount paid will be less then I have found. I do not consider that quantum should be variable but I do accept that timing should be variable. Therefore, the order should be framed to describe the transfer of H’s interest in the escrow account as a lump sum instalment so that both it and the October lump sum can be described as one lump sum by instalments. However, the order should carry a recital recording my intention that I would expect any application to vary the lump sum to be limited to timing only.

As to other matters:

At the conclusion of submissions, I asked the parties if they would want me to give an indication as to costs to avoid an additional hearing. I made it clear that any indication I would give would be preliminary and that I would accept further submissions if my guidance was not accepted.

My preliminary view will come as no surprise. I have made serious findings about H’s approach to this case and his behaviour during the litigation. Ordinarily, I would be minded to say that H should pay 50% of W’s costs. However, W pursued a hopeless conduct case. My view is that H should pay 1/3 of W’s costs as set out in Form H1. This amounts to £250,000. I am minded to defer payment of this sum until 31 October 2025 on the basis that the majority of H’s current liquidity is earmarked for other provision for W.

That is my judgment and preliminary view on costs.