TC09681 - [2025] UKFTT 01333 (TC)
First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)

TC09681 - [2025] UKFTT 01333 (TC)

Fecha: 10-Nov-2025

Issue 1 - was Moir a “promoter” of “notifiable arrangements” as defined by sections 306 and 307 FA 2004 ?

Issue 1 - was Moir a “promoter” of “notifiable arrangements” as defined by sections 306 and 307 FA 2004?

71.

It is necessary to set out the relevant legislation in some detail to understand what is meant by “promoter” and by “notifiable arrangement”. The legislation requires the reader to work through a number of definitions, applying those to the relevant facts, before returning to consider whether there are “notifiable arrangements” as defined in Section 306 FA 2004, and whether Moir is a “promoter” as defined in Section 307 FA 2004.

72.

The starting point is Section 307 FA 2004, which provides:

307 Meaning of “promoter” 

(1)

For the purposes of this Part a person is a promoter—

(a)

in relation to a notifiable proposal, if, in the course of a relevant business, the person (“P”)—

(i)

is to any extent responsible for the design of the proposed arrangements,

(ii)

makes a firm approach to another person (“C”) in relation to the notifiable proposal with a view to P making the notifiable proposal available for implementation by C or any other person, or

(iii)

makes the notifiable proposal available for implementation by other persons, and

(b)

in relation to notifiable arrangements, if he is by virtue of paragraph (a)(ii) or (iii) a promoter in relation to a notifiable proposal which is implemented by those arrangements or if, in the course of a relevant business, he is to any extent responsible for—

(i)

the design of the arrangements, or

(ii)

the organisation or management of the arrangements.

(1A)  For the purposes of this Part a person is an introducer in relation to a notifiable proposal if the person makes a marketing contact with another person in relation to the notifiable proposal.

(2)

In this section “relevant business”  means any trade, profession or business which—

(a)

involves the provision to other persons of services relating to taxation…

73.

Thus there must be “notifiable arrangements” or a “notifiable proposal”, for a person to be a “promoter” in relation to them. The meaning of “notifiable arrangements” and “notifiable proposal” is set out in Section 306 which provides:

306 Meaning of “notifiable arrangements” and “notifiable proposal”

(1)

In this Part “notifiable arrangements”  means any arrangements which—

(a)

fall within any description prescribed by the Treasury by regulations,

(b)

enable, or might be expected to enable, any person to obtain an advantage in relation to any tax that is so prescribed in relation to arrangements of that description, and

(c)

are such that the main benefit, or one of the main benefits, that might be expected to arise from the arrangements is the obtaining of that advantage.

74.

The Tax Avoidance Schemes (Prescribed Description of Arrangements) Regulations 2006/1543 were made under the power in Section 306(1) FA 2004, and came into force from 1 August 2006. Regulation 5 sets out the arrangements which are prescribed. It provides:

5.— Prescribed descriptions of arrangements

(1)

The following arrangements are prescribed for the purposes of Part 7 of the FA 2004 (disclosure of tax avoidance schemes)—

(a)

in relation to income tax, corporation tax and capital gains tax, any arrangements which fall within any description specified in a provision of these Regulations listed in paragraph (2);

(2)

The provisions are—

(c)

regulation 8 (description 3: premium fee);

(e)

regulation 10 (description 5: standardised tax products);

(h)

regulation 18 (description 8: employment income provided through third parties);

75.

Therefore, if the arrangements under consideration here fall within any one of the descriptions specified, they will be “notifiable arrangements”. HMRC argue that the provisions of Regulations 8, 10 and 18 apply to the arrangements here.

76.

Regulation 8 provides:

8.— Description 3: Premium Fee

(1)

Arrangements are prescribed if they are such that it might reasonably be expected that a promoter or a person connected with a promoter of arrangements that are the same as, or substantially similar to, the arrangements in question, would, but for the requirements of these Regulations, be able to obtain a premium fee from a person experienced in receiving services of the type being provided.  But arrangements are not prescribed by this regulation if—

(a)

no person is a promoter in relation to them; and

(b)

the tax advantage which may be obtained under the arrangements is intended to be obtained by an individual or a business which is a small or medium-sized enterprise.

(2)

For the purposes of paragraph (1), and in relation to any arrangements, a “premium fee” is a fee chargeable by virtue of any element of the arrangements (including the way in which they are structured) from which the tax advantage expected to be obtained arises, and which is—

(a)

to a significant extent attributable to that tax advantage, or

(b)

to any extent contingent upon the obtaining of that tax advantage as a matter of law. 

77.

Regulation 8 is widely drafted so either a promotor or a person connected with a promoter would be able to obtain a premium fee. A premium fee is a fee that is attributable to, or contingent upon, an advantage in relation to any tax that might be expected as a main benefit of the arrangements.

78.

I consider first whether an advantage in relation to tax might be expected as a main benefit from the arrangements. HMRC submit that this is the case, and point to Moir’s admission that there is an “incidental” tax advantage to the annuity model arrangements.

79.

As HMRC note, Moir have accepted that some tax advantage was intended to be obtained from the annuity solution. Given emails such as Moir’s email of 2 May 2018 to Individual SH (set out above) it would be extremely difficult for Moir to deny that any advantage in relation to tax might be expected from the arrangements.

80.

In their correspondence of 27 February 2023 to HMRC, Moir set out what they argue is the purpose of the arrangements:

The arrangements are in place to benefit the employees or “users” as you refer to them in your letter. You have seen in the evidence of the 9 employees above that all of them, with the one exception are on the financial breadline and have either low bank balances or overdrawn the majority if not all the time in some cases. It is therefore a fact that [Moir] assists these workers with their cashflow – or in layman’s terms offers assistance to ordinary people – many who provide essential services to the NHS who itself if cash restricted. To suggest [Moir] is doing a public service would perhaps be going a bit too far – but nevertheless it can not be denied that the real purpose here is to provide cashflow assistance in workers payroll. Granted, that these workers are obtaining a tax advantage while using the arrangements too.

As stated above the real purpose of the arrangements is to assists ordinary people make ends meet and enhance their already devasted cashflow positions. That is the main benefit of the arrangement while it is acknowledged that a tax advantage is also enjoyed – but that is purely incidental and not deliberate. Certainly, and unequivocally, not the main benefit of the arrangements.

81.

I have considered Moir’s argument that the “real purpose of the arrangements” was to provide a cash-flow advantage for individuals. However, I have been unable to find any reference to such purpose in the correspondence between Moir and individuals in the bundle. If enhanced cash-flow was the main purpose of Moir’s annuity solution then it is peculiar that Moir did not mention this to individuals when explaining how their arrangements worked. In addition, having considered the bank statements showing the dates on which individuals were paid under the annuity solution, it is difficult to see what Moir thought was the cash-flow advantage gained by any of the individuals who used the annuity solution model. As Moir explained in its email of 2 May 2018 to Individual SH:

The annuity portion is usually paid to you 24 hours after fees are received from your client/agency. However, your base salary is paid on the same day.

82.

An arrangement which resulted in payment of a small amount on one day but with a delay of a further working day for payment of a larger amount, would not have resulted in a cash-flow advantage. Having to wait a further working day would not have assisted any individuals who were on the “breadline”. While those individuals would receive a larger amount overall (because Jarvis did not deduct the tax that would have been required to be deducted if the second payment had been accepted to be salary) the delay in receiving the majority of the sum due would disadvantage any individual worker who required “cashflow assistance”.

83.

Having considered all of the documents in the bundle, and the many references by Moir to acting “in the most tax efficient way possible” and being able to use “tax relief” to maximise the percentage of the gross salary that was retained by an individual, I am satisfied that one of the main benefits (if not the main benefit) that might be expected to arise from the annuity arrangements set out above was the obtaining of a tax advantage.

84.

I look now at whether there was a “premium fee”, that is a fee which was attributable to, or contingent upon, the tax advantage that I am satisfied was expected to be brought about by the annuity arrangements. In HMRC v Hyrax Resourcing Ltd & Ors [2019] UKFTT 63 (TC), Judge Mosedale stated:

214.

It seems to me to be obvious that Hyrax was able to take a cut from the gross fee paid for the scheme user’s services; its ability to take a percentage of the gross payment is evidence that, instead of a cut, it would have been able to obtain a fee. Whether paid the same amount as a percentage of the gross earnings or as fee, the cut or fee are economically the same to a middleman, as Hyrax was; the fact it was actually able to earn an amount economically the same as a fee is good evidence that it might be reasonably expected that a promoter of substantially similar arrangements would be able to obtain a fee from the arrangements.

85.

HMRC argue in their submissions that Moir (or Jarvis) was able to take 12-14% of the amounts paid through the arrangements, and that this percentage is “economically equivalent to a fee”. I agree with HMRC that a percentage payment is equivalent to a fee payment, and that what is relevant is whether Moir or Jarvis is able to earn an amount economically the same as a premium fee which is attributable to the intended tax advantage or contingent upon the obtaining of that tax advantage.

86.

In their correspondence of 27 February 2025 to HMRC, Moir state:

… it has not been proven that a fee has been deducted (save a few exceptions where a £26 per week margin has been applied and shown on the various payslips).

We note you have deduced [individual CMN] must have paid a fee of 12%! You also conclude that a premium fee is proven by virtue of the fact that the fee is dependent on the level of “income” as opposed to the amount of work carried out (the old fashioned time and material basis). The modern way accountants bill is in fact fixed fees, as opposed to T&M as the admin to support this is colossal. As a derivative of this pricing model Moir used a fair and transparent policy of charging a percentage of income simply because the £26 fixed fee was insufficient to cover its overheads and was often abused by workers trying it on by consolidating timesheets – hence why the percentage was introduced.

87.

Although Moir appear shocked by HMRC’s suggestion that individual CMN paid a fee of 12%, the illustrations that Moir provided to individuals, detailed above, show that Jarvis proposed deducting a management fee of 13.75% to individual SE and a fee (for management and insurance combined) of approximately 14.33% for individual SH, and of approximately 15% for individual CKC.

88.

Moir has referred to a fixed fee of £26 being insufficient to cover its overheads. This fee appears in the three Moir payslip illustrations provided to individual JE, apparently to illustrate the traditional PAYE model, and two payslips for individual CKC which Moir provided as enclosures to its letter to HMRC dated 27 February 2023. Towards the end of the bundle there are also payslips for KM, LB and EA-S, who were employees of Moir. Those payslips demonstrate Moir’s traditional PAYE model rather than the annuity model operated via Jarvis.

89.

In respect of the annuity model, there are no payslips or illustrations which show a fixed fee (of £26 or otherwise). Jarvis was entitled to charge its fee for the annuity arrangements as a percentage of the gross fee for the individual’s services payable by the end-client. However, I am satisfied that a percentage fee which was as large as 13.75% of gross fee for services was possible under the annuity model only because such a small amount of tax had been deducted from the two payments made to the individuals. Realistically, no prospective individual user of Moir’s traditional umbrella model would have agreed that Moir should deduct 13.75% of their gross salary as payment for Moir’s services, in addition to the deduction of tax and NICs.

90.

In Hyrax, Judge Mosedale also stated:

221.

Hyrax’s cut was a % of the gross contract value of the contract for the scheme user’s services. The greater the contract value, the greater the expected tax saving (as tax is a % of earnings), and therefore Hyrax’ cut increased in line with the expected tax saving. It was clearly charged as a % of the contract value (and therefore the expected tax saving) and did not reflect the amount of work involved: the evidence indicated that the work carried out by Hyrax would be roughly equivalent for all scheme users. But the charges would depend on the contract value.

222.

It seems fair to say that the charge was to a significant extent attributable to the expected tax advantage as there is no other way of explaining why it would be charged as a % of the contract value; Hyrax was in effect splitting the expected tax saving with its scheme user. In conclusion, I find that a promoter of substantially similar arrangements would be able to obtain a premium fee.

91.

I reach a similar conclusion here: Moir and/or Jarvis split the expected tax saving with the individual user. I am satisfied that the percentage fee which Jarvis deducted was attributable to (or contingent upon) the tax advantage expected to be brought about by the annuity solution offered by Moir.

92.

The final part of Regulation 8 to consider is whether Moir or Jarvis could expect to obtain a premium fee “from a person experienced in receiving services of the type being provided”. All of the individuals who used the annuity model did, in fact, pay the significantly higher percentage fee for use of that model, and so I am satisfied such a fee could be expected to be obtained from persons using Moir and/or Jarvis for the umbrella arrangements.

93.

Therefore, I am satisfied that there was a premium fee, and that Regulation 8 applies to the arrangements under consideration here.

94.

Having reached this conclusion, it is not strictly necessary to consider Regulation 10 or 18, and so I touch upon each of these only briefly.

95.

Regulation 10 provides:

10.— Description 5: standardised tax products

(1)

Subject to regulation 11, arrangements are prescribed if a promoter makes the arrangements available for implementation by more than one person and the conditions in paragraph (2) are met.

(2)

The conditions are that an informed observer (having studied the arrangements and having regard to all relevant circumstances) could reasonably be expected to conclude that—

(a)

the arrangements have standardised, or substantially standardised, documentation—

(i)

the purpose of which is to enable a person to implement the arrangements;

(ii)

the form of which is determined by the promoter; and

(iii)

the substance of which does not need to be tailored, to any material extent, to enable a person to implement the arrangements;

(b)

a person implementing the arrangements must enter into a specific transaction or series of specific transactions;

(c)

the transaction or series of transactions is standardised, or substantially standardised, in form; and

(d)

either the main purpose of the arrangements is to enable a person to obtain a tax advantage or the arrangements would be unlikely to be entered into but for the expectation of obtaining a tax advantage.

96.

In making their submissions, HMRC have argued that the FTT should consider the four stage test set out in Hyrax which summarises Regulation 10:

233.

… (i) was there substantially standardised documentation; (ii) was the purpose of such documentation to enable implementation by the client; (iii) and was its form determined by the promoter and (iv) not tailored to a material extent to reflect the circumstances of the client?

97.

HMRC’s submission is that the answer to each of these questions is yes. In its letter of 27 February 2023, Moir accepts that the arrangements used standard template contracts of employment, but it says that this was due to efficiency and to avoid discrimination. Having seen the documents in the bundle for nine sample individuals, I am satisfied that the documents used by both Jarvis and Moir were standardised, that the form of these documents was determined by Moir and/or Jarvis, that the documents did not need to be tailored to any material extent, and that the purpose of this standardisation was to enable Moir and Jarvis to implement the arrangements.

98.

I have already concluded that a main purpose of the arrangements is to enable a person to obtain a tax advantage. I am satisfied that Regulation 10 applies to the arrangements under consideration here.

99.

For the avoid of doubt, I have not ignored the fact that Regulation 10 is subject to Regulation 11. Although Moir has not argued that any of the exceptions in Regulation 11 apply, I have nevertheless considered Regulation 11, and I am satisfied that Regulation 11 does not apply to except the arrangements here from falling within Regulation 10.

100.

Regulation 18 provides:

18.— Description 8: Employment income provided through third parties

(1)

Arrangements are prescribed if—

(a)

Conditions 1 and 2 are met and Condition 3 is not met; or

(b)

Conditions 1, 2 and 3 are met and at least one of Conditions 4 and 5 is met.

(2)

Condition 1 is met if the arrangements involve at least one of the following—

(a)

a relevant third person taking a relevant step under section 554B;

(b)

any person taking a relevant step under section 554C or 554D; or

(c)

B taking a step under section 554Z18 or 554Z19.

(3)

Condition 2 is met if the main benefit, or one of the main benefits, of the arrangements is that an amount that would otherwise count as employment income under section 554Z2(1) is reduced or eliminated.

(4)

Condition 3 is met if, by reason of at least one of sections 554E to 554XA or regulations made under section 554Y, Chapter 2 of Part 7A does not apply.

(5)

Condition 4 is met if the arrangements involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps without which the main benefit in paragraph (3) would not be obtained.

(6)

Condition 5 is met if the arrangements involve—

(a)

a relevant step being treated as taking place; and

(b)

Chapter 2 of Part 7A applying as a consequence of sub-paragraph (a).

(7)

In this regulation—

(a)

references to sections or Parts are to those in ITEPA unless otherwise stated;

(b)

“B” has the meaning given for Part 7A by sections 554A(1)(a) and 554Z17(7) read together;

(c)

“contrived or abnormal” has the same meaning as in section 207 of the Finance Act 2013; and

(d)

“relevant third person” has the same meaning as in section 554A(7).

101.

Condition 1 involves the taking of a step. Moir appears to accept that this condition is met, and I am satisfied that this condition was satisfied when Jarvis entered into transactions and made payments to relevant individuals.

102.

Condition 2 is met if one of the main benefits is that an amount that would otherwise count as employment income under section 554Z2(1), is reduced or eliminated. While Moir has denied that a main benefit of the arrangements is the reduction of employment income, I do not agree. As Moir explained to individual JE on 1 April 2019:

A small portion of the fees received would be taxed as normal (£14,000 in the first example) - the remainder paid in the form of an annuity to mitigate the tax.

103.

I do not accept that individuals using the annuity model arrangements would agree to take a small “basic salary” unless they were satisfied that a large part of the remainder of the gross fees for their services would also be paid to them after that remainder of those fees had supposedly been converted into another form of payment. I am satisfied a main benefit of the arrangements is the reduction of employment income.

104.

HMRC argue that Condition 3 is not met as none of the exclusions in Sections 554E to 554XA apply. This aspect is not addressed by Moir. I am satisfied that HMRC are correct in their submissions, that Chapter 2 of Part 7A does apply and so Condition 3 is not met.

105.

That is sufficient for Regulation 18 to apply.

106.

If the arrangements that are the subject of this application are within any of Regulation 8, 10 or 18, then they are “notifiable arrangements”. I am satisfied all three of Regulations 8, 10 and 18 apply to the arrangements here. Having satisfied myself that the arrangements that are the subject of this application are “notifiable arrangements”, I can now return to Section 307 to consider whether Moir was a “promoter”.

107.

Moir has denied that it meets any of the conditions in Section 307(1)(a), and so denies that it is a promoter. Moir has not addressed Section 307(1)(b). I agree with HMRC that Section 307(1)(b)(ii) applies as, in the course of its business, Moir made the arrangements under consideration available for implementation and also organised and managed those arrangements.

108.

For Section 307(1)(b)(ii) to apply, Moir’s business must be a “relevant business”, and so it must be a business which involves the provision “of services relating to taxation”. HMRC’s submissions in this regard are the Moir’s services relate to taxation because Moir gives advice about the tax advantages of entering into its arrangements. I agree. I am satisfied that a service providing arrangements that structure employment income payments in a particular way in the expectation of obtaining a tax advantage from that structure, is a service relating to taxation.

109.

In addition, I have noted the declaration that individuals were required to sign on entering the annuity arrangements, which stated:

The information given to me is based upon leading Tax Counsel’s opinion of the relevant UK legislation and this opinion is regularly updated to ensure it remains compliant each time there is an update to the relevant legislation.

and:

Even though all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that the arrangement I am entering into achieves the objectives of the planning there can never be any guarantee that HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) won’t take a conflicting view to Tax Counsel in relation to the relevant legislation.

110.

This declaration also required an individual who received an enquiry letter from HMRC to notify that enquiry to Jarvis within 48 hours, and to use Jarvis’s advisers to provide that’s individual’s “defence”. Although that declaration was part of the agreements signed with Jarvis, once HMRC had begun their investigations some of the individuals who had engaged with Jarvis then contacted Moir. Moir advised Individual CKC that it had “a competent team of compliance and tax specialists who determine the best course of action”. I am satisfied, from the remarkably similar wording that unrelated individuals used in their responses to HMRC’s enquiries, that Moir provided advice to those individuals on the response that should be given. Advice on how to respond to an enquiry by HMRC could not be anything other than a service relating to taxation.

111.

After that lengthy consideration, I decide answer issue 1 in favour of HMRC. I am satisfied that Moir was a “promoter” of “notifiable arrangements” as defined by sections 306 and 307 FA 2004.